Presented by Olimpia Guidi and Sarah Kuipers
Human rights organisations and NGOs play a crucial role in monitoring the impact of sanctions on human rights and providing support to affected parties. 12
In addressing the impact of sanctions on rights, Russia has recourse to various international mechanisms. These include the United Nations (UN), which it can engage through the UN Security Council, leveraging its position as a permanent member to voice concerns and negotiate resolutions. 15 Additionally, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Russia can challenge trade-related sanctions that contravene WTO agreements through dispute settlement mechanisms. 16
Furthermore, Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe subjects it to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 17 Individuals or entities affected by sanctions can bring cases before the ECHR alleging violations of human rights protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. 18 Moreover, Russia could potentially utilise the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to challenge sanctions it believes violate international law or treaties. 19
However, ICJ jurisdiction requires the consent of all parties involved, posing limitations on its effectiveness. 20
Despite these avenues, the effectiveness of international mechanisms in safeguarding rights impacted by sanctions is subject to various limitations. Political considerations often hinder progress, with powerful actors reluctant to challenge one another’s actions. 21 Legal processes within these international bodies are typically time-consuming, offering delayed relief. 22 Enforcement of decisions and compliance by sanction-imposing countries can also be challenging. Furthermore, the scope of these mechanisms may not fully address the extraterritorial application of sanctions or their broader economic ramifications.
24A-Input_for_GA79_thematic_report_-_2024Photo by Frederic Köberl on Unsplash
References
12 Goncharenko, G., & Khadaroo, I. (2020). Disciplining human rights organisations through an accounting regulation: A case of the ‘foreign agents’ law in Russia. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 72, 102129. Available at:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S104523541930108X
15 Gifkins, J. (2021). Beyond the veto: Roles in UN Security Council decision-making. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 27(1), 1-24.
16 Gantvarg, I. (2023). Categorisation and Legality of Trade Sanctions Imposed on Russia: Examining Compatibility with WTO and UN Legislation.
17 Nelaeva, G. A., Khabarova, E. A., & Sidorova, N. V. (2020). Russia’s Relations with the European Court of Human Rights in the Aftermath of the Markin Decision: Debating the “Backlash”. Human Rights Review, 21, 93-112
18 Ibid.
19 Sarkin, J. J., & Sarkin, E. (2022). Reforming the International Court of Justice to Deal with State Responsibility for Conflict and Human Rights Violations. International Human Rights Law Review, 11(1), 1-35. Available at:https://brill.com/view/journals/hrlr/11/1/article-p1_001.xml
20 Wulandari, R. (2022). Jurisdiction Issues of the International Court and the effectiveness of ICJ’s Decision in the Russia-Ukraine Dispute Resolution. Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari’ah dan Masyarakat, 22(2), 343-350.
21 Frye, T. (2022). Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia. Princeton University Press.
22 Ibid.
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