Bangladeshi Student Protests: Demands for Genuine Meritocracy 

Written by Uilson Jones 

Since July 5th, Bangladesh has found itself engulfed by mass student protests. Grinding the country to a halt and leaving no stone unturned in its efforts to destabilize the government and its clique, the Bangladeshi student protests have reasserted the rights of civil society in a country where the authoritarianism of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has taken root. The narrative of the student protests developed rapidly throughout the month of July which had morphed into a united front that sought to topple the political status quo – Hasina and her cabinet. 

The Motivations for the Outbreak of the Movement 

The trouble came about with the ratification of the quota system, the origins of which lie in the 1972 legislation by then Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The quota system states the percentage of government jobs that are reserved and disseminated to the children and grandchildren of those that fought in the Bangladeshi Liberation War against Pakistan in 1971 (Al Jazeera, 2024). In practice, this meant the provision of well-paying government jobs to a caste of people who were already secure. In a country plagued by economic troubles and rising poverty rates, the dissemination of aristocratic privileges to the already well-off did not sit well with the millions of people who were capable of taking these jobs due to their merit, yet barred from them simply because they did not qualify under the quota system. It is therefore highly unsurprising when the Bangladeshi High Court reintroduced the job quota on July 5th, that the first to respond were students and universities. This reversed a key government decision made in concession to the 2018 Bangladesh Quota Reform Movement. 

The quota system was a major point of tension for students and educational institutions. As it stood, 44% of jobs were tacitly based off merit, whilst 30% were reserved for the children and grandchildren of the freedom fighters, with quotas for ethnic minorities, women, disabled people, and backward districts sharing in the remaining piece of the pie (Al Jazeera, 2024). As stated above, in a climate of economic and financial strain, students and educational facilities thrust themselves into the forefront of the movement, as the quota system was a seen as a significant impediment for themselves in the future. As such, a much more meritocratic system was called for, one that eliminated the quota system for the privileged and shared its portion with the sections of ‘merit’, ‘ethnic minorities’, ‘women’, amongst others. In other words, the movement was not so much ‘anti-quota’, as it was more concerned with removing and rearranging government jobs to other sections of society.  

Engagement of Civil Society and Government Response 

Tens of thousands of people took to the streets to express their disapproval of the quota bill that was placed back on the agenda by the government in early July. A decision that overturned the previous 2018 moratorium on the quota system as a result of the then major uproar of civil society. In a firm attempt to express their discontent as well as their desire for meaningful change in the quota system. Spearheaded by university students and the educational institutions, the size and purview of the protests grew throughout the month as developments on the streets gave way to a dark reality.  

The government response to the civil unrest triggered in full by foul decision-making, culminated in the bloodiest state crackdown in Bangladeshi history. Beginning with an attempt to destabilize the protest movement, a number of state adjacent actors took it upon themselves to dress in plain clothing and beat protestors at random to cause chaos and sow division (CIVICUS, 2024). It became overwhelmingly clear that the thugs who were doing their part in violently dispersing large crowds, were in fact members of the significantly problematic Bangladeshi Chhatra League. Founded in 1948 and colloquially known as the Chhatra League, the group is the student wing of the ruling Bangladeshi Awami League, or simply Awami League (CIVICUS, 2024). The depravity and senseless violence prompted by state officials against the peaceful protestors was so blatant, that the quota movement could not and did not cease and desist.  

Numerous pictures and videos from the scenes were now able to be found on various social media sites, as well as mainstream media coverage showing the extent of the violence against protestors shocked people around the world. A case in point was the aimless killing of Abu Sayed, a student at Rangpur’s Begum Rokeya University (Amnesty International, 2024). On the 15th of July, police presence was overt and destructive. The Chhatra League, proving unable to contain the protests alone with its unorthodox methods, opened the avenue for the participation of Bangladeshi police and secret service. Upon closing into a crowd of protestors that quickly dispersed from their position, the police encountered a single student who stood in defiance, arms spread along the sides. Wielding nothing other than a wooden stick, positioned 15 metres away from fully geared police units, Abu Sayed was not in any position to deal any harm to officials. Yet, the police responded by unloading the barrels of their shotguns into Sayed, killing him on the spot (Amnesty International, 2024). Abu Sayed, whose death was filmed and posted on social media sites, became a crucial symbol of police brutality, paving the way towards a reinvigoration of the movement despite the life-threatening dangers that come with taking a stand. 

The government crackdown saw many instances of police opening fire, with live ammunition, into large crowds of unarmed protestors in order to instil fear and dispersal (UN News, 2024). The situation deteriorated to such a grave extent, that helicopters began to be used against protestors. Rapid gunfire coming from the helicopters, were aimed at significant crowds of people and took the mass repression and killing to an unimaginable level (The Telegraph, 2024). The militarization of the country and its response to the movement became evermore violent and repressive, yet the protests showed no sign of abating. In fact, it was quite the opposite.  

When Reform Meets Revolution 

The Anti-Discrimination Students Movement, together with the Non-Cooperation Movement, were unanimous in pushing for one overt demand by the time August rolled around. Following a month of unprecedented police brutality and the death of well over a thousand people, these groups sought to align their demands according to such developments. The quota reform movement, having begun as a result of irresponsible government policy, now evolved into a revolutionary movement of widespread scale. Their demand, otherwise known as the one-point movement, was the resignation of the now former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina along with her cabinet (UN News, 2024).  

Having started as a mere quarrel with a particular government policy, the unprompted brutality in the government’s response led the student movement to adapt to the objective necessities of the hour. The state that the country and its people were left in, made the decision to overturn the government a rather simple one. After all, over 1000 deaths were recorded since the onset of the movement (NBC, 2024). Such was the price that Bangladeshis had to pay for the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and her cabinet. Succeeding the Awami League government, is Muhammad Yunus who leads the interim government for the time being (ORF, 2024). The future for Bangladesh remains uncertain, yet the actions taken by student protestors and the widespread movement afterwards is a promising sign for the health of Bangladeshi civil society. The participants in the movement have showed the world that the government is not impenetrable, and under given circumstances is rather fragile. The tens of thousands of protestors, as well as those that perished at the hands of the authoritarian rule of the Awami League, serves as an inspiration to those around the globe seeking justice, peace, and meritocracy. 

References

  • Al Jazeera. (2024). What’s behind Bangladesh’s violent quota protests. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/whats-behind-bangladeshs-violent-quota-protests.  
  • Bose, S. & Chaudhury, A. B. S. (2024). Interim government: The faces of change in Bangladesh. ORF. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/interim-government-the-faces-of-change-in-bangladesh.  
  • Corea, H. & Erum, N. (2024). What is happening at the quota-reform protests in Bangladesh? Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/what-is-happening-at-the-quota-reform-protests-in-bangladesh/.  
  • CIVICUS. (2024). Bangladesh: Brutal crackdown on quota reform protesters by security forces and ruling party youth wing. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/bangladesh-brutal-crackdown-on-quota-reform-protesters-by-security-forces-and-ruling-party-youth-wing/.  
  • Ganguly, A. (2024). ‘Gunfire from helicopters last night’: Voices from Dhaka belie Bangladesh govt claim. https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/gunfire-from-helicopters-last-night-voices-from-dhaka-belie-bangladesh-govt-claim/cid/2036483.  
  • Mishra, V. (2024). Shocking violence in Bangladesh must stop: UN Rights Chief. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1152811.  
  • Mishra V. (2024). Bangladesh: UN urges peaceful transition as PM resigns and flees the country. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1152826.  
  • NBC. Over 1,000 killed in Bangladesh’s violence since July, health ministry chief says. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/1000-killed-bangladesh-violence-july-health-ministry-chief-says-rcna168928.  
  • Cover Image via Wikimedia Commons

Russia Strikes Again: The Devastation of Ukraine’s Largest Children’s Hospital 

Written by Uilson Jones 

For many people around the world, Monday mornings consist of a rush to their place of employment or attending classes at school, going about their day without the slightest disturbance – apart from the casual annoyance due to traffic delays and the like. For Ukrainians, Mondays (as well as every other day) begin and end in destruction, bloodshed and grief. 

On Monday July 8th, Russia launched a massive barrage of missiles against key points of civilian infrastructure in Kyiv and many other urban centres. Amongst these structures was Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital, Okhmatdyt. As a result of this vicious attack against Ukrainian children, a staggering 36 people were killed and another 140 injured, according to Andriy Yermak (BBC, 2024). These figures which are initial estimates, are expected to climb much higher given further investigation. The missiles struck surgical, oncological and toxicological departments, virtually levelling these intensive care units where children with cancer and other life-threatening illnesses were being treated (UNSC, 2024).  

The immediate aftermath on the scene was one right out of a horror movie – yet this was a brutal reality for Ukrainians on the ground. Hundreds of children with chronic illnesses, medical personnel, and staff were being rapidly evacuated from the shattered ruins of the building. Roads and highways in Kyiv were blocked up with waves of ambulances attempting to get on site in time to save as many lives as possible. A horror of unimaginable scale erupted as civilians on the scene, rescue teams, ambulances and fire brigades attempted to do everything in their power to lend their helping hand. 

What of the response of Russian officials around the globe? The course of action taken by Russian officials was to outright deny its involvement in the Monday attack, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. An unending tirade followed, pointing fingers at the West and Ukraine for the decimation of the children’s hospital. Russia’s Council President for July went so far as to state the following: “If this was a Russian strike, there would have been nothing left of the building and all the children would have been killed and not wounded” (UNSC, 2024).

Shamelessly covering up this hideous war crime, he chose to boast about the might of the Russian war machine – or whatever is left of it after struggling against the significantly smaller military might of Ukraine for two and a half years. A war that was supposed to last three days is rapidly approaching its third year as Ukrainians have been able to bog-down their opponent (Defense One, 2022). With slow and modest gain on the front lines, the consistent strikes on civilian infrastructure have been evident. Over the course of this time, the UN has verified 1,878 Russian attacks against various civilian infrastructure facilities, of which 249 (only in 2023) were directly attributed to Russian invaders (UNSC, 2024).  

Now, one must reasonably pose the following questions: How long will it take for some states to deny the visibly absurd statement that Russia is not targeting civilians? India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi was on a visit in Moscow during that time, willingly praising Putin for his hospitality, whilst the Indian Embassy was located only a few hundred meters away from Russian-induced destruction. Furthermore, how can it be justified to have a party that initiate attack at the head of the Council, supposedly supporting universalist principles of world peace and human rights? The term ‘war criminals’ has been applied time and time again to the Russian military and its officials, in numerous and ongoing UN investigations regarding human rights concerns in Ukraine (UNHRC, 2024).

The Council is not the place for cheap and dirty politics. It is a place for upholding the necessary values of the international community, ones that are being violated every hour of every waking day by the so-called Russian Federation. How can one speak of ceasefires and peace deals with Russia, when the Russian military is so blatantly destroying every aspect of Ukrainian society, including the most vulnerable sections of its population – children with chronic illnesses? It is due to these indiscriminate strikes levied against civilian infrastructure, that the European Parliament has declared Russia to be a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ (EP, 2022). 

These attacks by the Russian government will not cease on their own. Ukraine must be granted the full right to defend itself in any manner it so pleases. As it currently stands, Russia is using bases deep within its territory to carry out such acts. Ukraine has not yet received the permission to nip these in the bud to definitively safeguard its people (Politico, 2024). Furthermore, Ukraine requires urgent humanitarian and lethal aid to be able to cope with said attacks. This means modern medical and technical equipment, more air defence systems, shells, artillery systems and far more. In history, the world has learned the hard way of what happens when imperialistic states with totalitarian leaders are able to get away with widespread murder and occupation. One hopes that these mistakes will not be repeated, not only for the sake of Ukrainian children and the rest of its population, but also for the sake of the entirety of Europe.

These important decisions were of absolute necessity already in 2022. One can only agitate and hope for their implementation now and in the near future. Negotiation is impossible, when the opponent is so willing to decimate the most defenceless sections of Ukraine’s population. Without urgent aid, we will surely hear of many more such egregious events taking place. Immediate steps need to be taken in order to ensure the safety of children given the ongoing state of war, and stronger measures need to be put into place which can allow children to study, heal, rest and play in peace. 

References

  • Copp, T. (2022). ‘The convoy is stalled’: Logistics failures slow Russian advance, Pentagon says. Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/convoy-stalled-logistics-failures-slow-russian-advance-pentagon-says/362666/. 
  • Corp, R, & Herrmannsen, K. (2024). Children’s hospital hit as Russian strikes kill dozens in Ukraine. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cl4y1pjk2dzo. 
  • European Parliament. (2022). European Parliament declares Russia to be a state sponsor of terrorism. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55707/european-parliament-declares-russia-to-be-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism.  
  • Melkozerova, V. (2024). Zelenskyy urges Biden to allow Ukraine to hit Russian airfields to stop Kremlin bombing campaign. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/volodymyr-zelenskyy-biden-putin-bomb-strikes-russia-bombing-ukraine-war-kremlin/ 
  • UNSC. (2024). Russian Federation’s Attack on Ukainian Children’s Hospital ‘Not Only a War Crime’ but ‘Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity’, Medical Director Tells Security Council. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm. 
  • UNHRC. (2024). Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iicihr-ukraine/index.  
  • Cover Image via Official Website of Ukraine 

Belarussian Language Policy: Threats to Native-Instruction in Education

Written by Uilson Jones

The declaration of Belarussian independence on August 25th, 1991, ushered in an era of unprecedented parliamentary debate over the official state language policy. Stemming from centuries of repression and Russification during the periods of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Tsarist Empire preceding it, there existed a powerful desire for self-determination. Policies that disadvantaged the Belarussian ethnolinguistic identity were pushed, whilst a bias towards Russian language and culture for centuries has given precedence to a weaker ethnolinguistic identity amongst Belarusians. The newly found independence marked a national re-awakening, leading to the initial decision to opt for the promotion of the Belarussian language, declaring it as the only official state language. 

As such, during the years 1990-1994, Belarus had its sole experiment with restrictive language policy, legislating around other national minority languages, including Russian, Polish, and Lithuanian. The article delves into the ensuing trajectory of Belarussian language policy up to and including the contemporary status quo, with a particular focus on the right to native instruction for national minorities in educational facilities. 

The Tumultuous 90s

The post-Soviet period of the 1990’s was plagued by legislative inconsistencies, political corruption, and ethnolinguistic tensions. The historical trajectory of the East Slavic states (Belarus, Ukraine and Russia) began somewhat similarly, arising from the powerful desire for independence, particularly from the domineering presence of Moscow. As a result, a policy overwhelmingly beneficial to the Belarussian language was created in the immediate aftermath of independence. Belarussian was declared as the sole state language, meaning schools, public institutions, the government and its agencies were obliged to speak Belarussian. This policy, however, was far from uncontested by various political factions in the country.

The national awakening in Belarus, in regard to pursuing a national language policy, proved to be rather unpopular. Polls that surfaced in 1993 referenced the fact that “less than 25% of Belarussians knew their native tongue well and less than 50% were willing to promote the knowledge of it” (Brown, 2007). As such, following the 1994 Belarussian Presidential Election, which resulted in a landslide victory for Alexander Lukashenko, the final blow to the policy of Belarussianization had been dealt. The elections symbolized a crucial reinvigoration of the language debate. 

The high levels of ethnolinguistic polarization necessitated a referendum, which was organized later in the same year. The topic on the agenda was whether the Russian minority language should be considered an official state language alongside Belarussian. With a turnout of 64.8%, the referendum resulted in the granting of equal status to the Russian language with a staggering 86.8% in favor (Nohlen & Stover, 2010). This represented a major pivot from the previous course of action.

However, as opposed to malicious interference in the internal affairs of Belarus, the attitude of the Belarussian people was for the most part that of indifference, if not outright support for the usage of Russian in official institutions (Brown, 2007). There are numerous variables that promote descriptions of why public opinion is the way that it is in Belarus. The key explanation rests in the historical trajectory. After centuries of Russification, the Belarussian identity was heavily weakened. Choosing to conceptualize itself in the political-territorial sense, as opposed to the ethnocultural, as stipulated by Brubaker’s framework for post-Soviet relations (Brubaker, 1994). As such, very little attention gets paid to the cultural development and preservation of Belarussian language, culture, and traditions. 

Legislative Hypocrisy in Minority Native Instruction 

The full recognition of the Russian language throughout the 2000s, into the 2010s, and up until today has produced rather skewed statistics in terms of educational instruction in the full variety of national minority languages in Belarus, which are referenced below. What began with a fruitful language policy, providing the opportunity for students from national minority backgrounds, such as Polish and Lithuanian communities to study in their own languages, ended with the total domination of Russian linguistic institutions. This shift has occurred in congruence with Belarussian historical trajectory. A combination of utility in economic prospects, as well as comfort in conversing in Russian has yielded powerful incentives for Belarussian to utilize Russian. Whereas Belarussian is construed as out-of-date and unuseful for the current reality in Belarus and beyond.

According to the 2022 United Nations Minority Rights Report on Belarus, the observations of the rapporteur have highlighted rather concerning developments in the educational and linguistic rights of such communities. As it currently stands, Polish and Lithuanian schools have faced widespread closure (BHC, 2022). This development went hand in hand with the conversion to either Belarussian or Russian linguistic schools, virtually eliminating the right to native instruction for national minorities.  

Although the ethnic Russian minority makes up only 7.5% of Belarus’ population, the Russian language is considered a dominant language thus phasing out ethnic Polish and Lithuanian linguistic education (UNECE, 2024). The relative size of the Russian minority, despite being significantly larger in respect to the Poles and Lithuanians, cannot alone describe the harsh linguistic discrimination observed in the educational field. Although potentially accounting for a part of the bias, it is likely that other variables are at stake. 

What differentiates the Russian minority from the Polish and Lithuanian? The immediate answer is found in the work of Fernand De Varennes (2017) who argues that the “proximity and status of the kinstate [of the national minority in question]” is of utmost importance. In other words, the significance of the Russian minority lies in the deep ties it has to its kinstate, owing to its symbiotic relation to that source of power. Thus, the pressure exerted by a far more powerful neighbor has produced a spillover effect leading to emphasis on Russia as opposed to the much weaker states of Poland and Lithuania (speaking in relative terms).  

The Status of Belarussian 

Having considered the state of the national minority languages of Belarus, what can be said of the status of the Belarussian language? Despite being a formal state language as well as the official ethnolinguistic identity of the Belarussian people, the on-the-ground reality could not be further from this. The Belarussian language has been long stigmatized as a backwater village language and is considered as more of a dialect of Russian as opposed to its own language, particularly by the so-called big brother in the East (Komorovskaya, 2016). Centuries’ worth of aggressive Russification has nipped the development of a Belarussian ethnolinguistic identity in the bud and with the granting of official language status to Russian, this development has not only not slowed down but assumed its prior breakneck speed.  

The amended language policy culminated in the replacement of Belarussian and thus Russification continued apace. As it stands, for every 250 schools only five teach in Belarussian. This highlights the fact that Belarussian people are not guaranteed education in their native language, despite Belarussian being acknowledged as the official titular language (BHC, 2022). 

Virtually every aspect of society, including all of the major urban centers utilize Russian at work, at home, in education, and in daily life. The upgrading of the Russian language has culminated in the downgrading of the Belarussian language, in the manner of a destructive dialectic, leading to the virtual erasure of Belarussian ethnolinguistic identity. This is reinforced by the overwhelmingly better economic prospects one has access to if they opt for Russian education, as opposed to the niche Belarussian. The political situation, with Lukashenko’s dictatorship cozying up with that of Putin’s, only worsens the status of Belarussian and puts it at risk of complete erasure.   

Concluding Remarks

This article has covered the ethnolinguistic development of Belarus and its national languages. The upgrading of Russian to official state language status has dealt an irreparable blow to the cultural development of not only the Polish and Lithuanian communities, but also of Belarussian – the official ethnolinguistic identity in Belarus. Despite possessing an equal status on paper, Belarussian is threatened by complete decimation in the face of the ever-expanding usage of Russian in virtually all fields of life. This can in no way be considered as the free development of cultures. 

If Belarussian, Polish and Lithuanian communities want to preserve their right to native instruction in educational facilities, where the majority of early life socialization happens, there needs to be a swift and direct response to the predominance of Russian. This would require the toppling of the totalitarian nature of Lukashenko’s regime. 

References:
  • BHC (2022). UNHRC Advisory Committee.  
  • Brown, N. A. (2007). Status language planning in Belarus. Language Policy, 6(2), 281–301.  
  • Brubaker, R. (1994). Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutionalist account. Theory and Society, 23(1), 47-78. 
  • Nohlen, D. & Stover, P. (2010). Elections in Europe. doi.org/10.5771/9783845223414. 
  • Komorovskaya, V. (2016). The future of the Belarussian language: Is it doomed to extinction? Acta Philologica, 48, 15-28. 
  • UNECE. (2024). The 2019 census of population of the Republic of Belarus: Migration and ethnocultural characteristics. https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/7.Census%20WP14%20BEL%20Vasilevskaya%20ENG.pdf
  • Cover Image via Unsplash

The war in Ukraine and its impact on education

Commencing on the 24th of February 2022, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to unfathomably disastrous outcomes, both internationally and within both countries. Of course, the scale of destruction had mapped onto virtually every aspect of the political, economic, and socio-cultural functioning of Ukraine’s society. Leaving no one unaffected by its persistent brutality, Russia’s military adventurism has highlighted the particularly pertinent problems surrounding the daily struggles of educational institutions, their children and their staff in producing a safe and stable environment that is conducive to the educational needs of the youth.

This article breaks down the Ukrainian educational struggles in the context of the waging of a genocidal war by its belligerent neighbour. Furthermore, contemporary innovative solutions to some of these educational issues will be outlined – as well as an assessment of their utility. Lastly, it is of essence to avoid perceiving these educational struggles as isolated cases specific to the Russo-Ukrainian War. On the contrary, these struggles must necessarily be understood in connection with other parts of the world which are consumed by the devastating impacts of chauvinism and warfare. Only from this comparative understanding can one begin to construct a fruitful perspective that is solutions-based, as opposed to the simple dissemination of platitudes devoid of meaning.  

Background Information 

The onset of the war has caused widespread devastation, particularly in the five oblasts (regions) affected the most being Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Kherson and Kharkiv. As of the 9th of November 2023, over 3,790 educational facilities have been either damaged or totally destroyed. These are often the result of “aerial attacks, artillery shelling, rocket strikes”, and in certain cases even cluster munitions (Human Rights Watch, 2023). It is the imprecise nature of Russian weaponry that particularly causes them to indiscriminately shell and strike civilian infrastructure, if not also the vile disregard for the laws of war on the part of the invading army. As such, it is not uncommon for pupils’ school days to be interrupted by siren alerts forcing them to flee into a bomb shelter. There has even been evidence of deliberate striking of schools, with the shelling of one such building with the word “children” written in large as a message in front of it (CNN, 2022). 

In addition to this, there has been extensive occupation of schools by Russian troops, who utilize the space to store munitions, weaponry, vehicles, tanks, amongst other military equipment. The military-use of schools strictly breaches the laws of war. Launching attacks from such locations causes a reciprocation from the Ukrainian counter-battery fire, thus leading to even further destruction of schools. Beyond the exploitation of educational facilities for military purposes, there has been comprehensive evidence of the Russian army engaging in not uncommon looting and pillaging. The stolen equipment includes, but is not limited to, desktops and laptops, televisions, interactive whiteboards, and heating systems. The Human Rights Watch has summarized this by stating “what was not stolen was often broken”. Before ultimately leaving the premises, Russian forces engage in destruction and vandalism, often denoting hateful sentiment towards Ukrainian people (Human Rights Watch, 2023).  

The question should then be posed: how are students able to continue their studies given such wholescale destruction of their schools? Students who have found themselves without feasible schooling options had to resort to continue their studies from a different school in another area. Although moving is expensive, time-consuming, and therefore is not an option for the majority of people along the front lines, if not actively assisted by the government (which is also not always possible). Students became accustomed to studying in shifts, in between sirens, as well as remotely. The last option was made redundant to a great extent, given that Russia has deliberately and over a prolonged period of time targeted civilian infrastructure such as power and electricity stations, including the hydroelectric Kakhovka Dam in the Kherson region. In the rough conditions of power outages, major floods, and routine shelling multiple times a day, it is unsurprising that these adjustments have been insufficient in the face of Russia’s brutality. Therefore, the physical devastation of educational facilities has significantly impacted Ukraine’s ability to commit to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which plainly states in Article 26 that “everyone has the right to education” (UDHR, 1948).  

These educational struggles had not commenced only in 2022. Violent ethnic conflict was raging in the Donbas since the beginning of 2014, which already produced devastating realities for students, staff, and the entirety of the educational sector. This was further exacerbated by the effects of the global pandemic, Covid-19. At just about the time that Covid-19 was starting to subside, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was launched. As such, for the past decade, students and staff were unable to catch a break as the situation progressively went from bad to worse to inconceivable as it stands today. The laws of war simply do not exist for the invading forces who have rampaged through thousands of schools and other educational facilities, using them for the purposes named above as well as for the detainment, torture, and execution of innocent civilians.  

Solutions in the Context of War 

In order for the educational system to continue apace, some modifications were needed to be made. Ukraine began establishing shelter zones in schools (Visit Ukraine, 2023). These were visited quite frequently as a result of the daily shelling and provided the security the students needed to maintain their education. Taking exams and going to lessons in an underground bomb shelter is far from an uncommon occurrence in Ukraine. In Kharkiv, the government has resorted to building “bunker schools” in the subway for a more safe, stable, and quiet environment conducive to studying, as the explosions will not be heard (CNN, 2024).  Further adding onto the stress for students and staff are the conditions of working in irregular shifts to ensure as many students are accommodated as possible. Whereas remote learning remains interrupted by the incessant shelling of Ukraine’s power infrastructure.  

An additional class was added to the educational curricula for all students. Announced by Ukrainian Deputy Interior Minister Kateryna Pavlichenko, ‘safety classes’ were introduced in schools. These special classes were dedicated to the critical important knowledge of life safety and civil defence (Visit Ukraine, 2022). Such practical information must be imparted upon the youth in order for them to understand how to behave in numerous circumstances, as well as the necessary precautions to be taken in an active war zone.  

Concluding Remarks 

The nature of the educational struggles in light of the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been examined, and the innovation that Ukraine has witnessed in solutions to these educational struggles have been duly noted. However, it is of essence to note that these need not be considered as solutions per se. The accommodation that Ukraine has made to the functioning of educational institutions should instead be construed as a temporary band-aid, one that harshly scratches the surface of the real problems facing many millions of children, teachers, and others included in the process. As such, our attention must shift to the source of boundless suffering – Russian imperialism.  

A long-lasting peace settlement is essential to the stability of educational institutions, and a critical necessity for the wellbeing of students all over Ukraine. However, this settlement must not be on the terms of the invader. That does not solve the problems of the educational issues students face in the temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine. The peaceful settlement of the conflict will necessary be on Ukrainian terms, including the necessary persecution of war criminals responsible for the decimation of Ukrainian education. For now, Ukraine is valiantly fighting for its freedom and independence from Russian aggression. Children had nothing to do with the decision to begin the invasion, yet they are ultimately paying the highest price. The end of Russia’s war on Ukrainian children is long overdue.   

References