Missing children of Dutch asylum shelters

By Mayeda Tayyab

In May 2024, Lost in Europe released the findings of their investigation into the disappearance of unaccompanied children in Europe. This investigation revealed that 51,433 children disappeared from refugee centres across Europe between 2021 and 2023, with Italy having the highest number of missing unaccompanied minors at 22,899 children (Van den Hof, 2024). Unfortunately, this is not the first time such a discovery has been done.

Netherlands:

15,404 unaccompanied refugee minors registered in the Netherlands in the last three years (Dutch News, 2024). 850 of these children have disappeared from asylum shelters without any trace (Van den Hof, 2024).

Before 2024:

This is not the first time the Dutch authorities have found themselves in this situation. In 2023, 360 minors had disappeared from refugee shelters in the Netherlands between 2022 and 2023, all of whom vanished from the Ter Apel reporting centre. That year, 4449 minors without parents or guardians had applied for asylum in the Netherlands (Dutch News, 2023).

Government response: 

The Human Rights Committee has asked the Dutch government to take urgent measures in investigating the trend of missing unaccompanied minors as well as addressing the root issues causing these disappearances. The Dutch government has also been asked to improve the quality of living standards and resources provided to children in the asylum shelters.

The Dutch national rapporteur on human trafficking, Hermann Bolhaar, has criticised the Dutch refugee system and the government for their lack of implementing any protective and safeguarding measures, given the urgency of the situation and the danger unaccompanied children are finding themselves in.

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Poland’s Education System: Striving for Equity and Inclusion to Fulfill the Right to Education

By Iris Karoli

The modern Polish  emerged in the aftermath of World War II, addressing the significant challenge of rebuilding the country’s social and economic frameworks. Since then, it has undergone extensive reforms, particularly since the fall of communism in 1989. Significant adjustments to educational policies were required due to this crucial shift to a market economy to better reflect democratic values and satisfy the needs of a society that was changing quickly.

Since September 1, 2017, the Polish educational system has been undergoing reform. The Law on School Education and the Provisions introducing the Law on School Education are two significant Acts passed by the Parliament in December 2016.

Providing teachers with sufficient resources, training, and support will help Poland prioritize integrating students with special educational needs (SEN) into regular classrooms. SEN students can flourish in the classroom and contribute to their overall success by emphasizing inclusive education practices and customized support plans.

Overall, Poland needs to take a multifaceted approach to achieve universal access to education that tackles structural inequalities, advances equity, and cultivates an inclusive culture within the educational system. Poland can get closer to achieving its goal of a society in which every person has the chance to learn, develop, and prosper by keeping these initiatives as a top priority and making investments in the future of its students.

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Upcoming country visit of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries to Côte d’Ivoire.

Presented by Ariel Ozdemir and Caren Thomas

The history of Côte d’Ivoire shows periods of political instability and coups. The 2002 Ivorian Civil War deepened the divisions within the country. 1 The presidential election in 2010 highlighted the power struggle between the candidates, which increased the political and ethnic tensions in the country. This constant state of political instability and civil unrest can contribute to Ivorian nationals’ being more susceptible to recruitment into mercenary activities. The lawlessness prevalent within Côte d’Ivoire may force individuals to seek stability or financial gain from different sources.
Despite Côte d’Ivoire being the largest economy in the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the country’s 46.3 per cent of its population is below the poverty line. Gender inequalities continue to persist within the country. This is noticed right from the grassroot level. Only 52 per cent of the girls have completed secondary education in the country compared to 63 per cent of the boys. Additionally, the fluctuations in cocoa, coffee, and palm oil export prices severely impact the Ivorians as their livelihoods depend on these commodities. 2

However, despite the progress in domestic legal responses to mercenarism in Côte d’Ivoire, the country has yet to ratify the 1989 Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. While the country supported the 3rd Cycle UPR recommendation to ratify the convention, the mid-term assessment outlined the lack of any substantial actions to do so. 6 As a result, Côte d’Ivoire still has substantial further progress to make in its fight against the use of mercenaries. An optimistic sign as to potential future progress on ratification can be found in the Ivorian Minister of Foreign Affairs’ 2019 speech, in which he asserted Ivorian support for the convention and urged those nations to ratify the convention that had not yet done so. However, whether this declaration represents a wider domestic desire to begin the ratification process is yet unclear.

PMC activities pose significant threats to Ivorian stability. Foreign actors have been exporting PMC and military equipment to many countries on the African continent, and Côte d’Ivoire is no exception. Two principal PMC’s have a strong presence in the country, namely the French PMC CorpGuard 12 and the Russian Wagner group. Since 2017, CorpGuard, founded by Secopex’ co-founder David Hornus, which is itself active in Somalia and the CAR, has been training the Ivorian military. 13 According to CorpGuard, during a 9-month training period they set up 4 infantry companies, 1 operational center, and trained 1,235 soldiers “to United Nations standards”. 14
Despite being strongly marketed as harbingers of peace and allegedly participating in the transformation of Ivorian military personnel from “soldiers in war” to “soldiers of peace”, 15 the complete lack of regulation of PMCs has resulted in an inability to enforce legitimacy and accountability. In this light, CorpGuard’s training of President Alassane Ouattara’s military can be understood to have had a direct impact on the 2020 electoral violence.

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References

1 Tayoh, B. (2009). Background information. In Property Taxation in Francophone West Africa: Case Study of Côte d’Ivoire (pp. 1–4). Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18288.3
2 Nelson, N. (2020). The Top 3 Causes of Poverty in Côte d’Ivoire. The Borgen Project. https://borgenproject.org/poverty-in-cote-divoire/

6 S.E.M. Marcel Amon-Tanoh. “Conseil De Sécurité Des Nations Unies Débat Public De Haut Niveau Sur Le Thème: Les Activités Mercenaires Comme Source D’insecurite Et De Destabilisation En Afrique Centrale Déclaration De S.E.M. Marcel Amon-Tanoh Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères De La République De Côte d’Ivoire.” New York, February 4, 2019. https://press.un.org/fr/2019/cs13688.doc.htm

12 Note: David Hornus rejects the description of CorpGuard as a PMC and claims that “CorpGuard is an operational security and defense service company which does not meet the designation of a private military company.” source: Martin, Elise. “Armée: de Lyon à la Côte d’Ivoire, pourquoi la société « de sécurité et de défense » CorpGuard interroge?” 20 Minutes, April 28, 2023. https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/4034203-20230428-armee-lyon-cote-ivoire-pourquoi-societe-securite-defense-corpguard-interroge
13 Kadlec, Amanda. “In Africa, Wagner Is Not the Only Game in Town.” New Lines Magazine (blog), July 17, 2023. https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/in-africa-wagner-is-not-the-only-game-in-town/
14 CorpGuard. “Developments And Challenges of Peacekeeping Operation in The French-Speaking World 2017-2020.” CORPGUARD Conseil International (blog), May 26, 2020. https://www.corpguard.com/fr/evolutions-et-defis-du-maintien-de-la-paix-dans-lespace-francophone/
15 Observatoire. “Table ronde du 4 octobre 2017 – 3ème panel.” OBG, October 7, 2017. https://www.observatoire-boutros-ghali.org/2017/10/table-ronde-du-4-octobre-2017-3/

Country Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Presented by Merve Tiregul

Recent data spanning from March 2020 to June 2021 further highlights this disparity, indicating that black women were 14% less likely to be referred to Refuge for assistance by the police compared to their white counterparts who are survivors of domestic abuse. 2 The data implies a systematic failure by the police to adequately support Black women against domestic abuse. According to Victim Support’s research in 2022, victims of domestic abuse, particularly from Black and ethnic minority backgrounds, often face dismissal and marginalisation by the police. The study found that nearly half of Black and ethnic minority respondents felt that the police treated them differently due to their heritage. Over half of all respondents reported instances of domestic abuse multiple times before receiving appropriate police action, with almost a quarter needing to report three times or more. Despite increased reports of domestic abuse, recent data from the Office for National Statistics shows an 8% rise in related offences, underlining the urgent need for improved support and response mechanisms for victims. 3

According to a 2020 survey conducted in the UK, Black, minoritised women, and non-binary individuals were more prone to experiencing online violence during COVID-19, with many reporting worsened abuse during the pandemic. This emphasises the necessity of adopting responses that incorporate an intersectional perspective. 46% of the participants indicated they had encountered online abuse since the onset of COVID-19. This percentage rose to 50% among Black and minoritised women and nonbinary individuals. Among survey participants who encountered online abuse in the year prior to the survey, 29% noted that it intensified during the COVID-19 period. Black and minoritised women and non-binary individuals were disproportionately affected, with 38% indicating that the pandemic contributed to heightened online violence. Gender emerged as the most frequently cited reason for online abuse, with 48% reporting gender-based abuse, followed by 21% for abuse related to gender identity and sexual orientation, 18% for ethnicity, 10% for religion, and 7% for disability. Black and minoritised individuals were almost as likely to face abuse based on ethnicity as they were on gender, with 46% reporting gender-based abuse and 43% reporting ethnicity-based abuse. Additionally, they were more prone to religious-based abuse compared to white respondents. 4

In England, since September 2020, Relationships Education has been mandatory for all primary school pupils, while Relationships and Sex Education (RSE) has been compulsory for secondary pupils, alongside Health Education for all students in state-funded schools. RSE curriculum encompasses crucial topics such as sexual consent, exploitation, abuse, grooming, harassment, rape, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and domestic abuse, aiming to equip students with the knowledge to navigate current and future relationships. In primary schools, comprehensive sex and relationships education can empower children to stay safe by fostering confidence in seeking help, understanding bodily autonomy, and providing appropriate language for discussing private body parts. 15

The UK recently updated the Relationship and Sexuality Education (RSE) curriculum requirements in Northern Ireland. The new curriculum will include age-appropriate, comprehensive, and scientifically accurate education on sexual and reproductive health and rights. The education will provide factual information on preventing pregnancy, abortion rights, and accessing relevant services without advocating a particular stance. 16

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References

2 Refuge. (2021, September 30). Ahead of Black History Month, Refuge calls for better protection for Black women experiencing domestic abuse. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://refuge.org.uk/news/refuge-better-protection-of-black-women-domestic-abuse/
3 Victim Support. (2022, December 1). New research shows police failing to act on domestic abuse reports – ethnic minority victims worst affected. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.victimsupport.org.uk/new-research-shows-police-failing-to-act-on-domestic-abuse-reports-ethnic-minority-victims-worst-affected/
4 End Violence Against Women. (2020). The ripple effect: COVID-19 and the epidemic of online abuse. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Glitch-and-EVAW-The-Ripple-Effect-Online-abuse-during-COVID-19-Sept-2020.pdf

15 Female genital mutilation: resource pack. (2023). Gov.uk. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/female-genital-mutilation-resource-pack/female-genital-mutilation-resource-pack
16 New requirements for Relationship and Sexuality Education curriculum in Northern Ireland. (2023). Gov.uk. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-requirements-for-relationship-and-sexuality-education-curriculum-in-northern-ireland

Follow-up to the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls’ country visits to Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Greece, Poland, Honduras, Chad, Samoa, Kuwait and Hungary

Presented by Ariel Ozdemir, Luna Plet and Olimpia Guidi

The Lenca, indigenous to southwestern Honduras and northeastern El Salvador, reside in approximately 50 villages within a 100-km radius of La Esperanza, the capital city of the mountainous Intibucá department. 1 Most of these villages find themselves on the outskirts of the public education system due to factors such as poverty, age, geographic isolation, gender, and ethnicity. These circumstances collectively contribute to the difficulty in accessing education for many inhabitants.
The educational hurdles for Lenca girls in Honduras, especially in regions like San Francisco de Opalaca, are intricate and deeply influenced by socio-economic, cultural, and geographical factors. These challenges are marked by restricted access to education due to economic constraints, particularly affecting girls pursuing primary education. Gender-sensitive education proves to be a critical aspect of the struggles faced by Lenca girls. Prevailing patriarchal norms pose obstacles to their educational opportunities.
Concerns about the quality of education in public schools, notably in regions like San Francisco de Opalaca, are pronounced. Challenges include limited access to junior high schools in most villages and the geographic obstacles that impede education beyond grade 6. 2 Inadequacies in the education infrastructure, such as a shortage of teachers and insufficient facilities, further hinder the provision of quality education for Lenca girls. Furthermore, with a literacy rate of 30-50%, the Lenca population typically spends an average of only four years in school. 3 This low educational attainment contributes to a pervasive sense of inferiority and a lack of confidence in advocating for a democratic and civil society.
The need for revamping the curriculum to address gender equality, stereotypes, and violence is evident. Emphasis is placed on incorporating human rights workshops to create awareness about gender, cultural, educational, and employment equality. 4 This approach strives to foster an inclusive and supportive educational environment, empowering Lenca girls and addressing societal challenges they encounter.

education for disadvantaged communities . 21 Women and girls, already facing obstacles in pursuing education, find themselves further marginalised by the privatisation of schooling . 22
Consider the challenges faced by promising young students in La Esperanza who experience increased fees due to their schools’ privatisation, leading to their education’s abandonment. This educational setback not only perpetuates the cycle of poverty but also underscores the gendered impact of privatisation on educational opportunities for women and girls.
Expanding on the educational aspect, it’s essential to recognise that privatisation can lead to a reduction in educational resources. Privatised institutions may prioritise profit over educational quality, leaving women in poverty with fewer educational support systems. This, in turn, perpetuates systemic disadvantages, limiting the potential for upward mobility through education.
Healthcare Challenges
Privatisation in the healthcare sector can pose significant challenges for vulnerable populations, particularly women. As essential healthcare services become privatised, the financial burden on impoverished women intensifies, limiting their access to crucial medical support. The lack of affordable healthcare options further entrenches gender disparities in health outcomes . 23

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References

1 Susan Stone, “El Maestro En Casa,” El Maestro en Casa, accessed January 20, 2024, https://lencaedu.wordpress.com/
2 Wanda Bedard, “2009 – Honduras,” 60 million girls, accessed January 20, 2024, https://60millionsdefilles.org/en/our-projects/2009-honduras/
3 Susan Stone, “El Maestro En Casa,” El Maestro en Casa, accessed January 20, 2024, https://lencaedu.wordpress.com/
4 Wanda Bedard, “2009 – Honduras,” 60 million girls, accessed January 20, 2024, https://60millionsdefilles.org/en/our-projects/2009-honduras/

21 Edwards Jr, D. B., Moschetti, M., & Caravaca, A. (2023). Globalisation and privatisation of education in Honduras—Or the need to reconsider the dynamics and legacy of state formation. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 44(4), 635-649. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01596306.2020.1852181
22 Murphy-Graham, E. (2007). Promoting participation in public life through secondary education: evidence from Honduras. Prospects, 37(1), 95-111. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11125-007-9013-2
23 Hasemann Lara, J. E. (2023). Health Sector Reform in Honduras: Privatisation as Institutional Bad Faith. Medical Anthropology, 42(1), 62-75. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01459740.2022.2125388

2024 Thematic Report to the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly

Presented by Olimpia Guidi and Sarah Kuipers

Human rights organisations and NGOs play a crucial role in monitoring the impact of sanctions on human rights and providing support to affected parties. 12

In addressing the impact of sanctions on rights, Russia has recourse to various international mechanisms. These include the United Nations (UN), which it can engage through the UN Security Council, leveraging its position as a permanent member to voice concerns and negotiate resolutions. 15 Additionally, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Russia can challenge trade-related sanctions that contravene WTO agreements through dispute settlement mechanisms. 16

Furthermore, Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe subjects it to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 17 Individuals or entities affected by sanctions can bring cases before the ECHR alleging violations of human rights protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. 18 Moreover, Russia could potentially utilise the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to challenge sanctions it believes violate international law or treaties. 19

However, ICJ jurisdiction requires the consent of all parties involved, posing limitations on its effectiveness. 20

Despite these avenues, the effectiveness of international mechanisms in safeguarding rights impacted by sanctions is subject to various limitations. Political considerations often hinder progress, with powerful actors reluctant to challenge one another’s actions. 21 Legal processes within these international bodies are typically time-consuming, offering delayed relief. 22 Enforcement of decisions and compliance by sanction-imposing countries can also be challenging. Furthermore, the scope of these mechanisms may not fully address the extraterritorial application of sanctions or their broader economic ramifications.

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References

12 Goncharenko, G., & Khadaroo, I. (2020). Disciplining human rights organisations through an accounting regulation: A case of the ‘foreign agents’ law in Russia. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 72, 102129. Available at:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S104523541930108X

15 Gifkins, J. (2021). Beyond the veto: Roles in UN Security Council decision-making. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 27(1), 1-24.
16 Gantvarg, I. (2023). Categorisation and Legality of Trade Sanctions Imposed on Russia: Examining Compatibility with WTO and UN Legislation.
17 Nelaeva, G. A., Khabarova, E. A., & Sidorova, N. V. (2020). Russia’s Relations with the European Court of Human Rights in the Aftermath of the Markin Decision: Debating the “Backlash”. Human Rights Review, 21, 93-112
18 Ibid.
19 Sarkin, J. J., & Sarkin, E. (2022). Reforming the International Court of Justice to Deal with State Responsibility for Conflict and Human Rights Violations. International Human Rights Law Review, 11(1), 1-35. Available at:https://brill.com/view/journals/hrlr/11/1/article-p1_001.xml
20 Wulandari, R. (2022). Jurisdiction Issues of the International Court and the effectiveness of ICJ’s Decision in the Russia-Ukraine Dispute Resolution. Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari’ah dan Masyarakat, 22(2), 343-350.
21 Frye, T. (2022). Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia. Princeton University Press.
22 Ibid.


Examining Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Implications for Currently and Formerly Incarcerated Populations

Presented by Samantha Orozco and Ariel Ozdemir

In the complex landscape of United States prison labour, there exist six primary categories of prison labour, namely maintenance work within carceral facilities, state prison industries, public works assignments benefiting governmental and non-profit entities, employment with private industries, work-release programs and restitution centres, and agricultural work.

Maintenance work primarily consists of tasks to maintain the prisons themselves, such as janitorial duties, food preparation, grounds maintenance, repair work, laundry, and providing essential services like working in prison hospitals, stockrooms, stores, barber shops, and libraries.

Discriminatory labour assignments
According to a report by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on exploitative carceral labour, race is a large determinant in work assignments. The report reveals that Black men are predominantly assigned to lower-paying or unpaid work such as agricultural, maintenance, or other facilities services jobs, while a higher proportion of white men are assigned to higher-paying jobs such as public works positions.

Inadequate wages & extortion
Incarcerated labourers are paid inadequate wages, often receiving minimal to no compensation; this condition has continued for decades without noticeable improvement. Moreover, prisons, along with the federal government, routinely deduct substantial portions—sometimes up to 80%—of these meagre wages to cover court-imposed fines, taxes, family support, restitution, and room and board expenses, exacerbating the financial burdens faced by those behind bars. According by the ACLU report, states also use the profits garnered from wage deductions “to sustain and expand incarceration” for such things as the construction and renovation of carceral facilities and the establishment and expansion of prison labour programs. Prisons frequently exploit and extort inmates by charging them exorbitant prices for essential items such as phone calls to families and toiletries. Consequently, the families of incarcerated individuals experience significant financial strain to meet these basic needs under price gouging. This also contributes to increased community-level financial insecurity and incarceration in areas with higher rates of incarcerated community members, perpetuating a vicious cycle of exploitation and insecurity.

Incarcerated labourers are not protected by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), a federal statute that sets minimum standards and safeguards for health and safety in the workplace. As a result of the lack of workplace protections, incarcerated workers face many dangers in the workplace. Despite lacking jurisdiction to protect these workers, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has conducted limited investigations which have uncovered severe health and safety concerns and a complete failure to ensure protections in the workplace.

Firstly, many lack proper safety training, leaving them vulnerable to preventable injuries and even fatalities while on the job. A staggering 70% of those surveyed by the ACLU reported receiving no formal job training. Additionally, they often find themselves working in unsafe environments, such as meat and poultry processing plants, garment factories operating sewing and cutting machinery, and industrial-scale prison kitchens and laundries where they’re exposed to hazardous chemicals and industrial machinery. Furthermore, incarcerated workers frequently endure a denial of medical care for workplace injuries. Moreover, during the COVID-19 pandemic, they were thrust to the frontline of the response effort, engaging in tasks like producing personal protective equipment (PPE) while being barred from using it, working in morgues, cleaning medical units, and undertaking frontline health roles, all of which put them at heightened risk of contracting the virus. Despite these dangers, incarcerated workers deemed to have essential job assignments were mandated to continue working.


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Towards Global Justice: Advocating for a Moratorium on the Death Penalty

Presented by Sarah Kuipers, María Núnez Fontán and Ariel Ozdemir

In 2020, 37 states voted against at the UNGA res 75/183 on the use of the death penalty, one of which was North Korea (DPRK). i However, the DPRK has not yet abolished the death penalty and therefore remains a retentionist state. Due to its political nature and isolationist policies, the subsequent lack of access to the DPRK continues to prove a barrier to data collection on the implementation of the resolution and the abolition of the death penalty for NGOs and international bodies alike. However, eyewitness accounts of North Korean defectors provide vital information into the inner workings of the DPRK and the ongoing use of the death penalty. This report will outline relevant updates on the situation in the DPRK regarding the use of the death penalty, the implementation of resolution 75/183, and the impacts on human rights in the country.

According to some NGOs, there are not many reliable sources from the DPRK, which would provide transparent data on the death penalty. As mentioned by Amnesty International, the issue lies within the dependent media sources and lack of transparency in verification. v

While the DPRK maintains that they do not carry out public executions, credible information from defectors gathered by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International contradicts these statements. xii As of recent reports, the DPRK has continued to employ the death penalty as a means of enforcing its authoritarian rule. The death penalty is codified into North Korean law for various lethal and non-lethal crimes. For example, the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (enacted in January 2023) bans any language deemed to have foreign influence or exhibit linguistic similarities to South Korean language. xiii During and following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea has also enforced a ‘Shoot on Sight’ order at the border for anyone attempting to enter or leave the country. xiv While limitations on freedom of movement have been somewhat eased for select people within and outside North Korea, the majority of the country’s citizens continue to be banned from leaving, punishable by death as “treachery against the nation”. xv

In another case last year, 20 young athletes were reportedly sentenced to 3-5 years hard labour for using South Korean language and slang (while execution was also a possible legal punishment for their actions under the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act) xxi . Executions have also been reportedly carried out for religious and superstitious activities, drugs, and the breaking of covid regulations. xxii Moreover, reports indicate that infanticide and forced abortion have been used, especially in cases of mothers who were political prisoners, people with disabilities, victims of sexual violence by government officials and prison guards, and defectors forcibly repatriated from the PRC.

However, the utilisation of the death penalty in North Korea represents a gross violation of fundamental human rights including the right to life. The process lacks the most basic standards of due process and fairness, violating the fundamental right to a fair trial. Trials are often conducted behind closed doors, with defendants denied access to legal representation and facing pressure to provide forced confessions. xxiii Furthermore, the arbitrary nature of the accusations and lack of transparency surrounding these executions raise serious concerns about the legitimacy of the judicial system in North Korea.


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References

i UN RESOLUTION FOR A UNIVERSAL MORATORIUM ON THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY ANALYSIS OF THE 2020 VOTE. (n.d.). Retrieved April 10, 2024, from https://old.ecpm.org/wp-content/uploads/flyer-moratoire-GB-2020-211220.pdf

v DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2022 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL REPORT (n.d.). Retrieved April 10, 2024, from https://www.amnesty.ch/de/themen/todesstrafe/dok/2023/todesstrafen-bericht-2022-hoechststand-seit-5-jahren/amnesty-report-death-sentences-and-executions-2022.pdf

xii Amnesty International (2021) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea): Public Executions: Converging Testimonies. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/asa240011997en.pdf

xiii Hassan, T. (2023) North Korea: Events of 2023. Human Rights Watch https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea

xiv Sifton, J. (2020) North Korea’s Unlawful ‘Shoot on Sight’ Orders: Lethal Force at Border Needs to Comply with Human Rights Law. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/28/north-koreas-unlawful-shoot-sight-orders
xv Hassan, T. (2023) North Korea: Events of 2023. Human Rights Watch https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea; Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (2009) The Criminal Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/The%20Criminal%20Law%20of%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Korea_2009_%20(1).pdf

xxi Kim, J. (2023) North Korea Sentences 20 Young Athletes for ‘Speaking Like South Koreans’. Radio Free Asia. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/athletes-04132023094854.html
xxii Reuters (2023) North Korea Executes People for Sharing S Korean Media: Report. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/31/north-korea-executes-people-for-sharing-s-korean-media-report; Bremer, I. (2024) North Korea Has Executed Citizens for Violating COVID Rules: Report. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korea-has-executed-citizens-for-violating-covid-rules-report/

xxiii Amnesty International (2021) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea): Public Executions: Converging Testimonies. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/asa240011997en.pdf


Special Rapporteur on Right to Development – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

Presented by Merve Tiregul, Olimpia Guidi, Ruth Tesfay and Veronica Grazzi

The right to development for children refers to ensuring that children have access to the necessary conditions for their holistic growth and well-being, encompassing economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions. The planetary crisis, including the climate emergency, biodiversity collapse, and widespread pollution, poses an immediate danger to children’s rights worldwide. Nations have an obligation to address environmental harm and climate change due to the adverse effects of environmental degradation on the enjoyment of children’s rights. As the Convention on the Rights of the Child outlines, children’s rights extend to environmental protection, entitling children to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. i States should take measures to ensure that children are protected from foreseeable premature or unnatural death and threats to their lives and enjoy their right to life with dignity. Such measures include adopting and effectively implementing environmental standards, for example, those related to air and water quality, food safety, lead exposure and greenhouse gas emissions, and all other adequate and necessary environmental measures that protect children’s right to life. Moreover, children have the right to quality education that enables their intellectual, emotional, and social development. However, the right to education is particularly susceptible to the effects of environmental harm. ii This susceptibility can lead to school closures, interruptions in education, increased dropout rates, and damage to school facilities and recreational spaces.

One notable approach in Romania is the establishment of youth councils at the local level. These councils serve as platforms for young people to voice their opinions, propose initiatives, and engage in decision-making processes on issues affecting them and their communities. xiii Through these councils, young people have the opportunity to contribute actively to local governance and advocate for policies that address their needs and concerns. xiv Additionally, Romania has implemented educational programs to promote civic engagement and participatory citizenship among children and youth. xv

The prevalence of anti-Gypsyism, as highlighted in the ECRI’s 2019 Report on Romania, perpetuates bias and exacerbates social marginalisation, with Roma individuals enduring unjust labels and unfair associations with criminality. xix
The national Roma integration strategy addresses these challenges by prioritising education, employment, healthcare, and housing. Recognising Roma as an official ethnic minority, the strategy focuses on ensuring school attendance, especially for Roma girls, and ending school segregation. xx However, poverty rates among children remain high, with nearly 30% enduring poverty spanning three to four years. This issue is especially prominent in rural areas where one out of every two children lives in poverty. xxi Romania’s efforts to integrate Roma children into early childhood education and care and promote Roma entrepreneurship signify steps toward inclusion, yet persistent poverty highlights the need for sustained action and targeted policies.

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References

i United Nations – Committee on the Rights of the Child. (2023). General comment No. 26 (2023) on children’s rights and the environment, with a special focus on climate change. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/crccgc26general-comment-no-26-2023-childrens-rights

ii ibid

xiii Stănuș, C., & Pop, D. (2021). Local State-Society Relations in Romania. Close Ties in European Local Governance: Linking Local State and Society, 319-335. Available at:https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_22
Ibid.
xv Alfirević, N., Arslanagić-Kalajdžić, M., & Lep, Ž. (2023). The role of higher education and civic involvement in converting young adults’ social responsibility to prosocial behaviour. Scientific Reports, 13(1), 2559. Available at:https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-02329562-4

xix Council of Europe. (2019). ECRI Report on Romania (Fifth Monitoring Cycle). https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-romania/168094c9e5


xx European Commission. (n.d.). Romania – Facts and figures. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-andfundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/roma-eu/roma-equality-inclusion-and-participation-eucountry/romania_en#:~:text=National%20strategy%20for%20Roma%20integration,-
Romania’s%20top%20priorities&text=In%20Romania%2C%20the%20Roma%20are,and%20ending%20segregation%20in%20schools.

xxi The World Bank & UNICEF. (2017). Romania: Children in public care. https://www.unicef.org/romania/sites/unicef.org.romania/files/2019-04/Romania_Children_in_Public_Care_2014.pdf

Digital Technologies in Justice Administration: Human Rights Report to the General Assembly

Presented by Daphne Rein and Maria Samantha Orozco

In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of new technologies to administer justice in the Netherlands. To give a few examples of the digital technologies used, there has been an increase in legal applications, the creation of prediction tools for lawyers, such as judicial analytics, and an increase in legal help desks that offer free legal advice. i

In the Netherlands, the regulatory framework used is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and various data protection laws and regulations, which protect the sensible data of the general public. These laws and regulations have been adopted before the use of AI in the judicial system. But in the Netherlands, concerning Artificial Intelligence, the European Commission is helping the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure to set up a national AI supervision system to supervise AI applications, which can be used for AI in the administration of justice vii , for example, with legal applications. In the future, this can help regulate the risks of using artificial intelligence in the judicial system.

The analysis concludes that deploying new technology to solve governance problems can be problematic because “technological systems reflect the embedded privileges of those who design them”. xiv

These incidents highlight the alarming risks faced by children from migrant communities, particularly those of African descent, due to the biased use of AI in the justice system. Innocent young men are disproportionately criminalised, derailing their aspirations for work or higher education. xxiii Furthermore, the child support tax debacle resulted in children from already disadvantaged families being denied equal access to education, perpetuating cycles of poverty and inequality.

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References

i Jan van Ettekoven, B & Prins, C. (2018). “Chapter 18: Data analysis, artificial intelligence and the judiciary system”. Research Handbook in Data Science and Law. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing). pp.425-447. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111300.00026

vii European Commission. (2023). Commission supports the Netherlands in setting up a national Artificial Intelligence supervision system through the Technical Support Instrument. Directorate-General for Structural Support. https://commission.europa.eu/news/commission-supports-netherlands-setting-national-artificial-intelligence-supervision-system-through-2023-10-05_en

xiv Land, M. & Aronson, J. (2020). “Human Rights and Technology: New Challenges for Justice and Accountability” (Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 16) p. 232

xxiii Amnesty International. (2020). Netherlands: We sense trouble: Automated discrimination and mass surveillance in predictive policing in the Netherlands. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur35/2971/2020/en/