New property rental laws in the Netherlands: Affordable rent act

Written by Loes Barendrecht

 

From the 1st of July 2024 new rental laws are implemented in the Dutch housing market: The Fixed Rental Contracts Act (Wet vaste huurcontracten). Both for tenants and landlords this new legislation will bring significant changes, aimed to protect the tenants and provide more security. This short article will discuss the main changes, the reasons behind these changes, and highlight potential consequences for students.

Main Changes
From the 1st of July 2024 it is only allowed to offer a rental contract for an indefinite period. Until July 1, 2024, landlords were free to offer fixed term tenancy agreements, these temporary rental contracts automatically end after a set period. However, from July 1, 2024, only permanent rental contracts can be offered. This means that all new rental contracts offered by landlords have to be for an indefinite period. The already existing temporary contracts will remain valid until their end date, but if these contracts are extended, they will be permanent as well.
Exceptions to the Rule
Although permanent rental contracts are now the norm, there are several important exceptions included in a General Administrative Order (AMvB). For specific groups, for example students and urgent housing seekers, it is still possible to obtain a rental contract for a fixed term. However these contracts come with strict rules and can only be for the maximum period of two years.
Reasons for the Changes
The main reasons for the legislation to change was to provide tenants with more security regarding their living situation. Temporary rental contracts can cause uncertainty as tenants often have to move or renegotiate their rental terms at the end of the contract, leading to higher costs. By mandating permanent rental contracts, the position of tenants is strengthened, especially in a stressed housing market as in the Netherlands.
Consequences for Students and International Students
However, particularly for students, the new legislation could have some positive consequences. If the landlord decides to offer a permanent contract, then the law offers more security for students who want to stay in one place longer. They no longer have to worry about finding new accommodation at the end of a temporary contract. This could be particularly beneficial for international students who are often less familiar with the local housing market and have a smaller network to rely on.
But if the landlord decides to offer a fixed contract, students can still benefit from the option of concluding a temporary rental contract for a maximum of two years. This is useful for students who are studying at a particular location for a short period, such as during an exchange program.
Potential Challenges
However there are also some challenges with these new regulations. A possible challenge is that landlords might be less motivated to rent to students, since they have to offer a permanent contract. This could in the long term limit the availability of student housing, especially in cities with high demand for student accommodation.
On top of that, the introduction of permanent rental contracts could lead to an increase in rental prices as landlords try to minimize their risks. Students, who in general do not have a lot of money, may experience additional financial pressure as a result.
In short
The Fixed Rental Contracts Act, effective from July 1, 2024, changes the Dutch rental market. While the law is intended to provide tenants with more security, specific exceptions have been made for certain groups. This legislation will increase housing security for many tenants but may also introduce new challenges, especially for students and international students. It is important for both tenants and landlords to stay up to date about the new rules and understand their rights and obligations.

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Source

Changes in rules and regulations in summer and autumn 2024 | I amsterdam. (n.d.). I Amsterdam.
https://www.iamsterdam.com/en/live-work-study/living/whats-changing-in-the-netherlands-in-summer-2024

Ministerie van Algemene Zaken. (2024, July 15). Mag mijn verhuurder mij een tijdelijk huurcontract aanbieden?Rijksoverheid.nl. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/huurwoning-zoeken/vraag-en-antwoord/wanneer-kan-ik-tijdelijk-huren

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. (2024, June 7). Wet vaste huurcontracten vanaf 1 juli 2024 van kracht. Nieuwsbericht | Rijksoverheid.nl. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2024/06/07/wet-vaste-huurcontracten-vanaf-1-juli-2024-van-kracht

 

Freedom of expression in Turkey: Lawyers and Arrests: Dilek Ekmekçi and others

By Panashe Marie Louise Mlambo

Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right that protects the ability to express oneself without unjustified restrictions. It is normally undisputed when dealing with social media presence when individuals share their opinions without erroneous implications. However, in Turkey, despite the Constitution providing for freedom of speech, many laws and legislations have been enacted, and amendments have been made to undermine the very principle of freedom of expression. This article will provide an analysis of freedom of speech and the legal system in Turkey and take a look at the charges against different lawyers in the context of International law, Turkish Law, and countries near it, using the 2024 case of Dilek Ekmekçi as the case study. 


The Arrests of Lawyers

A lawyer named Dilek Ekmekçi was released from prison on October 22, 2024, only to be promptly detained again by police, reflecting the ongoing repression faced by legal professionals in Turkey. This incident follows a troubling trend highlighted by the Court of Cassation’s ruling on September 18, 2020, which upheld the sentences of 14 human rights lawyers from the People’s Law Office, , who were convicted on similar charges. The crackdown continued with the recent arrest of Naim Eminoğlu and Doğa İncesu on July 2, 2024, both prominent members of the Progressive Lawyers Association, accused of being part of the Gülen Movement.  In January 2024, a staggering sentence of over 125 years was handed down to 19 lawyers,  further illustrating the Turkish government’s aggressive stance against those perceived as dissenters. These cases underscore the precarious situation for lawyers in Turkey, where legal actions are increasingly viewed as tools for political suppression rather than justice.


The law against the people

Under The Social Media Law (2020), the Turkish government can restrict and monitor any social media interactions and online free speech if necessary  and this is one of the ways in which all these lawyers mentioned above had their data used for a case to be made against them. Coupled with Turkey’s Anti-Terror Law (Law No. 3713), which penalises individuals who disclose or publish the identity of officials on anti-terrorist duties or who identify such persons as targets, this is used broadly, and in most cases of online discourse, the different individuals are arrested for incitement and spreading of terrorism rhetoric.  


In addition to the above, law enforcement usually limits freedom of speech with Article 125 of the Penal Code, which criminalises defamation and slander. In 90% of the cases above, the three legislations are cited together to justify the limitation of freedom of speech and arrest individuals who use online platforms to share their opinions on fraud, murder, and many more. Recent developments, such as the passing of the controversial “disinformation law” in October 2022, exemplify this trend by criminalising the dissemination of false information, which is determined by the government. 


As can be deduced from the above cases and legal frameworks in Turkey, the country’s laws are against international laws of freedom of speech, particularly breaches Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information without interference by public authority.  The disinformation law also violates Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protects the right to seek, receive, and impart information.  


In 2021, the ECHR ruled that Turkey violated freedom of expression rights in the case of Vedat Şorli, who faced criminal charges and pre-trial detention for criticising the president on social media.  The ECHR concluded that this conviction represented unjustified interference with Şorli’s freedom of speech and in a 2014 case, journalists Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener were detained as part of the OdaTV investigation after publishing material critical of government-linked entities. The ECHR ruled that their detention violated both their rights to a fair trial and freedom of expression. 


Despite these findings, he Turkish government continues utilising the legal frameworks to arrest and detain different individuals who use social media to criticise the government. 

Lawyer Dilek Ekmekçi

The case of Dilek Ekmekçi highlights the ongoing challenges to judicial independence and freedom of expression in Turkey. Ekmekçi, after accusing prominent leaders of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) of being involved in the assassination of former Grey Wolves leader Sinan Ateş, was arrested; her allegations targeted high-ranking MHP members, including figures close to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; she was charged with defamation and insulting public officials through social media posts. Despite an initial release, the prosecutor’s appeal led to her re-arrest by the Istanbul 25th High Criminal Court. 


In her court statements, Ekmekçi claimed that her detention was due to a fabricated indictment and referenced other government actions intended to undermine her legal standing. She cited instances where she was pressured, including through threats of psychiatric evaluations and multiple lawsuits. Ekmekçi’s defence argued that her prosecution was a retaliatory measure aimed at silencing her criticism, categorising the case as a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation), often used to intimidate and suppress dissenting voices. 


The state of freedom of expression 

The state of freedom of expression in Turkey has reached a critical juncture, characterized by systemic repression and legal frameworks that stifle dissent. Recent legislative measures, such as the controversial “disinformation law” passed in October 2022, exemplify the government’s tightening grip on free speech, allowing for the criminalisation of information deemed false and imposing severe penalties for those who share it (Amnesty International, 2022).  


This law has been criticised for creating a chilling effect, deterring individuals from expressing their opinions, or engaging in public discourse for fear of prosecution. Additionally, the Turkish judiciary has increasingly become an instrument of political control, often disregarding rulings from the European Court of Human Rights that emphasise the protection of free expression (English PEN).  


The cases of lawyers like Dilek Ekmekçi, who faced charges under anti-terrorism laws for their advocacy work, highlight the precarious position of legal professionals in Turkey. As the government continues to utilise vague legal definitions to target critics, it undermines not only national constitutional guarantees but also international human rights obligations, effectively rendering freedom of expression nearly non-existent in Turkey’s current political climate (Freedom House).


Conclusion

It is evident that the Turkish government’s restructuring of the legal system aims to suppress all criticism of its officials and minimise freedom of expression. The excessive measures employed to address issues such as slander against officials do not resonate with the general public, and the blatant disregard for international law and democratic principles raises serious concerns that must be addressed. The legal profession, much like activism, journalism, and other sectors of society, deserves to uphold its freedom of expression. The direct targeting of the judicial system, evidenced by the significant number of lawyers arrested in less than a decade, signals a broader issue within the system and undermines the Turkish government’s claims of democracy. The case of Dilek Ekmekçi is not an isolated incident; rather, it reflects a troubling pattern of similar cases occurring throughout the country.

Featured Photo by Wesley Tingey on Unsplash

References

 i       Front Line Defenders. (n.d.). 14 lawyers arrested and charged. Front Line Defenders. Retrieved from https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/14-lawyers-arrested-and-charged 

 ii       International Observatory for Lawyers in Danger. (n.d.). Joint statement of international protest condemning Turkey’s arrest of Naim Eminoglu and Doğa İncesu of the Progressive Lawyers Association (CHD). International Observatory for Lawyers in Danger. Retrieved from https://protect-lawyers.org/en/joint-statement-of-international-protest-condemning-turkeys-arrest-of-naim-eminoglu-and-doga-incesu-of-the-progressive-lawyers-association-chd-2/ 

 iii      The Arrested Lawyers Initiative. (2024). Ankara appeal court defies ECHR, sentences 19 lawyers to 125 years. The Arrested Lawyers Initiative. Retrieved from https://arrestedlawyers.org/2024/01/31/ankara-appeal-court-defies-echr-sentences-19-lawyers-to-125-years/ 

 iv      Kandemir, E., & Hudson, M. (2022). Turkey’s new media law is bad news, but don’t report it. Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/turkeys-new-media-law-is-bad-news-but-dont-report-it/ 

 v      Republic of Turkey. (1991). Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. 3713) on crimes committed by terrorist organizations. Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey.

 vi      United Nations. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). United Nations Treaty Collection.  

  European Court of Human Rights. (2021). Şorli v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights.

 vii    JURIST. (2021). Europe rights court: Turkey liable for freedom of expression right violation. JURIST News. Retrieved from https://www.jurist.org/news/2021/10/europe-rights-court-turkey-liable-for-freedom-of-expression-right-violation/ 

 ix    Turkish Minute. (2024). Lawyer arrested after accusing Erdogan, far-right ally of ex-Grey Wolves leader’s murder. Turkish Minute. Retrieved from https://www.turkishminute.com/2024/09/02/lawyer-arrested-after-accusing-erdogan-far-right-ally-ex-grey-wolves-leaders-murder/ 

 x    Amnesty International. (2022). Turkey: New disinformation law poses serious threat to freedom of expression. Amnesty International.  

 xi      English PEN. (n.d.). Turkey: Freedom of expression in jeopardy. English PEN. 



Current Issues The conflict in Congo: impact on education

By Zoe Alford

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is undergoing a major humanitarian crisis, that is severely impacting education and human rights. Due to the ongoing conflict in the region, millions of people have been displaced, teachers kidnapped and schools turned into battlegrounds. Escalation of the conflict in the North Kivu region of the DRC has forced 540 schools to close in the past year, removing pivotal educational opportunities from many students (Save the Children, 2024).

Education in the DRC:

This current situation unravels decades of progress in the DRC, where great strides had been made in recent decades to create universal access to education. Access to primary school education has increased significantly in the last few decades, with net attendance rates increasing from 52% in 2001 to 78% in 2018 (UNICEF, 2024).

Nonetheless, the country still faces major structural issues regarding access to education. 7.6 million children and half of all girls between age 5-17 are not in school, with the cost of school for families living in poverty being a major reason (UNICEF, 2024). Despite the promise of free primary education from the DRC government, households facing extreme poverty struggle to pay for registration fees, school uniforms and school supplies (UNICEF, 2024). Secondary school enrolment rates further reflect this education gender gap, with 44% of girls enrolled compared to 70% of boys (UNESCO, 2024). This is further reflected in secondary school completion rates with just 51.4% of girls and 63.5% of boys continuing onto graduation (UNESCO, 2024). For higher education, 5% of women and 8% of men were enrolled in tertiary education in 2020 (UNESCO, 2024).

Payroll fraud, insufficient budgets, and a lack of materials and infrastructure also create challenges for the educational system in the DRC. Many of the 500,000 teachers in the country have gone without government pay for many years, leaving parents responsible to supplement their pay (Brant et al., 2021). In a country with already high levels of poverty, this creates a major financial obstacle to education. Teachers often must supplement their low incomes with second or even third jobs, reducing their time, energy, and passion and consequentially the quality of teaching (Brant et al., 2021).

The gender gap in school enrolment, the socio-economic disparities in educational access, as well as financing issues, are only worsened by the escalating conflict in the DRC. With the closing of hundreds of schools in the country, these systemic issues have and will continue to exacerbate, leaving hundreds of thousands more and more children without education opportunities.

Violence in North Kivu:

Since the beginning of the conflict in DRC in 1996, more than 6 million people have died and many millions more displaced (CFR, 2024). Beginning in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the First Congo War saw the invasion of the eastern part of the DRC by Rwandan troops and Congo-based Tutsi militias. The invasion of the north Kivu region was supported by Uganda, Burundi and Congo’s then opposition leader and future leader Laurent Kabila. Rwandan officials justified the invasion, arguing that Hutu groups in eastern DRC were still a threat to their Tutsi population who had been decimated during the genocide. While some Hutu militants were killed, the majority of the thousands of causalities were refugees and non-combatant Congolese (CFR, 2024). In 1998, the second Congo War saw worsening political tensions between armed groups and governments in the region. With targeted campaigns against the Huti amounting to war crimes, it caused international outrage. In a failed coup attempt, DRC’s leader, Kabila, was assassinated and replaced by his son (CFR, 2024). The following years saw peace agreements between DRC, Rwanda and Uganda implemented, however rebel groups continued to emerge creating tensions and flashpoints in the last two decades. Most notability, is M23, a mostly Tutsi rebel group with ties to the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. The name is taken from March 23 2009, when the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) signed a peace treaty with the DRC government, becoming a political party and the M23 soldiers integrated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Islamic State (ISIS) are two major Islamist rebel and affiliated militia groups (Lawal, 2024). The DRC’s abundance of natural resources, especially their large reserves of rare earth minerals and metals essential for modern technology, has propelled their local problems onto the international stage. The involvement of China and historically, large US tech companies has only created further tensions and deepened inequality.

The violent and fraudulent national elections in 2023 saw major clashes between M23 and ADF. This again escalated in February 2024, creating a humanitarian disaster, political chaos and insecurity across the region. Education is not only indirectly affected by this conflict, but also actively targeted. Armed groups have seized 23 schools in the north Kivu region and directly attacked 10 schools (Save the Children, 2024). Teachers have also been kidnapped and students abducted on the way to school or in class. A further 29 schools have also been turned into emergency shelters for displaced civilians (Save the Children, 2024).

Conflict and its impacts on education:

Conflict also indirectly impacts on the right to education. Economic hardship often leaves children forced to work instead of going to school, with girls disproportionally affected. The long-term consequences of conflict can be felt by generations to long-term development setbacks and lack of opportunity (Mlaba, 2023). This leads to long term economic and social disruption, which in turn can trigger further conflicts in the future. Education and its relationship to conflict is often “complex, multi-scalar and non-linear” (Novelli & Cardozo, 2008), meaning that the impacts of conflict are often not immediately noticeable.

Emergency Education:

International efforts have been made to mitigate these effects by protecting education during conflicts and promoting conflict-sensitive education strategies (Mlaba, 2023). As an example of such mitigation efforts, UNICEF, the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) have partnered up to construct three temporary learning spaces (UNICEF, 2024). In just a few weeks, with support from local communities, classrooms were constructed using wood and other readily available materials. These new spaces have allowed several dozen additional pupils to enrol. The temporary classes provide displaced children the opportunity to continue their education and benefit children from nearby families (UNICEF, 2024). On top of their academic studies, students are also learning essential social skills, such as interacting and building relationships with others outside their immediate community. Unfortunately, however, with around 3 quarter of a million children out of school because of this conflict, a lot more must be done to ensure all Congolese children have access to education (UNICEF, 2023).

Conclusively, To to ensure peace and development not only in the DRC, but across the globe, it is of paramount importance that education is prioritised for all children. By protecting education, investing in quality teachers, educating future generations about history and financing rebuilding projects, a more stable and equal society can be reached. While access to education is perhaps not the first issue that comes to mind when discussing the conflict in the DRC, it is highly important to use education as a tool to safeguard long-term stability and peace.

References

Brandt, C.O., Marchais, G., Mwakupemba, J.T., Moshonas, S. De Herdt, T. (2021). Why payroll fraud in the DRC’s education sector will be hard to fix. The Conversation.

https://theconversation.com/why-payroll-fraud-in-the-drcs-education-sector-will-be-hard-to-fix-162257

Center for preventative action (CFR). (May 15, 2024). Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo

Lawal, S. (February 21, 2024). A guide to the decades-long conflict in DR Congo. Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/21/a-guide-to-the-decades-long-conflict-in-dr-congo

Mlaba, K. (June 26, 2023). How do war & conflict impact education? Global Citizen. https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/how-do-war-conflict-impact-education/

Novelli, M., & Cardozo, M.T.L. (2008). Conflict, education and the global south: New critical directions. International Journal of Educational Development, 28(4), 473-488. doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2008.01.004

Save the Children. (2024, March 28). DRC: Violence in North Kivu forces over 500 schools to close, with teachers kidnapped and students terrified [Press release].

https://www.savethechildren.net/news/drc-violence-north-kivu-forces-over-500-schools-close-teachers-kidnapped-and-students-terrified

UNICEF. (March 29, 2023). Conflict in eastern DRC is having a devastating impact on children’s education. UNICEF [Press release].

https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/conflict-eastern-drc-having-devastating-impact-childrens-education

UNICEF. (2024). Education: every child has the right to go to school and learn.

https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/en/what-we-do/education

UNICEF. (February 22, 2024). A wish to return to school is realized. UNICEF

https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/en/stories/wish-return-school-realized

UNSECO. (January, 2024). Congo, Democratic Republic (DRC): Education Country Brief. International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa.

https://www.iicba.unesco.org/en/node/80#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20UNESCO%20Institute,and%2063.5%20percent%20of%20boys

 

Featured image by Doug Linstedt  from Unsplash

Missing children of Dutch asylum shelters

By Mayeda Tayyab

In May 2024, Lost in Europe released the findings of their investigation into the disappearance of unaccompanied children in Europe. This investigation revealed that 51,433 children disappeared from refugee centres across Europe between 2021 and 2023, with Italy having the highest number of missing unaccompanied minors at 22,899 children (Van den Hof, 2024). Unfortunately, this is not the first time such a discovery has been done.

Netherlands:

15,404 unaccompanied refugee minors registered in the Netherlands in the last three years (Dutch News, 2024). 850 of these children have disappeared from asylum shelters without any trace (Van den Hof, 2024).

Before 2024:

This is not the first time the Dutch authorities have found themselves in this situation. In 2023, 360 minors had disappeared from refugee shelters in the Netherlands between 2022 and 2023, all of whom vanished from the Ter Apel reporting centre. That year, 4449 minors without parents or guardians had applied for asylum in the Netherlands (Dutch News, 2023).

Government response: 

The Human Rights Committee has asked the Dutch government to take urgent measures in investigating the trend of missing unaccompanied minors as well as addressing the root issues causing these disappearances. The Dutch government has also been asked to improve the quality of living standards and resources provided to children in the asylum shelters.

The Dutch national rapporteur on human trafficking, Hermann Bolhaar, has criticised the Dutch refugee system and the government for their lack of implementing any protective and safeguarding measures, given the urgency of the situation and the danger unaccompanied children are finding themselves in.

Missing-children-of-Dutch-asylum-shelters-Download

Poland’s Education System: Striving for Equity and Inclusion to Fulfill the Right to Education

By Iris Karoli

The modern Polish  emerged in the aftermath of World War II, addressing the significant challenge of rebuilding the country’s social and economic frameworks. Since then, it has undergone extensive reforms, particularly since the fall of communism in 1989. Significant adjustments to educational policies were required due to this crucial shift to a market economy to better reflect democratic values and satisfy the needs of a society that was changing quickly.

Since September 1, 2017, the Polish educational system has been undergoing reform. The Law on School Education and the Provisions introducing the Law on School Education are two significant Acts passed by the Parliament in December 2016.

Providing teachers with sufficient resources, training, and support will help Poland prioritize integrating students with special educational needs (SEN) into regular classrooms. SEN students can flourish in the classroom and contribute to their overall success by emphasizing inclusive education practices and customized support plans.

Overall, Poland needs to take a multifaceted approach to achieve universal access to education that tackles structural inequalities, advances equity, and cultivates an inclusive culture within the educational system. Poland can get closer to achieving its goal of a society in which every person has the chance to learn, develop, and prosper by keeping these initiatives as a top priority and making investments in the future of its students.

Polands-Education-System-Striving-for-Equity-and-Inclusion-to-Fulfill-the-Right-to-Education-1Download

Upcoming country visit of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries to Côte d’Ivoire.

Presented by Ariel Ozdemir and Caren Thomas

The history of Côte d’Ivoire shows periods of political instability and coups. The 2002 Ivorian Civil War deepened the divisions within the country. 1 The presidential election in 2010 highlighted the power struggle between the candidates, which increased the political and ethnic tensions in the country. This constant state of political instability and civil unrest can contribute to Ivorian nationals’ being more susceptible to recruitment into mercenary activities. The lawlessness prevalent within Côte d’Ivoire may force individuals to seek stability or financial gain from different sources.
Despite Côte d’Ivoire being the largest economy in the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the country’s 46.3 per cent of its population is below the poverty line. Gender inequalities continue to persist within the country. This is noticed right from the grassroot level. Only 52 per cent of the girls have completed secondary education in the country compared to 63 per cent of the boys. Additionally, the fluctuations in cocoa, coffee, and palm oil export prices severely impact the Ivorians as their livelihoods depend on these commodities. 2

However, despite the progress in domestic legal responses to mercenarism in Côte d’Ivoire, the country has yet to ratify the 1989 Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. While the country supported the 3rd Cycle UPR recommendation to ratify the convention, the mid-term assessment outlined the lack of any substantial actions to do so. 6 As a result, Côte d’Ivoire still has substantial further progress to make in its fight against the use of mercenaries. An optimistic sign as to potential future progress on ratification can be found in the Ivorian Minister of Foreign Affairs’ 2019 speech, in which he asserted Ivorian support for the convention and urged those nations to ratify the convention that had not yet done so. However, whether this declaration represents a wider domestic desire to begin the ratification process is yet unclear.

PMC activities pose significant threats to Ivorian stability. Foreign actors have been exporting PMC and military equipment to many countries on the African continent, and Côte d’Ivoire is no exception. Two principal PMC’s have a strong presence in the country, namely the French PMC CorpGuard 12 and the Russian Wagner group. Since 2017, CorpGuard, founded by Secopex’ co-founder David Hornus, which is itself active in Somalia and the CAR, has been training the Ivorian military. 13 According to CorpGuard, during a 9-month training period they set up 4 infantry companies, 1 operational center, and trained 1,235 soldiers “to United Nations standards”. 14
Despite being strongly marketed as harbingers of peace and allegedly participating in the transformation of Ivorian military personnel from “soldiers in war” to “soldiers of peace”, 15 the complete lack of regulation of PMCs has resulted in an inability to enforce legitimacy and accountability. In this light, CorpGuard’s training of President Alassane Ouattara’s military can be understood to have had a direct impact on the 2020 electoral violence.

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23A-Upcoming_country_visit_of_the_Working_Group_on_the_use_of_mercenaries_to_Cote_dIvoire

Photo by Alexander Jawfox on Unsplash

References

1 Tayoh, B. (2009). Background information. In Property Taxation in Francophone West Africa: Case Study of Côte d’Ivoire (pp. 1–4). Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18288.3
2 Nelson, N. (2020). The Top 3 Causes of Poverty in Côte d’Ivoire. The Borgen Project. https://borgenproject.org/poverty-in-cote-divoire/

6 S.E.M. Marcel Amon-Tanoh. “Conseil De Sécurité Des Nations Unies Débat Public De Haut Niveau Sur Le Thème: Les Activités Mercenaires Comme Source D’insecurite Et De Destabilisation En Afrique Centrale Déclaration De S.E.M. Marcel Amon-Tanoh Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères De La République De Côte d’Ivoire.” New York, February 4, 2019. https://press.un.org/fr/2019/cs13688.doc.htm

12 Note: David Hornus rejects the description of CorpGuard as a PMC and claims that “CorpGuard is an operational security and defense service company which does not meet the designation of a private military company.” source: Martin, Elise. “Armée: de Lyon à la Côte d’Ivoire, pourquoi la société « de sécurité et de défense » CorpGuard interroge?” 20 Minutes, April 28, 2023. https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/4034203-20230428-armee-lyon-cote-ivoire-pourquoi-societe-securite-defense-corpguard-interroge
13 Kadlec, Amanda. “In Africa, Wagner Is Not the Only Game in Town.” New Lines Magazine (blog), July 17, 2023. https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/in-africa-wagner-is-not-the-only-game-in-town/
14 CorpGuard. “Developments And Challenges of Peacekeeping Operation in The French-Speaking World 2017-2020.” CORPGUARD Conseil International (blog), May 26, 2020. https://www.corpguard.com/fr/evolutions-et-defis-du-maintien-de-la-paix-dans-lespace-francophone/
15 Observatoire. “Table ronde du 4 octobre 2017 – 3ème panel.” OBG, October 7, 2017. https://www.observatoire-boutros-ghali.org/2017/10/table-ronde-du-4-octobre-2017-3/

Country Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Presented by Merve Tiregul

Recent data spanning from March 2020 to June 2021 further highlights this disparity, indicating that black women were 14% less likely to be referred to Refuge for assistance by the police compared to their white counterparts who are survivors of domestic abuse. 2 The data implies a systematic failure by the police to adequately support Black women against domestic abuse. According to Victim Support’s research in 2022, victims of domestic abuse, particularly from Black and ethnic minority backgrounds, often face dismissal and marginalisation by the police. The study found that nearly half of Black and ethnic minority respondents felt that the police treated them differently due to their heritage. Over half of all respondents reported instances of domestic abuse multiple times before receiving appropriate police action, with almost a quarter needing to report three times or more. Despite increased reports of domestic abuse, recent data from the Office for National Statistics shows an 8% rise in related offences, underlining the urgent need for improved support and response mechanisms for victims. 3

According to a 2020 survey conducted in the UK, Black, minoritised women, and non-binary individuals were more prone to experiencing online violence during COVID-19, with many reporting worsened abuse during the pandemic. This emphasises the necessity of adopting responses that incorporate an intersectional perspective. 46% of the participants indicated they had encountered online abuse since the onset of COVID-19. This percentage rose to 50% among Black and minoritised women and nonbinary individuals. Among survey participants who encountered online abuse in the year prior to the survey, 29% noted that it intensified during the COVID-19 period. Black and minoritised women and non-binary individuals were disproportionately affected, with 38% indicating that the pandemic contributed to heightened online violence. Gender emerged as the most frequently cited reason for online abuse, with 48% reporting gender-based abuse, followed by 21% for abuse related to gender identity and sexual orientation, 18% for ethnicity, 10% for religion, and 7% for disability. Black and minoritised individuals were almost as likely to face abuse based on ethnicity as they were on gender, with 46% reporting gender-based abuse and 43% reporting ethnicity-based abuse. Additionally, they were more prone to religious-based abuse compared to white respondents. 4

In England, since September 2020, Relationships Education has been mandatory for all primary school pupils, while Relationships and Sex Education (RSE) has been compulsory for secondary pupils, alongside Health Education for all students in state-funded schools. RSE curriculum encompasses crucial topics such as sexual consent, exploitation, abuse, grooming, harassment, rape, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and domestic abuse, aiming to equip students with the knowledge to navigate current and future relationships. In primary schools, comprehensive sex and relationships education can empower children to stay safe by fostering confidence in seeking help, understanding bodily autonomy, and providing appropriate language for discussing private body parts. 15

The UK recently updated the Relationship and Sexuality Education (RSE) curriculum requirements in Northern Ireland. The new curriculum will include age-appropriate, comprehensive, and scientifically accurate education on sexual and reproductive health and rights. The education will provide factual information on preventing pregnancy, abortion rights, and accessing relevant services without advocating a particular stance. 16

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References

2 Refuge. (2021, September 30). Ahead of Black History Month, Refuge calls for better protection for Black women experiencing domestic abuse. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://refuge.org.uk/news/refuge-better-protection-of-black-women-domestic-abuse/
3 Victim Support. (2022, December 1). New research shows police failing to act on domestic abuse reports – ethnic minority victims worst affected. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.victimsupport.org.uk/new-research-shows-police-failing-to-act-on-domestic-abuse-reports-ethnic-minority-victims-worst-affected/
4 End Violence Against Women. (2020). The ripple effect: COVID-19 and the epidemic of online abuse. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Glitch-and-EVAW-The-Ripple-Effect-Online-abuse-during-COVID-19-Sept-2020.pdf

15 Female genital mutilation: resource pack. (2023). Gov.uk. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/female-genital-mutilation-resource-pack/female-genital-mutilation-resource-pack
16 New requirements for Relationship and Sexuality Education curriculum in Northern Ireland. (2023). Gov.uk. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-requirements-for-relationship-and-sexuality-education-curriculum-in-northern-ireland

Follow-up to the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls’ country visits to Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Greece, Poland, Honduras, Chad, Samoa, Kuwait and Hungary

Presented by Ariel Ozdemir, Luna Plet and Olimpia Guidi

The Lenca, indigenous to southwestern Honduras and northeastern El Salvador, reside in approximately 50 villages within a 100-km radius of La Esperanza, the capital city of the mountainous Intibucá department. 1 Most of these villages find themselves on the outskirts of the public education system due to factors such as poverty, age, geographic isolation, gender, and ethnicity. These circumstances collectively contribute to the difficulty in accessing education for many inhabitants.
The educational hurdles for Lenca girls in Honduras, especially in regions like San Francisco de Opalaca, are intricate and deeply influenced by socio-economic, cultural, and geographical factors. These challenges are marked by restricted access to education due to economic constraints, particularly affecting girls pursuing primary education. Gender-sensitive education proves to be a critical aspect of the struggles faced by Lenca girls. Prevailing patriarchal norms pose obstacles to their educational opportunities.
Concerns about the quality of education in public schools, notably in regions like San Francisco de Opalaca, are pronounced. Challenges include limited access to junior high schools in most villages and the geographic obstacles that impede education beyond grade 6. 2 Inadequacies in the education infrastructure, such as a shortage of teachers and insufficient facilities, further hinder the provision of quality education for Lenca girls. Furthermore, with a literacy rate of 30-50%, the Lenca population typically spends an average of only four years in school. 3 This low educational attainment contributes to a pervasive sense of inferiority and a lack of confidence in advocating for a democratic and civil society.
The need for revamping the curriculum to address gender equality, stereotypes, and violence is evident. Emphasis is placed on incorporating human rights workshops to create awareness about gender, cultural, educational, and employment equality. 4 This approach strives to foster an inclusive and supportive educational environment, empowering Lenca girls and addressing societal challenges they encounter.

education for disadvantaged communities . 21 Women and girls, already facing obstacles in pursuing education, find themselves further marginalised by the privatisation of schooling . 22
Consider the challenges faced by promising young students in La Esperanza who experience increased fees due to their schools’ privatisation, leading to their education’s abandonment. This educational setback not only perpetuates the cycle of poverty but also underscores the gendered impact of privatisation on educational opportunities for women and girls.
Expanding on the educational aspect, it’s essential to recognise that privatisation can lead to a reduction in educational resources. Privatised institutions may prioritise profit over educational quality, leaving women in poverty with fewer educational support systems. This, in turn, perpetuates systemic disadvantages, limiting the potential for upward mobility through education.
Healthcare Challenges
Privatisation in the healthcare sector can pose significant challenges for vulnerable populations, particularly women. As essential healthcare services become privatised, the financial burden on impoverished women intensifies, limiting their access to crucial medical support. The lack of affordable healthcare options further entrenches gender disparities in health outcomes . 23

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References

1 Susan Stone, “El Maestro En Casa,” El Maestro en Casa, accessed January 20, 2024, https://lencaedu.wordpress.com/
2 Wanda Bedard, “2009 – Honduras,” 60 million girls, accessed January 20, 2024, https://60millionsdefilles.org/en/our-projects/2009-honduras/
3 Susan Stone, “El Maestro En Casa,” El Maestro en Casa, accessed January 20, 2024, https://lencaedu.wordpress.com/
4 Wanda Bedard, “2009 – Honduras,” 60 million girls, accessed January 20, 2024, https://60millionsdefilles.org/en/our-projects/2009-honduras/

21 Edwards Jr, D. B., Moschetti, M., & Caravaca, A. (2023). Globalisation and privatisation of education in Honduras—Or the need to reconsider the dynamics and legacy of state formation. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 44(4), 635-649. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01596306.2020.1852181
22 Murphy-Graham, E. (2007). Promoting participation in public life through secondary education: evidence from Honduras. Prospects, 37(1), 95-111. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11125-007-9013-2
23 Hasemann Lara, J. E. (2023). Health Sector Reform in Honduras: Privatisation as Institutional Bad Faith. Medical Anthropology, 42(1), 62-75. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01459740.2022.2125388

2024 Thematic Report to the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly

Presented by Olimpia Guidi and Sarah Kuipers

Human rights organisations and NGOs play a crucial role in monitoring the impact of sanctions on human rights and providing support to affected parties. 12

In addressing the impact of sanctions on rights, Russia has recourse to various international mechanisms. These include the United Nations (UN), which it can engage through the UN Security Council, leveraging its position as a permanent member to voice concerns and negotiate resolutions. 15 Additionally, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Russia can challenge trade-related sanctions that contravene WTO agreements through dispute settlement mechanisms. 16

Furthermore, Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe subjects it to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 17 Individuals or entities affected by sanctions can bring cases before the ECHR alleging violations of human rights protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. 18 Moreover, Russia could potentially utilise the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to challenge sanctions it believes violate international law or treaties. 19

However, ICJ jurisdiction requires the consent of all parties involved, posing limitations on its effectiveness. 20

Despite these avenues, the effectiveness of international mechanisms in safeguarding rights impacted by sanctions is subject to various limitations. Political considerations often hinder progress, with powerful actors reluctant to challenge one another’s actions. 21 Legal processes within these international bodies are typically time-consuming, offering delayed relief. 22 Enforcement of decisions and compliance by sanction-imposing countries can also be challenging. Furthermore, the scope of these mechanisms may not fully address the extraterritorial application of sanctions or their broader economic ramifications.

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References

12 Goncharenko, G., & Khadaroo, I. (2020). Disciplining human rights organisations through an accounting regulation: A case of the ‘foreign agents’ law in Russia. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 72, 102129. Available at:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S104523541930108X

15 Gifkins, J. (2021). Beyond the veto: Roles in UN Security Council decision-making. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 27(1), 1-24.
16 Gantvarg, I. (2023). Categorisation and Legality of Trade Sanctions Imposed on Russia: Examining Compatibility with WTO and UN Legislation.
17 Nelaeva, G. A., Khabarova, E. A., & Sidorova, N. V. (2020). Russia’s Relations with the European Court of Human Rights in the Aftermath of the Markin Decision: Debating the “Backlash”. Human Rights Review, 21, 93-112
18 Ibid.
19 Sarkin, J. J., & Sarkin, E. (2022). Reforming the International Court of Justice to Deal with State Responsibility for Conflict and Human Rights Violations. International Human Rights Law Review, 11(1), 1-35. Available at:https://brill.com/view/journals/hrlr/11/1/article-p1_001.xml
20 Wulandari, R. (2022). Jurisdiction Issues of the International Court and the effectiveness of ICJ’s Decision in the Russia-Ukraine Dispute Resolution. Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari’ah dan Masyarakat, 22(2), 343-350.
21 Frye, T. (2022). Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia. Princeton University Press.
22 Ibid.


Examining Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Implications for Currently and Formerly Incarcerated Populations

Presented by Samantha Orozco and Ariel Ozdemir

In the complex landscape of United States prison labour, there exist six primary categories of prison labour, namely maintenance work within carceral facilities, state prison industries, public works assignments benefiting governmental and non-profit entities, employment with private industries, work-release programs and restitution centres, and agricultural work.

Maintenance work primarily consists of tasks to maintain the prisons themselves, such as janitorial duties, food preparation, grounds maintenance, repair work, laundry, and providing essential services like working in prison hospitals, stockrooms, stores, barber shops, and libraries.

Discriminatory labour assignments
According to a report by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on exploitative carceral labour, race is a large determinant in work assignments. The report reveals that Black men are predominantly assigned to lower-paying or unpaid work such as agricultural, maintenance, or other facilities services jobs, while a higher proportion of white men are assigned to higher-paying jobs such as public works positions.

Inadequate wages & extortion
Incarcerated labourers are paid inadequate wages, often receiving minimal to no compensation; this condition has continued for decades without noticeable improvement. Moreover, prisons, along with the federal government, routinely deduct substantial portions—sometimes up to 80%—of these meagre wages to cover court-imposed fines, taxes, family support, restitution, and room and board expenses, exacerbating the financial burdens faced by those behind bars. According by the ACLU report, states also use the profits garnered from wage deductions “to sustain and expand incarceration” for such things as the construction and renovation of carceral facilities and the establishment and expansion of prison labour programs. Prisons frequently exploit and extort inmates by charging them exorbitant prices for essential items such as phone calls to families and toiletries. Consequently, the families of incarcerated individuals experience significant financial strain to meet these basic needs under price gouging. This also contributes to increased community-level financial insecurity and incarceration in areas with higher rates of incarcerated community members, perpetuating a vicious cycle of exploitation and insecurity.

Incarcerated labourers are not protected by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), a federal statute that sets minimum standards and safeguards for health and safety in the workplace. As a result of the lack of workplace protections, incarcerated workers face many dangers in the workplace. Despite lacking jurisdiction to protect these workers, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has conducted limited investigations which have uncovered severe health and safety concerns and a complete failure to ensure protections in the workplace.

Firstly, many lack proper safety training, leaving them vulnerable to preventable injuries and even fatalities while on the job. A staggering 70% of those surveyed by the ACLU reported receiving no formal job training. Additionally, they often find themselves working in unsafe environments, such as meat and poultry processing plants, garment factories operating sewing and cutting machinery, and industrial-scale prison kitchens and laundries where they’re exposed to hazardous chemicals and industrial machinery. Furthermore, incarcerated workers frequently endure a denial of medical care for workplace injuries. Moreover, during the COVID-19 pandemic, they were thrust to the frontline of the response effort, engaging in tasks like producing personal protective equipment (PPE) while being barred from using it, working in morgues, cleaning medical units, and undertaking frontline health roles, all of which put them at heightened risk of contracting the virus. Despite these dangers, incarcerated workers deemed to have essential job assignments were mandated to continue working.


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