Universal Periodic Review of China

  • Broken Chalk is a non-profit organisation with one main goal – To protect human rights in education. The organisation has a website and articles and is currently working on multiple projects, each aiming to fight human rights violations in the educational sphere. This report drafted by Broken Chalk contributes to the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for China, focusing exclusively on China’s human rights issues in education.
  • During the 3rd Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review for China in November 2018, China received 346 recommendations and supported 284. Twelve per cent of these supported recommendations relate to the 4th Sustainable Development Goal, Quality Education. These recommendations in the 3rd UPR Cycle will be the basis on which Broken Chalk discusses the progress of human rights issues related to education in China. This report from Broken Chalk will also suggest some recommendations for these educational issues as part of the 4th cycle of the Universal Periodic Review for China.
by Melissa Sugiarta

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Ilham Tohti: An Activist Smiling in the Face of Injustice (Urdu)

الہام توہتی،* بیجنگ منزو یونیورسٹی میں ایغور نسل کے سابق معاشیات کے پروفیسر، جنہیں حال ہی میں گارڈین نے ‘چین کا منڈیلا’ کہا ہے، کو 14 جنوری 2014 کو علیحدگی پسندی، نسلی منافرت کو ہوا دینے اور دہشت گردانہ سرگرمیوں کی حمایت کرنے کے الزام میں حراست میں لیا گیا تھا۔ چینی حکومتی پالیسیوں پر کھلی تنقید۔ اس کی گرفتاری کے بعد، 17 اور 18 ستمبر 2014 کے درمیان دو روزہ شو ٹرائل، جس کی وجہ سے اس کی مذمت اور عمر قید کی سزا ہوئی، بہت سے غیر ملکیوں کے ساتھ ساتھ ملکی مبصرین، دوستوں اور تنظیموں کے لیے ایک بڑا صدمہ تھا جنہوں نے الہام کی حمایت کی۔ اقلیتی ایغوروں کی خودمختاری، لسانی، ثقافتی اور مذہبی حقوق کا دفاع کرنے کے لیے ان کی نمایاں، دھمکی آمیز اور سب سے اہم سرگرمی۔ اویغور ترک زبان بولنے والے اور عام طور پر مسلم گروہ ہیں، جو زیادہ تر سنکیانگ ایغور خود مختار علاقے (اب سے XUAR) میں آباد ہیں۔ الہام کو ‘اویغور لوگوں کا ضمیر’ کہا جاتا ہے۔

Background

الہام کی سرگرمی 1994 میں اس وقت شروع ہوئی جب اس نے XUAR میں ایغوروں کی طرف سے ہونے والی خلاف ورزیوں کے بارے میں لکھنا شروع کیا۔ 2006 میں، اس نے آن لائن توجہ اس وقت مبذول کرائی جب اس نے اور دیگر اسکالرز نے uighurbiz.org پر ویب سائیٹ ‘Uyghur Online’ کی مشترکہ بنیاد رکھی۔ یہ ویب سائٹ چینی زبان کا پلیٹ فارم تھا جو ایغور اقلیت اور ہان چینیوں کے درمیان جاری تقسیم کو ختم کرنے کی کوشش کرتا تھا۔ پلیٹ فارم نے بنیادی طور پر ایک جگہ کے طور پر کام کیا جس پر الہام ایغور آواز کو ملکی اور بین الاقوامی سطح پر سنا سکتا تھا۔ اس میں یہ بتایا گیا کہ کس طرح اویغوروں کی حالت زار میں یہ محسوس ہوتا ہے کہ وہ کس طرح عام معاشرے کی طرف سے حقارت کی نگاہ سے دیکھتے ہیں اور چینی حکومت نے سماجی و اقتصادی ترقی کے حوالے سے انہیں بھلا دیا ہے۔ الہام ہان کو ایک کھلے، پرامن اور عقلی پلیٹ فارم پر مدعو کرے گا تاکہ ان کے مختلف خیالات پر بحث اور بحث کی جا سکے کیونکہ، جیسا کہ اس نے زور دیا، ہان ایغوروں کے دشمن نہیں تھے، باوجود اس کے کہ ان کے ساتھ امتیازی اور اکثر متشدد رویہ اختیار کیا جاتا ہے۔

اپنی ویب سائٹ کے ذریعے، الہام نے ایک پرامن اور جامع نقطہ نظر کو فروغ دیا اور کبھی بھی تشدد کو اکسایا یا اس کی حوصلہ افزائی نہیں کی۔ وہ حکومتی قوانین یا شہری معاشرے میں موجود بنیادی معاہدوں سے تصادم کے بارے میں محتاط تھا۔ تاہم، ویب سائٹ نے چینی حکومت کے غصے کو اپنی طرف متوجہ کرنا شروع کر دیا، جس نے پہلی بار جون 2008 میں چین کے اولمپک گیمز کی میزبانی سے قبل ویب سائٹ کو بند کر دیا۔ حکومت نے بند کی وجہ اس بنیاد پر دی کہ اس نے بیرون ملک مقیم نام نہاد اویغور انتہا پسندوں سے روابط کو عام کیا۔ XUAR کے دارالحکومت ارومچی میں بڑے نسلی فسادات، اور 5 جولائی 2009 کو اسلام کے زیادہ جارحانہ مطالعہ سے متاثر دہشت گردانہ حملوں کے نتیجے میں تقریباً 200 لوگ مارے گئے، 18,000 کو حراست میں لیا گیا، اور 34 سے 37 کے درمیان لاپتہ ہوئے۔ اس کے بعد الہام نے اس واقعے کے بارے میں کھل کر بات کی اور غائب رہنے والوں کے نام اور چہرے شائع کیے، جس کے نتیجے میں اسے 14 جولائی کو تقریباً پانچ ہفتوں تک گھر میں نظربند رکھا گیا اور بعد ازاں بین الاقوامی دباؤ کے بعد اسے رہا کر دیا گیا۔

ایک اور اہم لمحہ اس وقت آیا جب الہام اور اس کی بیٹی، جیور، امریکہ جانے والی فلائٹ میں سوار ہونے کے لیے ہوائی اڈے پر تھے کیونکہ الہام کو انڈیانا یونیورسٹی میں بطور وزٹنگ اسکالر پوزیشن لینا تھی۔ اسے حکام نے روکا، مارا پیٹا، حراست میں لیا اور جیور کو اکیلے امریکہ جانے والی پرواز میں دیکھا۔ اس واقعے نے الہام کی کہانی کے عروج کو نشان زد کیا۔ اکتوبر 2013 میں، ایک اویغور خاندان نے اپنی جیپ کو تیانان مین اسکوائر کے جنگشوئی پل پر ٹکر مار دی تھی، جس میں آگ لگ گئی تھی۔ چینی حکومت نے اسے ایک دہشت گردانہ حملہ قرار دیا، جس کے نتیجے میں الہام نے برطانیہ، فرانس اور امریکہ کے غیر ملکی میڈیا پر اپنی مرئیت بڑھا دی، اور 2 نومبر کو ‘سیاسی پولیس اہلکاروں’ نے الہام کی کار پر حملہ کیا جب وہ جا رہا تھا۔ ہوائی اڈے اپنی ماں کو لینے کے لیے۔ حکام نے تشدد اور دھمکیوں کا استعمال کیا، اگر اس نے غیر ملکی میڈیا سے بات کرنا بند نہیں کیا تو اس کے خاندان کی جان کو خطرہ ہے۔ الہام پر اپنی آواز کے خدشات کو ختم کرنے کے لیے دباؤ ڈالنے کے بعد، اس نے اپنے ذاتی دوستوں سے اپنی حفاظت کے بارے میں تشویش کا اظہار کرنا شروع کر دیا اور، کسی حد تک، ریڈیو فری ایشیا کے ایغور سروس کے رپورٹر، میھرے عبدلیم کو ٹیلی فون پر بیان دیتے ہوئے، اس نگرانی میں۔ ریاستی سیکورٹی ایجنٹس کی طرف سے اس پر بڑھتے ہوئے جذبات میں اضافہ ہوا اور ایسا محسوس ہوا جیسے جلد ہی اس کی آواز خاموش ہو جائے گی۔ اس تشویش کی بنیاد پر، اس نے اپنے آخری الفاظ کو حراست میں لینے کے بعد ہی ریکارڈ کرنے اور شائع کرنے کو کہا۔

Arrest, violations, and a show trial

جنوری 2014 میں، 20 کے قریب پولیس اہلکاروں نے بیجنگ میں الہام کے اپارٹمنٹ پر چھاپہ مارا اور اسے اس کے دو چھوٹے بچوں کے سامنے مارا۔ انہوں نے اسے حراست میں لے لیا اور اس کی ویب سائٹ کو مستقل طور پر بند کر دیا۔ اگلے دن، چینی وزارت خارجہ کے ترجمان، ہانگ لی نے وضاحت کی کہ انہیں ‘مجرمانہ طور پر حراست میں لیا گیا’۔ اس کی حراست کے الزامات کا انکشاف فروری میں اس وقت ہوا جب بیورو آف پبلک سیکیورٹی نے ‘علیحدگی پسندی’ – ایک مبہم اکاؤنٹ جو سزائے موت کی اجازت دیتا ہے – اور اس کی ویب سائٹ سے پیروکاروں کو بھرتی کرنے کے لیے اس کی باقاعدہ گرفتاری کا اعلان کیا۔ اس کی گرفتاری نے اس بنیاد پر الہام کی حمایت کی ایک لہر کو جنم دیا کہ اس نے XUAR کی آزادی کے مطالبات کے خلاف بظاہر بحث کی تھی اور وہ اس خطے کے حق میں تھا جو چین کا ایک حصہ رہ گیا تھا۔. ویب سائٹ فارن پالیسی نے الہام کے کئی ذخیرہ شدہ مضامین پر ان کا تجزیہ ان کے ثبوتی ریکارڈ کے حصے کے طور پر شائع کیا، اور کہیں بھی انہیں علیحدگی یا آزادی کا کوئی براہ راست یا بالواسطہ اظہار نہیں ملا۔ الہام کو پانچ ماہ تک نامعلوم مقام پر رکھا گیا، اسے خاندان یا دوستوں سے کسی بھی قسم کے رابطے سے روک دیا گیا، اور 26 جون تک اپنے وکیل لی فانگ پنگ سے ملنے سے روک دیا گیا، جب لی نے اطلاع دی کہ الہام کو پہلے 20 دنوں کے دوران بیڑیوں میں جکڑا گیا تھا۔ اسے حراست میں لیا گیا اور مارچ کے پہلے 10 دنوں تک حلال کھانے سے انکار کر دیا گیا۔ یہ کارروائیاں بین الاقوامی قانون کی خلاف ورزی ہیں اور دلیل کے طور پر ظالمانہ، غیر انسانی، توہین آمیز سلوک یا سزا کے دائرہ کار میں آتی ہیں۔ بہت سے لوگ یقین رکھتے ہیں اور ڈرتے ہیں کہ الہام نے ممکنہ طور پر اذیتیں برداشت کی ہوں گی۔

الہام نے اپنی جلد بازی اور غیر منصفانہ آزمائش کے آٹھ ماہ کے بعد صرف اپنے خاندان کو دیکھا۔ اسے 23 ستمبر تک قصوروار پایا گیا اور عمر قید کی سزا سنائی گئی، لیکن وہ اپنے خلاف لگائے گئے تمام الزامات سے انکار کرتا ہے۔ مقدمے کی سماعت کے دوران، پراسیکیوٹرز نے کہا کہ الہام اپنی کلاسوں میں دہشت گردوں کو ہیرو کے طور پر پیش کر رہا تھا، ‘اویغور سوال’ کو بین الاقوامی شکل دے رہا تھا، اور طالب علم کی شہادتوں کا استعمال کر رہا تھا جن کے بارے میں یہ خیال کیا جاتا ہے کہ اسے زبردستی حاصل کیا گیا ہے۔ الہام کی گرفتاری کے بعد کچھ طالب علموں کو جبری پٹیوں کی تلاشی کا سامنا کرنا پڑا، انہیں حراست میں لے لیا گیا، اور کچھ طویل عرصے تک لاپتہ رہے، اس طرح استغاثہ کی جانب سے ایک مجرمانہ مقدمہ بنانے کی کوشش کو اجاگر کیا گیا جس میں یہ الزام لگایا گیا تھا کہ الہام وہ پرامن شخص نہیں تھا جس نے خود کو ظاہر کیا تھا۔ اس کے بجائے چینی سیکورٹی کی نظر میں خطرناک تھا اور اسے بند کر کے خاموش ہونا پڑا۔

Behind Ilham’s struggle

لیکن الہام توحی کا معاملہ دراصل کیا ہے؟ عوامی جمہوریہ چین (PRC) کے قیام کے بعد سے ہی ایغور-ہان کشیدگی موجود ہے، وقتاً فوقتاً بدامنی پھیلتی رہتی ہے اور اویغوروں کے خلاف سخت پالیسیاں شروع ہوتی ہیں، خاص طور پر مارچ 2013 میں شی جن پنگ کے حکومت سنبھالنے کے بعد اور بعد میں۔ اسی سال دسمبر میں XUAR کے لیے ‘عظیم الشان اسٹریٹجک پلان’ کی نقاب کشائی کی، جس میں الہام نے خدشات کا اظہار کیا کہ ایغوروں پر دباؤ بڑھنے والا ہے۔ چینی حکومت نے اس مسئلے کو ‘اویغور سوال’ یا ‘سنکیانگ مسئلہ’ کے طور پر تشکیل دیا ہے جسے انہوں نے سینیفیکیشن کے عمل کے ذریعے حل کرنے کی کوشش کی ہے، جو چینی تاریخ میں کئی صدیوں سے موجود ہے اور اس میں انضمام کو فروغ دینے کی بجائے انضمام.[i] بعد ازاں اس نے ہان چینیوں کو ان پالیسیوں کے ذریعے خطے میں ہجرت کرنے کی ترغیب دی جو ایغوروں پر ہان کی حمایت کرتی تھیں، اور جس کے نتیجے میں سماجی و اقتصادی ترقی میں عدم توازن پیدا ہوا۔ الہام چین کی سنسر شپ ٹیکنالوجی اور قوانین کے استعمال کا شکار ہوا، جہاں آج سینا ویبو کی ٹویٹر جیسی ایپ پر ایک پوسٹ بھی اس کے مصنف کو جیل بھیج سکتی ہے اگر وہ بظاہر چینی حکومت پر تنقید کرتا ہے۔ الہام کی قید ثابت کرتی ہے کہ چینی حکومت ایغوروں اور ہان کے درمیان پل کو تسلیم نہیں کرتی۔ مارچ 2014 میں کنمنگ ٹرین اسٹیشن میں ہان چینیوں پر اویغوروں کے مبینہ دہشت گردانہ حملے کے جواب میں، حکومت نے ‘دہشت گردی کے خلاف عوامی جنگ’ کا اعلان کیا اور 2014 کے دوران علماء، کارکنوں، صحافیوں، مصنفین اور انسانی حقوق کے وکلاء کو نشانہ بنایا۔. بنیادی تضاد یہ ہے کہ انٹرنیٹ انسانوں کو جغرافیائی، سماجی، ثقافتی اور لسانی سرحدوں سے جوڑنے کے لیے بنیادی ٹول کے طور پر کام کرتا ہے اور جس پر آج کی تجارت اور مواصلات کا زیادہ تر حصہ ہوتا ہے۔ اس کے بجائے، چینی حکومت کی ‘عظیم فائر وال’ غیر ملکی مواد کے استعمال کو چین میں داخل ہونے سے روکتی ہے اور چین کی تصویر، مفادات اور پالیسیوں کے منظور شدہ بیانیے کے مطابق ڈیجیٹل مواد کو سنسر اور کنٹرول کرنے کے لیے انٹرنیٹ کو ایک بلڈجوننگ ٹول کے طور پر استعمال کرتی ہے، جو کہ اس کے پھیلاؤ کو مجرم قرار دیتی ہے۔ ‘افواہیں’ آن لائن اور سیاسی رائے یا بیانات کا اشتراک کرنے والے کسی بھی آن لائن اکاؤنٹ کے لیے پہلے سے رجسٹریشن کی شرط قائم کرنا۔.

اس تحریر کے مصنف کے طور پر، اور بروکن چاک میں اپنے ساتھیوں کے ساتھ، میں الہام توہتی اور ان جیسے بہت سے دوسرے لوگوں کی المناک کہانی سے گہرا تعلق محسوس کرتا ہوں کیونکہ میرا بھی ایک ذاتی بلاگ ہے جہاں میں موجودہ عالمی کے بارے میں اپنے خدشات پر بات کرتا ہوں۔ معاملات جس طرح سے الہام نے اپنے ‘برج بلاگ’ کے ذریعے اظہار رائے کی آزادی کا استعمال کیا، وہ کوئی جرم نہیں ہے، اور نہ ہی اسے بلاجواز طور پر الہام کو دہشت گردی کا حامی، منشیات فروش، ہتھیار بیچنے والا، یا ایک امریکی ایجنٹ قرار دینا چاہیے۔ اس نے واقعی اویغور اور ہان کو بات چیت میں مشغول کرنے، ان کے اختلافات کو نظر انداز کرنے اور عام لوگوں کی طرح زیادہ متحد ہونے کی کوشش کی۔. اس نے اویغوروں کے بارے میں دوسروں کو تعلیم دینے کے پرامن اور باخبر طریقے استعمال کرنے کا انتخاب کیا جو اس بیانیے کی مخالفت کرتے ہیں جو انہیں دہشت گرد، برائی، اور چینی معاشرے کی بنیادوں کے لیے سلامتی کے خطرات سے دوچار کرتا ہے۔ اس کے بجائے، وہ XUAR میں نسلی ایغوروں کے لیے ایک سیاسی شہید بن گیا، جس نے انسانی حقوق اور آزادیوں کا دفاع کرنے اور اسے وسعت دینے کے لیے متعدد ایوارڈز حاصل کیے، اور ایک ایسی روشنی جو 2017 سے چین کے حراستی کیمپوں میں ایغوروں کو درپیش نازک صورتحال پر روشنی ڈالتی رہی، جہاں انسانی حقوق کی بے شمار خلاف ورزیاں مار پیٹ، تشدد، عصمت دری، قتل، جبری مشقت اور ایغور خواتین کی نس بندی کی شکل اختیار کر لیتی ہیں۔

آخر کار، الہام کو ایک باشعور اور بہادر کے طور پر یاد کیا جاتا ہے اور چینی حکام کی ناانصافیوں اور دھمکیوں کے سامنے سر اٹھاتے ہوئے، نسلی ایغوروں کے لیے لڑنے کے لیے ایک مہم اور عزم کے ساتھ یاد کیا جاتا ہے۔

* To read and learn more about Ilham Tohti, there is a recent publication named ‘We Uyghurs Have No Say: An Imprisoned Writer Speaks’ (Verso Books). It is a series of collected essays and articles by Ilham prior to his detention. A paperback and eBook version are available at: https://bit.ly/3wiP6Mv

Written by Karl Baldacchino

Edited by Olga Ruiz Pilato

Translated by Mahnoor Tariq from https://brokenchalk.org/ilham-tohti-an-activist-smiling-in-the-face-of-injustice/

Sources;

[i] Kennedy, H. (2022) ‘We Uyghur’s Have No Say by Ilham Tohti Review – A People Ignored’. The Guardian. Available online from: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/09/we-uyghurs-have-no-say-ilham-tohti-review-background-genocide-china [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[ii] Makinen, J. (2014) ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’. Los Angeles Times. Available online from: https://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-detention-professor-20140117-story.html#axzz2qljh0LfJ [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Wong, E. (2014) ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’. The New York Times. Available online from: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/world/asia/separatism-trial-of-ilham-tohti-uighur-scholar-begins-in-china.html?_r=0 [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Wertime, D. (2014) ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/media/internet-where-nobody-says-anything [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Amnesty International, ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti: Levenslang Gevangengezet’. Available online from: https://www.amnesty.nl/wat-we-doen/themas/sport-en-mensenrechten/ilham-tohti [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Denyer, S. & Rauhala, E. (2016) ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’. The Washington Post. Available online from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/to-beijings-dismay-jailed-uighur-scholar-wins-human-rights-award/2016/10/11/d07dff8c-8f85-11e6-81c3-fb2fde4e7164_story.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’. Available online from: https://pen.org/advocacy-case/ilham-tohti/ [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[iii] Woeser, T. (2009) ‘Interview with Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti’. YouTube. Available online from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQT0iN1nMk8 [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also Johnson, I. (2014) ‘”They Don’t Want Moderate Uighurs”’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/they-dont-want-moderate-uighurs [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[iv] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’; see also Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress. Available online from: https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/defending-freedom-project/prisoners-by-country/China/Ilham%20Tohti#:~:text=Biography%3A%20Ilham%20Tohti%20is%20a,regional%20autonomy%20laws%20in%20China. [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[v] ) ‘Interview With Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti’; see also PEN America (2014) ‘Ilham Tohti: 2014 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award Winner’. YouTube. Available online from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gm6YLWrnKPw [Accessed 19/03/2022].

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[viii] known as 7/5 due to it being a sensitive date in China

[ix] ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also Tohti, I. (2013) ‘The Wounds of the Uyghur People Have Not Healed’. Radio Free Asia. Available online from: https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/wounds-07052013134813.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’.

[x] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’.

[xi] Ibid.; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also Tohti, I. (2013) ‘Uyghur Scholar Tohti Speaks About His Concerns Before Detention’. Radio Free Asia. Available online from: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/interview-02072014182032.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’.

[xii] ‘Uyghur Scholar Tohti Speaks About His Concerns Before Detention’; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’.

[xiii] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’; see also ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[xiv] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’

[xv] Ibid.; see also ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’; see also Cao, Y. (2014) ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/china-2014-through-eyes-human-rights-advocate [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[xvi] ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti: Levenslang Gevangengezet’; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’.

[xvii] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’.

[xviii] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also European Foundation for South Asia Studies, ‘Language, Religion, and Surveillance: A Comparative Analysis of China’s Governance Models in Tibet and Xinjiang’. Available online from: https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/comparative-analysis-of-governance-models-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[xix] Ibid.; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[xx] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Ilham Tohti is the recipient of PEN America’s 2014 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award, the 2016 Martin Ennals Award for human rights defenders who show deep commitment and face great personal risk, Liberal International’s 2017 Prize for Freedom, was nominated in 2019 and 2020 for the Nobel Peace Prize, and awarded in 2019 Freedom Award by Freedom House, the Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.

[xxiii] ‘We Uyghur’s Have No Say by Ilham Tohti Review – A People Ignored’; see also ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti.

*cover photo taken from: https://www.omct.org/fr/ressources/declarations/ilham-tohti-2016-martin-ennals-award-laureate-for-human-rights-defender

Education Challenges in China

Written by Luna A. Duran van Tijn

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ([OECD], 2016) “China has the largest education system in the world”, with almost 260 million students and over 15 million teachers in about 514,000 schools. While China prides itself in its advancements in the educational sector and has in fact paid a great deal of attention to its shortcomings, this article reveals that with such a large system come many challenges.

Setting the stage: China’s education system

Education bears great importance for the Chinese government (OECD, 2016). China has continued to invest heavily in its educational system on an absolute basis. Over the past 10 years, China has raised its educational spending by an average of 19%. With its belief that education is the foundation for national growth and modernisation, ensuring the compatibility of the system with the nation’s rate of such growth and modernisation as well as new educational demands and trends has meant continuous modifications and development in education reforms and programmes (OECD, 2016).

A particularly significant development in Chinese educational history was the Law on Compulsory Education passed in 1986, which held that all school-age children of Chinese nationality are entitled to compulsory education, and parents are responsible for registering their children in school and ensuring that they complete the required nine years of education (OECD, 2016). This law built an exhaustive system, outlining standards for schools, instructors, teaching and learning, as well as for funding education and the legal responsibilities of social sectors.  Since the legislation was changed in 2006, all students enrolled in compulsory education are now exempt from paying tuition and other fees. Moreover, according to the law’s 2015 revision, textbook prices are limited to marginal profit (OECD, 2016).

As to the specifics, China’s education system is managed by the state, with limited involvement from private companies, and continues to grow more decentralised (OECD, 2016). The Ministry of Education has recently moved away from direct control of the educational system and towards system-wide monitoring, directing educational reform through legislative initiatives, plans, financial support, informational services, policy recommendations, and administrative tools. Governments at the county level are in charge of running and providing education in schools. Most of the time, provincial governments are in charge of managing higher education institutions (OECD, 2016).

As has been previously stated, students must complete nine years of compulsory education (OECD, 2016). Figure 2 presents a chart with an overview of the organisation of China’s education system. Prior to the 1990s, secondary schools accepted students based on the results of admission exams. The government has replaced the entrance exam for secondary school with a policy of mandatory enrollment based on the area of residence (hukou) to emphasise the compulsory nature of junior secondary schools and as part of an attempt to shift the focus of education away from test scores and towards a more integrated approach to learning (OECD, 2016).

Students have the option to continue with senior secondary education after completing the compulsory education (OECD, 2016). General senior secondary, technical or specialised secondary, adult secondary, vocational secondary, and crafts schools are the five different categories of senior secondary schools in China. Prior to enrolling in senior secondary schools, students must take the Zhongkao, a public test whose results determine admission. The government assigns pupils to various senior secondary schools based on these scores. In recent years, China has made major efforts to increase enrollment in secondary vocational schools in order to satisfy the rapidly changing economic and labour demands of the nation. Despite the fact that senior secondary education is not required in China, 95% of junior secondary school graduates completed their studies there in 2014, a particularly significant figure considering it was only around 40% in 2005 (OECD, 2016).

The first ten years of the twenty-first century saw a significant increase in tertiary education in China as well (OECD, 2016). The gross enrollment ratio for postsecondary education in China increased from 21% in 2006 to 39% in 2014. Various institutions and initiatives were founded during this time, and there was a significant increase in the promotion of international collaboration and mobility. The tertiary education system become more varied as a result. Undergraduate programmes’ admissions are based on students’ college entrance examination (gaokao) scores. Admissions at the graduate level are based on another entrance examination (OECD, 2016).

Main challenges to the Chinese education system 

  1. Too large an emphasis on tests 

As has been touched on in the Background section, test scores play a highly significant role in the education system in China. Although the country has replaced the entrance exam for secondary school with hukou, senior secondary education and undergraduate as well as graduate programmes still heavily rely on evaluation scores.

A departure from the former system, a New Curriculum Reform has been underway since 2001 that addresses every aspect of the educational system, including educational philosophy, goal, content, methodology, and assessment systems at all educational levels (OECD, 2016). The new approach changes the examination-focused study mode to lessen the load on the students by relying on a variety of metrics for student achievements. The goal of this new evaluation method is to assist students in realising their potential, understanding who they are, and gaining confidence. Teachers should be able to examine and enhance their teaching techniques with the aid of the evaluation system. The new assessment system mandates periodic evaluation of curriculum implementation and study of implementation-related issues in order to assist schools in developing their curriculum systems (OECD, 2016).

Major adjustments are also being made to the gaokao (OECD, 2016). In 2014, the State Council released formal recommendations for the gaokao system overhaul. To lessen the impact of standardised testing, changes have been made to examinations at various levels. This examination reform attempts to create a contemporary examination system made up of standardised exams, thorough evaluation, and various admittance criteria. It also seeks to support overall education system change. As agreed upon with the central government, Shanghai and the province of Zhejiang will serve as the new system’s experimental pilot regions. Each province has created its own strategy to implement this change. Other towns and provinces have also revealed their own reform initiatives for the gaokao, including Beijing, Jiangsu and Guangdong (OECD, 2016).

Still, however, many sources within China as well as reports highlight the still-existing emphasis on test scores. In an article by Didi Kristen Tatlow (2014) in the New York Times, professor of education at the University of Oregon Yong Zhao revealed that the fundamental disregard for children’s individuality, hobbies, and passions in the Chinese educational system has resulted in a uniform student body. Because it compels students to spend practically all of their free time studying for exams, it leaves little time for leisurely pursuits like exercise. The intense rivalry also puts Chinese students under a lot of stress, which can harm their confidence and impair their self-esteem. Zhao also claimed a meaningful education, which focuses more on assisting each kid in growing than on pressuring them to get high test scores, is hampered in China by an overemphasis on test results (Tatlow, 2014).

In another article, one by Mark Kitto (2012) for Prospect Magazine, the focus on testing and scores is further illustrated as Kitto states that “the domestic Chinese lower education system does not educate. It is a test centre. The curriculum is designed to teach children how to pass them.” He continues, “schools do not produce well-rounded, sociable, self-reliant young people with inquiring minds. They produce winners and losers. Winners go on to college or university to take “business studies.” Losers go back to the farm or the local factory their parents were hoping they could escape” (Kitto, 2012).

Finally, reports on Chinese schools have led education experts to contend that this emphasis on exam-based education is the main cause of China’s high dropout rate (Moxley, 2010). A study by Northeast Normal University’s Institute of Rural Education from May claimed that the dropout rate in some rural areas was as high as 40 percent. The findings were ascribed in the research to “school weariness,” or exhaustion and apathy brought on by memorization drills and cramming (Moxley, 2010).

  1. A cutthroat system and mental health 

Worthy of its own section, albeit related to the previous challenge ascribed to the large emphasis on test scores, are the consequences on the mental health of Chinese students as a result of the harsh educational system in China.

According to the Annual Report on China’s Education (2014), or the Blue Book of Education, researchers closely examined 79 elementary and middle school suicide cases from 2013 and discovered that nearly all – 92 percent – occurred after a teen had experienced stress related to school, in some cases an argument with a teacher (Xinying, 2014). The second part of the school year, when children often suffer higher stress because of high school and college admission examinations, saw a 63 percent increase. The study included cases such as that of a middle school student in Hohhot who committed suicide by jumping off a building after learning that his test scores had dropped and of a 13-year-old boy in Nanjing who hanged himself at home for failing to finish his homework. The case of a girl in Sichuan province who cut her wrist and ingested poison afterlearning the results of her college entrance exam was also included. Suicides like these reveal the immense pressure students feel in China as a result of their studies, a concerning image of its educational system (Xinying, 2014).

  1. The rural-urban gap 

A third, rather crucial challenge to China’s education system has to do with the large gap between access to education in rural China compared to its urban counterparts.

China’s unprecedented levels and rates of urbanisation, with the urban population approximately tripling, hundreds of millions of Chinese have seen their quality of life improve and transformed by urbanisation (OECD, 2016). Nonetheless, it has also brought forth a number of significant societal problems. Among the most important issue is equal access to education. Not only should every child have access to school, but they should also have equal access to quality education.

Although the Chinese government has prioritised educational equity in compulsory education through a number of programmes in order to narrow the rural-urban gap, these have only solved a part of the problem (OECD, 2016). For instance, improvements have been made in infrastructural areas but even while the educational environment is improved, other considerations, such as fewer opportunities for advancement and a poorer standard of living in rural regions, make the teaching force deficit a significant issue. In this regard, policies have been made to attract more teachers in rural areas, but there is more required than just policies; broader efforts to improve social and economic opportunities in less developed parts of the country need to be addressed first (OECD, 2016).

An opinion piece by Helen Gao (2014) for the New York Times also explores this, arguing that “While many of their urban peers attend schools equipped with state-of-the-art facilities and well-trained teachers, rural students often huddle in decrepit school buildings and struggle to graspadvanced subjects such as English and chemistry amid a dearth of qualified instructors.” Additionally, she highlights research showing that a candidate from Beijing has a 41-fold higher chance of being accepted to ‘Peking University’ than a comparable applicant from the underdeveloped, predominantly rural province of Anhui (Gao, 2014).

Gao’s (2014) piece also connected the rural-urban gap to corruptive practices, stating “Parents fork out tens of thousands of dollars under the guise of “voluntary donations” to secure a slot for their children in elite elementary schools. (…) Further advantage can be purchased by parents who can pay handsomely to hire teachers to offer extra tutoring to their children, a practice discouraged by the authorities but widespread in reality” (Gao, 2014).

An added challenge to the presented gap stems from the hukou system (OECD, 2016). Large-scale internal migration brought on by China’s economic growth has substantial educational implications for both families and the government. With neighbourhood residency as the main basis for determining school enrolment in China, this means that migrant children must remain the same as their place of birth. Those who choose to remain with their parents will have restricted access to schooling  (OECD, 2016). Gao (2014) also touches on the effects of this as she explains that the hukou system denies rural children the right to enter urban public schools, forcing many of these migrant children to attend private schools that charge higher tuition fees. The unfortunate reality for many, she states, is that they “have no choice but to send their children back to their rural hometowns. Then, on the other hand, there are the children who separate from their parents and stay in their home regions, commonly referred to as “left-behind” children. They, more often than not, suffer from both mental health and educational effects (Gao, 2014).

  1. Authoritarianism in higher education

According to political scientist Elizabeth J. Perry (2015), China’s Communist party-state has created a variety of techniques to monitor and control student behaviour. Politically dependable peers serve as the leaders of the “homerooms” (banji) and “class years” (nianji)  and act as a conduit for information to and from the university administration. Peer pressure and oversight are integrated into the professional monitoring hierarchy. The “guidance counsellors” (fudaoyuan), trained employees entrusted with maintaining careful tabs on their student charges to ensure that their ideas and behaviour do not cross predetermined lines, form the cornerstone of the control system.  These guidance counsellors, who are aided by student informants, report directly to the deputy party secretaries responsible for student work (Perry, 2015).

These control procedures have even “modernised” in recent years thanks to new methodologies and tools (Perry, 2015). For instance, mental health facilities are now a common sight on Chinese college campuses. However, in China, the term “mental illness” is used to refer to beliefs and tendencies that the government deems to be politically dangerous, and the findings of the required mental health screenings given to first-year students are shared with political cadres for analysis and potential preventative or punitive action. Furthermore, the proliferation of the internet and social media has made it possible to gauge (and direct) student opinion in yet another “modernised” way. Counsellors and cadres counteract suspicious or subversive information on popular social media platforms (such as Weibo and WeChat) by commissioning counter-posts that support the officially sanctioned viewpoint in addition to censoring it (Perry, 2015).

In an effort to sway student sentiment in favour of the CCP’s objectives, the party-state uses both proactive and reactive methods (Perry, 2015). Military training (junxun) and ideological and political education (sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu) have been required courses at universities since the 1990s. These lessons and activities aim to instil dispositions and conduct that support the dictatorship. Teaching “cultural proficiency” (wenhua sushi) and “national character” (guoqing), which present Chinese history, art, philosophy, and literature in ways that present a natural relationship and fundamental compatibility between the splendours of China’s ancient “tradition” and its modern “socialist” system, has gained importance in recent years. As such, universities are a crucial element of a vast party-state project in cultural governance that aims to persuade people that CCP rule is justified by “Chinese characteristics” that make it both essential and natural (Perry, 2015).

Key takeaways

Although education in China has become a priority in recent decades, and has made great progress in its achievements and reforms, the country still faces some significant challenges. From an overemphasis on test scores that fail to create more well-rounded students and has adverse effects on students’ mental health to discrepancies brought about by the rural-urban gap, China needs to reform their zhongkao, gaokao and hukou systems to ensure a more balanced, equitable, quality education for all.

The fourth challenge discussed in this article, namely the control and subtle propaganda systems infiltrating the higher education levels in China, from a democratic perspective, limits students’ ability to form essential critical abilities. This challenge in particular is one that seems difficult to see addressed as it is actively pursued by the government and would therefore, rather than be seen as a challenge, be seen as a tool.  This makes this challenge particularly complex.

 

Reference list 

Chen, Y. (2017). Issues of the Chinese Education System. Leadership Society of Arizona. https://leadaz.org/2017/03/13/issues-chinese-education-system/

Gao, H. (2014). China’s Education Gap. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/sunday/chinas-education-gap.html

Kitto, M. (2012). You’ll Never be Chinese. Prospect Magazine. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/50279/youll-never-be-chinese

Moxley, M. (2010). CHINA: Alarming School Dropout Rate Blamed on Teaching Methods. Global Issues. https://www.globalissues.org/news/2010/06/30/6153

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2016). Education in China. A Snapshot. https://www.oecd.org/china/Education-in-China-a-snapshot.pdf

Perry, E. J. (2015). Higher Education and Authoritarian Resilience: The Case of China, Past and Present. Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30822717

Tatlow, D. K. (2014). Q. and A.: Yong Zhao on Education and Authoritarianism in China. The New York Times. https://archive.nytimes.com/sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/q-and-a-yong-zhao-on-education-and-authoritarianism-in-china/

Xinying, Z. (2014). School Tests Blamed for Suicides. China dailyhttps://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/14/content_17505291.htm

Kamile Wayit, an Uyghur student from China detained after posting a video

In November 2022, peaceful protests, referred to as “white paper protests”, sparked in multiple locations in China due to a fatal lockdown fire on 24 November 2022 and China’s zero-COVID policy in general. The fire had caused the death of at least ten people. In recent years, the Chinese authorities carried out widespread and systematic human rights violations and targeted Uyghur students, scholars, and other members of the Uyghur cultural elite in Artush.[1] Since 2017, 386 known cases of Uyghurs have been interned, disappeared, or imprisoned.

This Article goes into more depth about the case of Kamile Wayit and the urgent call for her release. 

The detention of Kamile Wayit

Kamile Wayit is a 19-year-old Uyghur Muslim and college student living in Henan, China. On 12 December 2022, Kamile was taken by the local Artush city police and detained after she had returned from Artush (Xinjiang), her hometown, for a winter break. According to Kamile’s brother, U.S.-based Kewser Wayit, she was targeted because of a video she posted online regarding the white paper protests. On 2 February 2023, Kewser Wayit called on and demanded that the Chinese authorities release his sister immediately and let her speak to him. He stated that his sister is “innocent and committed no crime.”[2] As of now, Kamile has been in detention since December 2022. Moreover, she is not allowed to have any contact with her family or to have a lawyer of choice. Moreover, Kamile may be subjected to torture and other ill-treatment. 

Urgent call for Kamile’s release

The grounds for Kamile’s detention are unclear, and Kamile’s arrest raises issues regarding the Freedom of Discrimination and the Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Therefore, Kamile should be released immediately unless there is sufficient, credible and admissible evidence that she has committed an internationally recognised criminal offence. Moreover, pending her release, Kamile’s whereabouts should be released, and she should be allowed regular access to her family and a lawyer of her choice. Lastly, pending her release, it should be ensured that Kamile has access to adequate medical care and is not subjected to torture and other ill-treatment. 

Take action!

Amnesty International, a non-governmental organisation standing up for international human rights, has called for action in the form of writing an appeal or signing a petition. By registering an appeal or signing the petition, you can help Kamile and try to protect her well-being. Please go to China: Uyghur student detained for posting protest video: Kamile Wayit – Amnesty International to see the model letter for writing an appeal, or go to Link to sign the petition.

Conclusion

This article discussed the targeting of Uyghur students, scholars, and other members of the Uyghur cultural elite in Artush, with particular attention to the case of Kamile Wayit, like Amnesty International, Broken Chalk calls for action and the urgent need for Kamile’s release.

Furthermore, Broken Chalk calls on the government of China to immediately release all those detained and sentenced for their ethnicity, religion, or peaceful exercise of their fundamental human rights. In addition, Broken Chalk calls on the international community to urgently condemn the Chinese government’s unconscionable persecution of Uyghur Intellectuals.

 

Written by Asha Ouni

[1] UHRP, “Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland”, March 2019, available at: Microsoft Word – UHRP_Intellectuals Report Update 3.docx (accessed on 12/04/2023).

[2] RFA, “U.S.-based Uyghur man calls on China to release his 19-year-old sister”, Jane Tang for RFA Mandarin, 26/01/2023, available at: US-based Uyghur man calls on China to release his 19-year-old sister — Radio Free Asia (rfa.org) (accessed on 12/04/2023).

Ilham Tohti: An Activist Smiling in the Face of Injustice

Ilham Tohti,* a former ethnic Uyghur economics professor at the Beijing Minzu University, recently referred to as ‘China’s Mandela’ by the Guardian,[i] was detained on January 14th, 2014, for inciting separatism, ethnic hatred, and supporting terrorist activities because of his open criticism towards the Chinese governmental policies.[ii] Following his arrest, the two-day show trial between September 17th and 18th, 2014, that led to his condemnation and life imprisonment sentence, came as a great shock to many foreign as well as domestic observers, friends, and organizations who supported Ilham due to his prominent, intimidating, and foremost activism defending the autonomy, linguistic, cultural, and religious rights of minority ethnic Uyghurs. The Uyghurs are a Turkic-speaking and commonly Muslim group, mostly inhabiting in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (henceforth XUAR). Ilham has been referred to as ‘the Uyghur people’s conscience’.[iii]

 

Background

Ilham’s activism began in 1994 when he started writing about the violations suffered by Uyghurs in the XUAR. In 2006, he shifted the attention online when he and other scholars co-founded the website ‘Uyghur Online’ at uighurbiz.org. The website was a Chinese-language platform seeking to bridge the ongoing divisions between the Uyghur minority and the Han Chinese.[iv] The platform essentially served as a space on which Ilham could make the Uyghur voice heard domestically and internationally. It delved into how the Uyghur’s plight contained them feeling looked down upon by the general society and forgotten by the Chinese government regarding socio-economic development. Ilham would invite the Han to an open, peaceful, and rational platform to discuss and debate their differing views because, as he emphasised, the Han were not the enemies of the Uyghurs, despite their discriminatory and often violent attitude towards them.[v]

Through his website, Ilham promoted a peaceful and holistic approach and never once incited or encouraged violence. He was careful about clashing with governmental laws or underlying agreements that exist in civic society.[vi] However, the website began to attract the ire of the Chinese government, which shut the website down for the first time in June 2008 before China hosted the Olympic games. The government reasoned the shutdown on the basis that it publicised links to so-called Uyghur extremists based abroad.[vii] The major ethnic riots in Urumqi, the capital of the XUAR, and terrorist attacks inspired by a more aggressive reading of Islam on July 5th, 2009,[viii] resulted in approximately 200 people killed, 18,000 detained, and between 34 to 37 disappearances. Following this, Ilham openly spoke about the incident and published the names and faces of those who remained disappeared, eventually leading to his house arrest and later incommunicado detention on July 14th for roughly five weeks until, following international pressure, he was released.[ix]

Another crucial moment came when Ilham and his daughter, Jewher, were at the airport to board a flight to the U.S. because Ilham was to take up a position at Indiana University as a visiting scholar. He was stopped by the authorities, beaten, detained, and saw Jewher being put on the flight to the U.S. alone.[x] This incident marked the climax of Ilham’s story. In October 2013, an Uyghur family crashed their Jeep on the Jingshui Bridge of Tiananmen Square, which had been set on fire. The Chinese government labelled it a terrorist attack, which consequently resulted in Ilham increasing his visibility on foreign media of Britain, France, and the U.S., and led to ‘political policemen’ ramming into Ilham’s car on November 2nd when he was on his way to the airport to pick his mother up. The authorities used violence and intimidation, issuing threats to his family’s life if he did not stop talking to the foreign media.[xi] With the pressure being dialled up on Ilham to cease his vocal concerns, he began to express worry about his safety to his personal friends and, somewhat prophetically, in a telephone statement to Mihray Abdilim, a Uyghur Service reporter for Radio Free Asia, that surveillance on him by state security agents increased and felt as if his voice would soon be silenced. Based on this concern, he asked for his last words to be recorded and published only after his detention.[xii]

 

Arrest, violations, and a show trial

In January 2014, around 20 police officers raided Ilham’s apartment in Beijing and beat him in front of his two young children. They detained him and permanently shut his website down. On the following day, Hong Lei, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, explained that he had been ‘criminally detained’. The charges for his detention were disclosed in February when the Bureau of Public Security announced his formal arrest for ‘separatism’ – a vague account that allows for capital punishment – and for recruiting followers from his website.[xiii] His arrest triggered a wave of support for Ilham on the grounds that he had visibly argued against calls for XUAR independence and was in favour of the region remaining a part of China. The website Foreign Policy published their analysis on several of Ilham’s cached articles as part of his evidentiary record, and nowhere did they find any direct or indirect expression of separatism or independence.[xiv] Ilham was held at an undisclosed location for five months, barred from any contact with family or friends, and withheld from meeting his lawyer, Li Fangping, until June 26th, when Li reported that Ilham was enervated at being shackled during the first 20 days of his detention and was refused Halal food for the first 10 days of March. These acts constitute violations of international law and arguably fall under the scope of acts of cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment. Many believe and fear that Ilham may have possibly endured torture.[xv]

Ilham only saw his family after eight months of his hasty and unfair trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by September 23rd, but denies all charges brought against him.[xvi] During the trial, the Prosecutors said that Ilham was portraying terrorists as heroes in his classes, internationalised the ‘Uyghur Question’, and made use of student testimonies that are assumed to have been obtained under duress. Some students faced forced strip searches after Ilham’s arrest, were detained, and some of whom remained missing for long periods, thus highlighting the prosecutors’ attempt to build an incriminating case alleging that Ilham was not the peaceful person who made himself out to be but was instead dangerous in the eyes of Chinese security and had to be silenced by being locked away.[xvii]

 

Behind Ilham’s struggle

But what is Ilham Tohti’s case really about? Uyghur-Han tensions have existed since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), simmering into pockets of unrest bursting from time to time and triggering harsher policies against Uyghurs, especially after Xi Jinping took the helm of government in March 2013 and later unveiled the ‘grand strategic plan’ for the XUAR in December of the same year, with Ilham expressing concerns that the pressure on Uyghurs was about to increase.[xviii] The Chinese government has framed the issue as the ‘Uyghur Question’ or the ‘Xinjiang Problem’ which they have attempted to solve through a process of Sinification, one that has existed for many centuries in Chinese history and that entails the promotion of assimilation rather than integration. It later encouraged the Han Chinese to migrate to the region through policies that favoured the Han over the Uyghurs, and which resulted in an imbalance of socio-economic development. Ilham fell victim to China’s use of censorship technology and laws, where today, even a single post on the Twitter-like app of Sina Weibo can land its author in jail if it seemingly criticises the Chinese government.[xix] Ilham’s imprisonment proves that the Chinese government does not acknowledge the bridge between Uyghurs and the Han. In response to the supposed terror attack by the Uyghurs on Han Chinese in the Kunming train station in March 2014, the government declared a ‘People’s War on Terror’ and targeted scholars, activists, journalists, writers, and human rights lawyers throughout 2014.[xx] The underlying contradiction is that the internet serves as the primary tool to connect human beings across geographical, social, cultural, and linguistic borders and on which much of today’s commerce and communication takes place. Instead, the Chinese government’s ‘Great Firewall’ blocks the consumption of foreign content from entering China and uses the internet as a bludgeoning tool to censor and control digital content according to the approved narrative of China’s image, interests, and policies, criminalizing the spreading of ‘rumours’ online and establishing a pre-registration requirement for any online account that shares political opinions or statements.[xxi]

As the author of this piece, and along with my colleagues at Broken Chalk, I feel a close affinity to the tragic story of Ilham Tohti and many others like him because I, too, have a personal blog where I discuss my concerns about current global affairs. Exercising freedom of expression in the way that Ilham did through his ‘bridge blog’ is not a crime, nor should it unjustly label Ilham as a terrorism supporter, a drug peddler, a weapon seller, or an American agent. He truly sought to get Uyghurs and the Han to engage in conversations, overlook their differences, and become more united as common people. He chose to use peaceful and informed ways of educating others about Uyghurs opposing the narrative that paints them as terrorists, evil, and security risks to the ethos or foundation of Chinese society. Instead, he became a political martyr for ethnic Uyghurs in XUAR, receiving numerous awards for defending and seeking to expand human rights and freedoms,[xxii] and a beacon that continues to shed light upon the precarious situation that Uyghurs have faced in China’s internment camps since 2017, where numerous human rights violations take the form of beatings, torture, rape, killings, forced labour, and the sterilisation of Uyghur women.[xxiii]

Ultimately, Ilham is remembered as knowledgeable and courageous and as having a drive and determination to fight for ethnic Uyghurs, keeping his head up in the face of injustice and intimidation by Chinese authorities.

 

* To read and learn more about Ilham Tohti, there is a recent publication named ‘We Uyghurs Have No Say: An Imprisoned Writer Speaks’ (Verso Books). It is a series of collected essays and articles by Ilham prior to his detention. A paperback and eBook version are available at: https://bit.ly/3wiP6Mv

*Author’s note: throughout the article, his first name is used. In Uyghur culture, his last name, ‘Tohti’, refers to his father’s name, akin to saying that Ilham is the son of Tohti.

 

Written by Karl Baldacchino

Edited by Olga Ruiz Pilato

 

Sources;

[i] Kennedy, H. (2022) ‘We Uyghur’s Have No Say by Ilham Tohti Review – A People Ignored’. The Guardian. Available online from: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/09/we-uyghurs-have-no-say-ilham-tohti-review-background-genocide-china [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[ii] Makinen, J. (2014) ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’. Los Angeles Times. Available online from: https://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-detention-professor-20140117-story.html#axzz2qljh0LfJ [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Wong, E. (2014) ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’. The New York Times. Available online from: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/world/asia/separatism-trial-of-ilham-tohti-uighur-scholar-begins-in-china.html?_r=0 [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Wertime, D. (2014) ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/media/internet-where-nobody-says-anything [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Amnesty International, ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti: Levenslang Gevangengezet’. Available online from: https://www.amnesty.nl/wat-we-doen/themas/sport-en-mensenrechten/ilham-tohti [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Denyer, S. & Rauhala, E. (2016) ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’. The Washington Post. Available online from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/to-beijings-dismay-jailed-uighur-scholar-wins-human-rights-award/2016/10/11/d07dff8c-8f85-11e6-81c3-fb2fde4e7164_story.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’. Available online from: https://pen.org/advocacy-case/ilham-tohti/ [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[iii] Woeser, T. (2009) ‘Interview with Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti’. YouTube. Available online from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQT0iN1nMk8 [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also Johnson, I. (2014) ‘”They Don’t Want Moderate Uighurs”’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/they-dont-want-moderate-uighurs [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[iv] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’; see also Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress. Available online from: https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/defending-freedom-project/prisoners-by-country/China/Ilham%20Tohti#:~:text=Biography%3A%20Ilham%20Tohti%20is%20a,regional%20autonomy%20laws%20in%20China. [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[v] ) ‘Interview With Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti’; see also PEN America (2014) ‘Ilham Tohti: 2014 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award Winner’. YouTube. Available online from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gm6YLWrnKPw [Accessed 19/03/2022].

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[viii] known as 7/5 due to it being a sensitive date in China

[ix] ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also Tohti, I. (2013) ‘The Wounds of the Uyghur People Have Not Healed’. Radio Free Asia. Available online from: https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/wounds-07052013134813.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’.

[x] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’.

[xi] Ibid.; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also Tohti, I. (2013) ‘Uyghur Scholar Tohti Speaks About His Concerns Before Detention’. Radio Free Asia. Available online from: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/interview-02072014182032.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’.

[xii] ‘Uyghur Scholar Tohti Speaks About His Concerns Before Detention’; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’.

[xiii] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’; see also ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[xiv] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’

[xv] Ibid.; see also ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’; see also Cao, Y. (2014) ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/china-2014-through-eyes-human-rights-advocate [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[xvi] ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti: Levenslang Gevangengezet’; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’.

[xvii] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’.

[xviii] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also European Foundation for South Asia Studies, ‘Language, Religion, and Surveillance: A Comparative Analysis of China’s Governance Models in Tibet and Xinjiang’. Available online from: https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/comparative-analysis-of-governance-models-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[xix] Ibid.; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[xx] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Ilham Tohti is the recipient of PEN America’s 2014 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award, the 2016 Martin Ennals Award for human rights defenders who show deep commitment and face great personal risk, Liberal International’s 2017 Prize for Freedom, was nominated in 2019 and 2020 for the Nobel Peace Prize, and awarded in 2019 Freedom Award by Freedom House, the Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.

[xxiii] ‘We Uyghur’s Have No Say by Ilham Tohti Review – A People Ignored’; see also ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti.

 

*cover photo taken from: https://www.omct.org/fr/ressources/declarations/ilham-tohti-2016-martin-ennals-award-laureate-for-human-rights-defender