El giro de Turquía hacia el Poder Duro: La captura de escuelas Hizmet por la Fundación Maarif de Turquía

Este documento resume y analiza cómo Turquía ha extendido su misión de cerrar las escuelas Hizmet en países africanos y europeos a través de la entidad público-privada conocida como la Fundación Maarif.

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Algunos artículos referenciados en este trabajo muestran cierta inclinación política y se constituyen como propaganda al referirse del movimiento Gulen como “Organización Terrorista Fetullah” (FETO).

Es importante remarcar que el gobierno turco adopto este termino como chivo expiatorio del golpe de estado fallido de 15 de Julio de 2016, atribuyéndolo al movimiento Gulen y sus miembros. Esta etiqueta busco crear la narrativa de que el movimiento Gulen tenía la única intención de reemplazar el gobierno; sin embargo, la realidad es que el movimiento y las escuelas actualmente sufren la persecución un gobierno amenazado por denuncias y escándalos, un gobierno que funciona a base de chivos expiatorios contra gente y familias inocentes.

INTRODUCCIÓN

Durante su tiempo en Turquía durante la década de 1960 y 70s, Fetullah Gulen fue un imam muy popular que predicó que la educación en inglés construía moralidad y carácter tanto como, sino más, la modestia, el altruismo, y el trabajo duro. Enfatizó que la educación era esencial para que Turquía emergiera en la era de la globalización.[i] De acuerdo con su ideología, el movimiento Gulen de los 80s fue ayudado a través de la financiación del llamado conservativo “Anatolian Tigers” para crear escuelas que transmitieran la educación basada, no formalmente, en los principios de Gulen. Estas escuelas fueron globalmente conocidas como Hizmet. La palabra “Hizmet” indicaba que la escuela enseñaba sobre luz, filosofía, reflexión, diálogo y tolerancia.[ii] Las escuelas fueron formadas primeramente por empresarios voluntarios de todo Turquía, y el personal fueron educadores que buscaban comprometerse con trabajo humanitario y caridad. Pronto se expandieron a varios países en la década de los 90, incluyendo en Norte América, Asia Central, Europa, Australia y especialmente Africa.[iii] En más de una ocasión, esto significo la primera toma de contacto informal de Turquía con otros países estableciendo lazos culturales, económicos y políticos con gobiernos extranjeros. Aunque el gobierno turco inicialmente dio soporte tácito a estas escuelas, las cosas se complicaron después de la Crisis Presidencial de 2007. Como resultado de la crisis el Partido de Justicia y Desarrollo (AKP) se aseguró del control político del país, formando una administración reticente de dejar demasiado control sobre asuntos de política nacional y exterior a las manos de agentes externos privados de dentro y fuera de Turquía.[iv] En una serie de conversaciones con el cofundador y director ejecutivo del Centro de Estudios Hizmet, el Doctor Ismail M. Sezgin explicó como la percepción del gobierno sobre las escuelas cambió a lo largo de los años. Inicialmente, el gobierno vio ventajas en asociarse con las escuelas porque la credibilidad del movimiento Gulen era bien recibida por la población turca. Sin embargo, esta percepción cambió a medida que el movimiento Gulen fue volviéndose cada vez más critico del gobierno a través de las cambiantes dinámicas políticas reflejadas en las elecciones de 2012.[v] Estas elecciones se revolvieron alrededor del entonces primer ministro y actual presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan, resultando en cargos de corrupción, el rechazo de los ideales occidentales democráticos y la disrupción de los planes para unirse a la Unión Europea (EU). El movimiento Gulen condenó el gobierno fuertemente durante este período de tiempo, causando que este reevaluara su percepción sobre el movimiento. El Dr. Sezegin explica que cuando aún aparecieron más cargos de corrupción en 2014, Gulen se convirtió en una amenaza real, provocando que Erdogan se opusiera explícita y activamente al movimiento. En última instancia, esta reevaluación política resultó en el intento del gobierno de atribuir el golpe de estado fallido de 15 de Julio de 2016 a la ahora llamada “Organización Terrorista Fetullah” (FETO) en un complot para forzosamente reconstruir el movimiento Gulen como una amenaza para la sociedad.[vi]

El golpe de estado fallido dió a Erdogan lo que él mismo llamó “un regalo de Dios” que permitió al AKP llevar a cabo un ataque y persecución de las escuelas Hizmet. Esta inquisición empezó en Turquía, haciendo sufrir a muchos de vulneraciones de derechos humanos y abusos, incluso encarcelamiento, pero rápidamente se expandió a nivel internacional cuando el gobierno solicitó a administraciones extranjeras el cierre de escuelas, especialmente aquellas ubicadas en África. Este ataque, obviamente, afectó negativamente a los estudiantes que recibían una educación de alta calidad en las escuelas Hizmet. En muchas ubicaciones empobrecidas, estas escuelas elevaron el nivel de educación y calidad de vida. No obstante, en un intento de aplastar el movimiento Gulen, el gobierno turco creó la pseudo-entidad conocida como la ‘Fundación Maarif’ apenas unas semanas antes del fallido golpe y le otorgó una autoridad mixta público-privada para cerrar o reemplazar las escuelas Hizmet. [vii]

La siguiente sección de este informe analizará brevemente la función de la Fundación Maarif, seguida de una sección que comenta la toma cronológica de las escuelas Hizmet en Bielorrusia, Burundi, Camerún, Chad, Djibouti, Guinea Ecuatorial, Etiopía, Gabón y Guinea por parte de la Fundación. Luego, el informe analizará el cambio de Turquía desde una postura de “soft-power” de diplomacia económica hacia una forma más dura de poder que corre el riesgo de transferir las consecuencias de la política interna de Turquía a otros estados. Por último, la sección final concluirá con algunas observaciones y recomendaciones breves

LOS MECANISMOS DE LA FUNDACIÓN MAARIF

El 17 de junio de 2016, el (entonces) primer ministro de Turquia, Ahmet Davutoglu, anunció la implementación de la ley 6721 que dio nacimiento a la Fundación Maarif, “maarif” significando “educación” o “instrucción”. El presidente Erdogan y su gobierno seleccionó sus 12 miembros: 4 elegidos por el mismo presidente, 3 elegidos por el Cabinete y el resto de los ministerios de educación, asuntos exteriores y economía, en conjunción con el Consejo de Educación Superior. [viii] A la Fundación se le otorgaron poderes:

“para proporcionar becas, escuelas, educación e instalaciones como escuelas, instituciones educativas y residencias estudiantiles, para brindarles becas en todos los procesos de educación, desde la educación preescolar hasta la universitaria, con el fin de desarrollar y mejorar los servicios educativos y de distribución, únicamente para poder permitirse las instituciones que puedan participar en las instituciones, la Fundación Maarif Turca, que se encuentra en el centro de Estambul, lleva a cabo investigaciones científicas, desarrolla y mejora métodos y lleva a cabo las actividades del país en el que opera, para realizar las actividades del país.”[ix]

Estos términos de referencia indican que la Fundación es una entidad gubernamental que recibe su presupuesto y directrices de funcionarios públicos. Se distingue de otras fundaciones por su capacidad adicional para llevar a cabo sus funciones en el extranjero “mediante la fundación o adquisición de empresas con personalidad jurídica de derecho privado”, lo cual se cumple claramente en los estatutos de las escuelas Hizmet fundadas en el extranjero. [x]  La verdadera intención subyacente de la Fundación se manifestó poco después del fallido golpe, cuando Erdogan solicitó que la Fundación “esté presente en 193 países (…) y dé prioridad a los países donde FETO tiene mayor influencia y es más conocido. No permitan que las escuelas de FETO se llamen ‘escuelas turcas'”.[xi]  En cierta medida, esto demuestra que Turquía continúa dependiendo de actores privados y semipúblicos en el extranjero que han establecido y mantenido relaciones con otros estados en el pasado, como se mencionó anteriormente con el movimiento Gulen.

La principal barrera para los intentos de la Fundación de expropiar los bienes físicos de las escuelas Hizmet es el hecho de que las autoridades locales deben estar de acuerdo en despojar a estas escuelas en favor de la Fundación, lo que a menudo resulta en juicios largos y agotadores, como se ha visto recientemente en Etiopía. [xii] A pesar de enfrentar resistencia en sus intentos de convencer a otros países de cerrar las escuelas Hizmet o entregar las instalaciones, el gobierno turco ha tenido más éxito en África utilizando lo que se puede llamar “enfoque coercitivo”. En este enfoque, Turquía utiliza “palos”, es decir, poder duro, en lugar de “zanahorias”, es decir, poder suave, para amenazar el progreso socioeconómico de un país y sus proyectos de infraestructura a través de presión económica e inversión. Dipama y Dal (2019) discuten el uso del enfoque coercitivo por parte de Turquía, describiendo cómo Turquía puede aprovechar sus vínculos con ciertos estados africanos a través de negocios, importaciones, exportaciones e inversión extranjera directa en beneficio propio. [xiii]  La próxima sección se centrará en la relación entre la Fundación y estos países africanos seleccionados antes de comparar el éxito de la Fundación en Bielorrusia y Europa continental.

LA FUNDACIÓN MAARIF EN BIELORUSSIA, BURUNDI, CAMERÚN, CHAD, DJIBOUTI, GUINEA EQUATORIAL, ETIOPÍA, GABÓN, Y GUINEA-CONACRI

Uno de los primeros países africanos en ceder a las demandas del gobierno turco fue Gabón. Los funcionarios públicos firmaron un Memorando de Entendimiento (MOU) con el vicepresidente de la Fundación Maarif, Hasan Yavuz, para ceder tres escuelas Hizmet a la Fundación, que constaban de un total de 200 estudiantes. [xiv] Chad también aceptó transferir escuelas Hizmet, pero la magnitud de la toma de posesión solo se documentó más tarde en 2017, cuando se expropió y transfirió a la Fundación Maarif un jardín de infancia, escuelas primarias, dormitorios y escuelas secundarias, previo a una visita del presidente Erdogan. [xv] En ese momento, el ministro de Educación de Chad, Ahmad Khazali Acyl, lo consideró un avance en las relaciones chadiano-turcas. Sin embargo, desde una perspectiva externa y objetiva, esto también puede considerarse una mayor eliminación de la influencia de Gulen en África para avanzar en la agenda de Erdogan, que ha retratado las escuelas Hizmet como una calidad educativa “falsa”. Es importante tener en cuenta que “[m]uchos países africanos, inmediatamente después del intento de golpe, deportaron a los miembros de Hizmet y transfirieron las escuelas dirigidas por el grupo a nuestra Fundación Maarif”.[xvi]

Durante 2017, la Fundación Maarif logró avances significativos en África, especialmente en Guinea-Conakry, Djibouti y Burundi. Un total de 10 escuelas en la capital de Guinea fueron transferidas a la Fundación después de un proceso de tres meses en el que las autoridades públicas cancelaron las licencias de Hizmet para enseñar y poseer las instalaciones privadas. Una vez que la Fundación se hizo cargo de las antiguas escuelas Hizmet, estas fueron remodeladas con frecuencia y se les dio nuevos nombres vinculados a mártires políticos supuestamente asesinados por los presuntos gulenistas durante el intento de golpe. [xvii]  Los funcionarios turcos inauguraron oficialmente las escuelas en eventos que imitaban las funciones humanitarias y caritativas de los antiguos propietarios de Hizmet. Del mismo modo, Joel Nkurabagaya, el entonces embajador de Burundi en Turquía afirmó en 2017 que Burundi estaba trabajando para permitir que la Fundación abriera sus propias escuelas después de la transferencia de numerosas escuelas Hizmet. Estos desarrollos fueron precipitados por la visita de Hasan Yuvuz a Burundi en mayo de 2017, aparentemente para discutir sobre educación, pero durante la cual los funcionarios burundeses y turcos introdujeron otros intereses políticos y económicos. Por ejemplo, durante la visita de Yuvuz, el presidente de Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, solicitó que Turkish Airlines abriera vuelos directos a Burundi. [xviii] De manera similar, Djibouti transfirió una instalación a la Fundación para su uso como jardín de infancia y escuela primaria. Además, fue uno de los primeros países en África en otorgar a la Fundación una parcela de 5 hectáreas para construir su propia institución educativa Maarif. Esta tendencia empezaría a tomar fuerza en África a partir de aquel momento.[xix]

En enero de 2018, la Fundación había signado ya un total de 26 acuerdos con estados africanos, de los cuales 16 transfirieron escuelas a la Fundación, resultando en la transferencia de alrededor de 9000 estudiantes bajo la influencia de la ideología islamista del presidente Erdogan y su agenda.[xx] A estos países africanos se les unió Guinea en Septiembre de 2018, cuando Sebnem Cenk, el Embajador de Turquía en Malabo, y Fabiola Angono Miko, el viceministro de Juventud y Deportes, y el Ministerio de Exteriores, acordaron la transferencia de una escuela Hizmet basada en la capital, Malabo, a la Fundación bajo el nuevo nombre de “Colegio Maarif de Malabo”.[xxi] A principios de 2019, la Fundación también consiguió ganar la cooperación del gobierno camerunés para cerrar y transferir escuelas Hizmet. Las ceremonias de reapertura fueron presenciadas por varios oficiales cameruneses y turcos de prestigio, con el embajador turco del país, Ayşe Saraç, comentando que:

“Camerún apoyó a nuestro país y se convirtió en nuestro amigo y aliado en nuestra lucha contra [Hizmet]. Las escuelas de la Fundación Maarif son cada vez más activas en el ámbito internacional y han logrado éxitos significativos. La Fundación Maarif turca abrirá nuevas escuelas en Camerún en el próximo período. Seguimos de cerca y apoyamos todos los trabajos realizados en este sentido.”[xxii]

Uno de los campos de batalla más críticos en la toma de control de las escuelas Hizmet se puede observar claramente en relación con Etiopía. Esta dinámica comenzó a mediados de 2019 cuando la primera escuela Hizmet, ubicada en Harar, fue expropiada y transferida a la Fundación, lo cual implicó tres años de desafíos legales antes de lograr la adquisición de una segunda escuela ubicada en la ciudad de Sebata.[xxiii] Estos desafíos legales se prolongaron debido a una investigación realizada por fiscales federales y estatales etíopes sobre terrorismo y lavado de dinero en la escuela que la Fundación Maarif estaba tratando de adquirir. Según el Centro de Estocolmo para la Libertad en 2021, la empresa privada de educación STEM, compuesta por varios inversores alemanes con sede en la capital etíope, Addis Abeba, era propietaria de la escuela.[xxiv] El director de la escuela, el Dr. Norbert Helmut Dinse, explicó que la escuela era de propiedad extranjera dentro del sector educativo de Etiopía y que:

“Inicialmente, la empresa fue establecida por inversionistas turcos. Con el tiempo, los tres inversores alemanes adquirieron la inversión siguiendo todos los procedimientos requeridos por la ley. Los inversores alemanes intervinieron y volvieron a tomar el control de la empresa matriz en total cumplimiento de los requisitos de las leyes del país.”[xxv]

Inicialmente, parecía que el Ministerio de Educación de Etiopía apoyaría a la escuela Hizmet y a sus propietarios de STEM debido a la evidencia legítima de su condición de escuela de propiedad privada, incluso aprobando su licencia escolar para el año académico 2020-2021. Sin embargo, esto cambió después de que la Oficina de Educación de Oromia y Sebata, junto con varios agentes de policía armados, ingresaron ilegalmente a la escuela, instalando al personal turco de la Fundación Maarif para comenzar a enseñar en lugar de la escuela original.[xxvi] Un representante de la Fundación, Levent Sahin, declaró que “[d]espués de la investigación, los fiscales generales estatales decidieron suspender las licencias de educación de la empresa Stem perteneciente a la organización terrorista. Queremos ver que esto sea un ejemplo para las demás escuelas”. A mediados de agosto de 2021, la Fundación tomó el control de otras once escuelas anteriormente administradas por Hizmet en Etiopía, con un total de 2,000 estudiantes. Aunque el personal y los estudiantes presentaron obstáculos legales adicionales para detener estas adquisiciones, la Fundación utilizó asociaciones de padres y maestros afines para frustrar estos intentos legales e influir en la burocracia educativa a su favor.[xxvii]

Hasta el momento de escribir esto, hay una falta de información creíble sobre la única institución que fue transferida o abierta en Bielorrusia. No obstante, este desarrollo ocurrió poco después de la apertura de dos escuelas en Bucarest, Rumania, y Elbasan, Albania, a finales de 2019. Ambas escuelas reemplazaron a las escuelas Hizmet que existían en los respectivos países. [xxviii]

EVALUANDO LAS CONSEQUENCIAS:

Hasta marzo de 2021, la Fundación Maarif había tomado el control de 216 escuelas Hizmet en 44 países, afirmando que había firmado otros 77 protocolos para supervisar la gestión de escuelas en otros 45 países.[xxix] Más de la mitad de las escuelas restantes gestionadas por el personal de Hizmet se encuentran en Estados Unidos y Europa. En Estados Unidos, hay un total de 312 escuelas, cuatro universidades y 155 escuelas autónomas (charter schools), con las instalaciones más grandes en los estados federales de Texas, Ohio, California y Florida.[xxx] La rápida actividad con la que la Fundación ha obtenido el control de las escuelas Hizmet plantea muchos riesgos en varios niveles: para los niños y sus padres, para las sociedades nacionales en las que operan las escuelas Maarif y a nivel bilateral entre Turquía y los países anfitriones.

Toguslu (2017) explicó estos riesgos en primer lugar a nivel bilateral, previendo correctamente que una vez que las tensiones diplomáticas de 2016 y 2017 disminuyeran, los países africanos habían allanado el camino para que las capacidades de poder duro de Turquía se expandieran aún más en África utilizando las escuelas como una extensión, como se observó en Senegal.[xxxi] En apariencia, la Fundación quiere que los países crean que la calidad de la educación y las instalaciones ofrecidas en las escuelas Maarif es de un nivel superior y que la Fundación pondrá fin a la supuesta educación difamada o defectuosa que se ofrecía anteriormente en las escuelas Hizmet. Esta presentación superficial es evidente en la declaración de Nalova Lyonga, Ministra de Educación Secundaria de Camerún:

“Los estudiantes aprenderán francés e inglés, además de turco, y desarrollarán una cultura diferente y el hábito de vivir juntos. Damos importancia a los diferentes idiomas como parte de la cultura y acogemos con alegría la educación turca. Creo que la cultura turca nos aportará mucho.”[xxxii]

A nivel más profundo, la realidad es que Turquía está utilizando la Fundación Maarif para expandir su influencia política. Esta tendencia se evidencia a partir de comportamientos pasados, como la exportación de profesores e imanes turcos a Europa para recopilar información sobre las comunidades diaspóricas y asegurarse de que sigan las directivas e ideología del partido AKP.[xxxiii] Akgun & Ozkan (2020) también han informado sobre las aspiraciones de la Fundación de ir más allá del ámbito educativo y realizar una contribución más amplia hacia la política exterior de Turquía y las relaciones diplomáticas a través del sector educativo.[xxxiv]

Además, existen riesgos significativos asociados a la erradicación de las escuelas Hizmet. Los maestros de Hizmet ofrecían una calidad educativa superior al promedio a los estudiantes en sus países de acogida. Esto se evidencia en la excelencia académica atribuida a los estudiantes y en la alta tasa de satisfacción mostrada por los padres; las escuelas Hizmet eran reconocidas hasta el punto en que los funcionarios estatales preferían enviar a sus hijos a la educación de Hizmet.[xxxv] Organizaciones internacionales, como la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), también han encontrado que el sistema educativo de Turquía tiene un rendimiento inferior en comparación con otros países. En particular, existe un riesgo conocido de acoso sexual en las instituciones educativas y en Turquía en general, demostrado por los escándalos que rodean a la Fundación Ensar, la cual tenía estrechos vínculos con el presidente Erdogan.[xxxvi] Turquía en sí misma no proporciona una educación de calidad a sus estudiantes y, sin embargo, exporta sus propios sistemas educativos y valores a otros países. Esto plantea un riesgo fundamental para los países que importan la educación turca al disminuir el nivel de la educación en los países receptores, impidiendo que los niños reciban la educación de calidad que merecen. Por extensión, esto podría tener un impacto negativo en el desarrollo económico de los países receptores al impedir la acumulación de capital humano a través de una educación de calidad.

Un riesgo importante es la posibilidad de que la Fundación Maarif pueda promover el objetivo de Erdogan de convertirse en líder del mundo islámico utilizando la inversión como un medio para congraciarse con él y su agenda ante los musulmanes no turcos que viven en el extranjero.[xxxvii] Esta ambición es peligrosa por dos razones. En primer lugar, el enfoque de “convivencia” y apertura de las escuelas de Hizmet para dialogar con diferentes etnias, especialmente religiones, contrasta fuertemente con la ideología cerrada y exclusiva de Erdogan, quien en el pasado ha afirmado abiertamente que los musulmanes y los cristianos no deben relacionarse entre sí. En segundo lugar, África tiene problemas únicos con el terrorismo, como la proliferación del ISIS en Mozambique, Uganda y la República Democrática del Congo, así como Boko Haram en Nigeria. Si la Fundación Maarif se hiciera cargo de un sector significativo del sistema educativo en muchos países africanos, estos problemas podrían empeorar, ya que las escuelas difundirían la ideología de Erdogan, que fundamenta la política en principios religiosos.[xxxviii] Dr. Dinse expresó su preocupación respect al riesgo de desestabilización de sociedades africanas diciendo:

“Lo que ha sucedido con nuestra inversión es extraño para cualquier observador (…) En un país con un sólido sistema de estado de derecho y que alberga la sede de la Unión Africana, la Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para África y muchas comunidades diplomáticas, resulta increíble que una inversión extranjera pueda ser tomada por la fuerza sin recurrir al estado de derecho.”

Las Escuelas Hizmet estaban protegidas de este riesgo porque carecían de un vínculo formal con Gülen y, por lo tanto, nunca intentaron crear un movimiento global basado únicamente en la ideología de Gülen. Ni las escuelas ni los estudiantes intentaron defender a Gülen después del fallido golpe de estado, ni se opusieron directamente a las acciones de Erdogan.[xxxix] Las escuelas se mantuvieron como instituciones educativas en lugar de herramientas políticas. La única actividad política vinculada causalmente a las escuelas Hizmet fue la protesta en defensa de la autonomía y legalidad de las escuelas frente a los intentos de adquisición de la Fundación Maarif. G. Angey (2018) documentó esta resistencia en un estudio de caso en Senegal, donde la sociedad civil, los padres y los funcionarios públicos, en lugar de turcos o personal de Hizmet, desafiaron públicamente las transferencias intentadas en los tribunales, citando los riesgos de perder oportunidades educativas valoradas.[xl]

No hay forma posible de que las escuelas Maarif estén aisladas de la política debido a que la Fundación es una institución del estado y porque Turquía mantiene una influencia económica sobre los gobiernos africanos. Por lo tanto, incluso si la sociedad civil africana, los funcionarios públicos y los organismos estatales se movilizan de manera más sustantiva contra las escuelas, los gobiernos africanos aún se verán obligados a cumplir y cooperar con las demandas de Erdogan debido a la amenaza económica de empeorar las relaciones con Turquía. Por ejemplo, la Comisión de Inversiones de Etiopía señala que Turquía es el segundo mayor inversionista en Etiopía, con $2.5 mil millones de inversión directa. Las empresas turcas también son los mayores empleadores, proporcionando aproximadamente 30,000 empleos.[xli] Estos hechos le otorgan a Erdogan el poder de influir, para bien o para mal, en el progreso socioeconómico de Etiopía y, por lo tanto, el poder de exigir acciones políticas al gobierno etíope.

CONCLUSIÓN

En resumen, el gobierno turco ha cambiado sus objetivos de política exterior hacia la exportación de la educación, especialmente hacia África. Inicialmente, este cambio fue producto del movimiento Gülen, que apoyaba la enseñanza de la moderación, el humanitarismo y el multiculturalismo. El movimiento Gülen inspiró las escuelas Hizmet, que carecían de cualquier vínculo explícito con Gülen y ciertamente no fueron planeadas por él, aunque buscaban continuar su ética innovadora. Estas escuelas allanaron el camino para la inversión privada, los vínculos culturales y la diplomacia educativa antes de la entrada de representantes públicos del gobierno turco; sin embargo, también es cierto que las escuelas Hizmet dependían de la buena voluntad del gobierno turco, utilizando redes oficiales de comunicación para abrir más escuelas en toda África. El surgimiento y la caída de Hizmet son, por lo tanto, una tragedia resultada de la identidad fluida de las escuelas. Eran tanto producto de Turquía, ya que se inspiraron en Gülen, fueron financiadas por empresarios turcos y fueron posibles gracias a las conexiones con funcionarios públicos, como producto de la sociedad local, que con el tiempo llegó a respetar y apropiarse de las instituciones donde sus hijos recibieron una educación de alta calidad. Esta localización de la propiedad formal e informal hizo que las escuelas adoptaran una identidad más africana o europea que turca. Esta dinámica es evidente en la lucha local, en lugar de internacional, contra la expropiación de las escuelas Hizmet.

Sin embargo, las narrativas relacionadas con las escuelas son divergentes. Muchas de las fuentes citadas en este informe respaldan la narrativa de que las escuelas Hizmet eran una extensión directa del movimiento Gülen que tenía la intención de aislar a Turquía y al AKP con el objetivo de derrocar al gobierno. Otros respaldan la contra-narrativa de que el movimiento y las escuelas están siendo perseguidos por el gobierno turco como parte de su campaña por el dominio político y el desprecio por los derechos humanos. Este informe avanza en esta contra-narrativa, destacando la escalada de propaganda del gobierno turco contra Gülen y las escuelas Hizmet en el extranjero, que recordaba los temores preexistentes sobre el terrorismo y la inestabilidad generalizados en África y Europa. El establecimiento de la Fundación Maarif profundizó estos temores al inculcar en las sociedades donde Hizmet había tenido éxito la idea de que las escuelas Hizmet difundían sentimientos antigubernamentales y ofrecían una educación de baja calidad. La Fundación ofreció sus propias escuelas Maarif como alternativa, afirmando que eran tanto educativamente superiores como más alineadas con los objetivos políticos de los países anfitriones. Pero la realidad es que la Fundación es un brazo extendido del régimen de Erdogan que tiene como objetivo erradicar el sistema Hizmet, recuperar el control sobre las relaciones exteriores y adquirir influencia sobre otros países y dignatarios bajo los auspicios de la sociedad civil extranjera.

[i] Toguslu, E. (2017) ‘The Turbulence between AKP and Hizmet: The African Case’. Centre for Hizmet Studies, p. 9; see also BBC (2016) ‘Tukey coup: What is Gulen movement and what does it want?’. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846 [Accessed 09/07/2022]; see also Norton, J. & Kasapoglu, C. (2016) ‘Turkey’s post-coup crackdown hits ‘Gulen schools’ worldwide’. BBC. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37422822 [Accessed 09/07/2022].

[ii] Toguslu, pp. 8-9.

[iii] Ibid., pp. 10-11 & 13; see also Dipama, S. & Dal, E. P. (2019) ‘Assessing the Turkish “Trading State” in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Dal, E. P. (eds.) (2019) Turkey’s Political Economy in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham., pp. 250-253; see also Angey, G. (2018) ‘The Gulen Movement and the Transfer of a Political Conflict from Turkey to Senegal’. Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 19(1), p. 53 (“By 2013, the Gülen Movement had over 100 schools in 50-odd countries across Africa and was collaborating closely with the Turkish state on the ground.”)

[iv] Toguslu, pp. 16-17; see also Akgun, B. & Ozkan, M. (2020) ‘Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Foundation’. Insight Turkey, Vol. 22(1), p. 60.

[v] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021a) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation took over 216 Gulen-linked schools in 44 countries, chairman says’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-maarif-foundation-took-over-216-gulen-linked-schools-in-44-countries-chairman-says/ [Accessed 16/07/2022] (In order to dissuade his followers regarding these charges, Erdogan began designated the Gulen movement as a terrorist organisation, and that these charges are merely a conspiracy to take down and usurp the government).

[vi] Dr. Sezgin likens Erdogan to Mephisto from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust, explaining that Erdogan’s corrupt nature could have stopped much earlier but instead progressed towards the pinnacle moment when he felt the zeal of the public supporting him and recognized that without support, he would face persecution. The series of charges led to Erdogan committing still more corruption and criminal activity, feeding his growing paranoia and need to collect constant intelligence, growing into a vicious cycle of corruption, crimes, and lies.

[vii] Toguslu, p. 19.

[viii] Ibid.; see also Angey, p. 58.

[ix] Abstract taken from the official law: https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/turkey/3393423/turkey-maarif-foundation-law.html [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[x] Toguslu, p.; Angey, p. 59.

[xi] Toguslu, pp. 19 & 20 19 (the author notes that “What the Education Ministry should be doing is being handed over to a foundation” which further indicates that the government wishes to continue acting via actors that hold a semi-public status of not exactly representing the government but still carrying out the tacitly approved conduct of its public officials); see also Angey, pp. 59-60; see also Akgun & Ozkan, p. 65 (Despite the nature of propaganda in this article, it is interesting to see how the domestic perspective of the Gulen movement’s and Hizmet schools’ respective images. It state that “In the past, the brand of ‘Turkish schools’ abroad was mostly used, popularized and even hijacked by FETO” and that the Foundation’s activities aim at “reclaiming [the] educational soft power for Turkey.”)

[xii] Toguslu, p. 21; see also Angey, pp. 60-61; see also Donelli, p. 10; see also Tigli, I. et al. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation takes over2nd FETO-linked school in Ethiopia’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkeys-maarif-takes-over-2nd-feto-linked-school-in-ethiopia/2305135 [Accessed 10/07/2022]; see also Daily Sabah (2021) ‘Tukey’s Maarif Foundation takes over all FETO schools in Ethiopia’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkeys-maarif-foundation-takes-over-all-feto-schools-in-ethiopia [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xiii] Angey, p. 60; see also Dipama & Dal, pp. 245-246, 249, and 257-263.

[xiv] Daily Sabah (2016) ‘Maarif Foundation takes over FETO schools in Gabon’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/12/22/maarif-foundation-take-over-feto-schools-in-gabon [Accessed 10/07/2022]

[xv] Halil, I. & Kazanci, H. (2017) ‘Turkey takes over FETO terror group schools in Chad’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-takes-over-feto-terror-group-schools-in-chad/1014315 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] Paksoy, Y. (2017) ‘FETO-free era of national education begins in Guinea’. Daily Sabah. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/02/02/feto-free-era-of-national-education-begins-in-guinea [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xviii] Yuzbasioglu, N. (2017) ‘Burundi transferring FETO schools to Turkish Foundation’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burundi-transferring-feto-schools-to-turkish-foundation/908418 [Accessed 10/07/2022]; see also Tih, F. K. (2017) ‘Burundi to transfer FETO schools to Turkey’s Maarif’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burundi-to-transfer-feto-schools-to-turkey-s-maarif/825981 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xix] Daily Sabah (2017) ‘Djibouti gives Turkey’s Maarif Foundation green light to build schools’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/education/2017/03/07/djibouti-gives-turkeys-maarif-foundation-green-light-to-build-schools [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xx] Stockholm Centre for Freedom (2018).

[xxi] Durul, T. (2018) ‘FETO-linked school in E.Guinea handed over to Maarif Foundation’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/feto-linked-school-in-eguinea-handed-over-to-maarif-foundation/1255942 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xxii] Turkiye Maarif Vakfi (2019) ‘Official Opening of Maarif Schools in Cameroun’. Available online from: https://turkiyemaarif.org/post/7-official-opening-of-maarif-schools-in-cameroun-615?lang=en [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxiii] Tigli, I. et al. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif takes over 2nd FETO-linked school in Ethiopia’. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkeys-maarif-takes-over-2nd-feto-linked-school-in-ethiopia/2305135 [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxiv] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021b) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation illegally seized German-run schools in Ethiopia, says manager’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-maarif-foundation-illegally-seized-german-run-school-in-ethiopia-says-manager/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Daily Sabah (2021).

[xxviii] Daily Sabah (2019) ‘Maarif Foundation opens its first school in EU’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2019/09/18/maarif-foundation-opens-its-first-school-in-eu [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxix] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021a).

[xxx] Usta, B. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif resumes activities at full speed, taking over 214 schools across world’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkeys-maarif-resumes-activities-at-full-speed-taking-over-214-schools-across-world [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxi] Toguslu, p. 21.

[xxxii] Turkiye Maarif Vakfi.

[xxxiii] Toguslu, p. 21; see also Pitel, L. (2021) ‘Erdogan’s great game: Soldiers, spies and Turkey’s quest for power’. Financial Times. Available online from: https://www.ft.com/content/8052b8aa-62b9-40c9-a40c-d7187d5cd98a [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also San, S. (2021) ‘Turkish spies are abducting Erdogan’s political opponents abroad’. Open Democracy. Available online from: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/turkish-spies-are-abducting-erdogans-political-opponents-abroad/ [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also Vidino, L. (2019) ‘Erdogan’s Long Arm in Europe’. Foreign Policy. Available online from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/07/erdogans-long-arm-in-europe-germany-netherlands-milli-gorus-muslim-brotherhood-turkey-akp/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxiv] Akgun & Ozkan, p. 68.

[xxxv] Toguslu, pp. 21-22; see also Angey, pp. 62 & 65; see also Donelli, p. 7.

[xxxvi] Toguslu, p. 22; see also Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (2018) ‘Result from PISA 2018 – Turkey’. Available online from: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_CN_TUR.pdf [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also Nordic Monitor (2019) ‘Turkey’s Ensar Foundation, caught up in child sexual abuse, became OIC partner’. Available online from: https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/09/turkeys-ensar-foundation-caught-up-in-child-sexual-abuse-became-oic-partner/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxvii] Toguslu, pp. 23-24; see also Stockholm Center for Freedom (2018)

[xxxviii] Toguslu, pp. 22-23 & 24.

[xxxix] Angey, p. 65.

[xl] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[xli] Daily Sabah (2021); see also Dipama & Dal, p. 260.

Cover Image :https://hizmetnews.com/24565/kyrgyzstan-rebuffs-turkish-takeover-of-gulen-schools/#.Y3CyWnbMJPY

Translated by Joan Vilalta Flo from the original https://brokenchalk.org/turkeys-hard-power-turn-handing-hizmet-schools-to-the-turkey-maarif-foundation/

Turkey’s Hard Power Turn: Handing Hizmet Schools to the Turkey Maarif Foundation

This paper summarizes and analyses how Turkey has extended its mission to close down Hizmet schools in African and European countries via the public-private entity known as the Maarif Foundation

 

Edited_Turkey_s_Hard_Power_Turn.edited

Download PDF :  https://brokenchalk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Edited_Turkey_s_Hard_Power_Turn.edited.pdf

Disclaimer

Some articles referenced in this report show a certain political bias and propaganda by referring to the Gulen movement as the ‘Fetullah Terrorist Organization’ (FETO).

It is important to note that the Turkish government adopted this label as a scapegoating mechanism to pin the 15th July 2016 failed coup attempt upon the Gulen movement and its members. This label sought to create a narrative the Gulen movement had the sole aim of overthrowing the government; however, the reality is that the movement and the schools are facing persecution by a government threatened by legal charges and scandals, one that relied on scapegoating innocent lives and families.

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INTRODUCTION

During his time in Turkey in the 1960s and ’70s, Fetullah Gulen was a well-renowned Imam who preached that English-taught education builds morality and character as much as, if not more, than modesty, altruism, and hard work. He emphasized that education was essential for Turkey’s emergence into the globalized era.[i] In furtherance of this ideology, the Gulen movement of the 1980s was aided by funding from the so-called conservative ‘Anatolian tigers’ to create schools that would carry out such education founded upon, but not formally linked to, the principles espoused by Gulen. These schools were referred to globally as Hizmet schools. ‘Hizmet’ indicated that the schools taught about light, philosophy, reflection, dialogue, and tolerance.[ii] The schools were first formed voluntarily by business people within Turkey and staffed by educators seeking to engage in humanitarian work and charity. They soon expanded to various locations abroad in the ‘90s, including North America, Central Asia, Europe, Australia, and especially Africa. [iii] More often than not, these schools were the first informal instance of Turkey establishing economic, cultural, and political links with foreign governments.

Although the Turkish government initially tacitly supported these schools, this became more complicated after the Presidential Crisis of 2007. As a result of this crisis, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured control of the country’s political handle, forming an administration wary of leaving too much control over national and foreign affairs in the hands of external, private actors within and outside of Turkey.[iv] In a series of talks with the co-founder and executive director of the Centre for Hizmet Studies, Dr. Ismail M. Sezgin outlined how the government’s perception of the schools changed over time. It initially saw advantages in associating with the schools because the Gulen movement’s credibility was well-received by the Turkish population. But this perception changed as the Gulen movement became increasingly critical of the government amid changing political dynamics reflected in the 2012 elections.[v] This election round targeted then-Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, resulting in corruption charges, a departure from Western ideals of democracy, and halted plans to join the European Union (EU). The Gulen movement condemned the government during this time, leading the government to reevaluate its perception of the movement. Dr. Sezgin explains that when more corruption charges emerged in 2014, Gulen became a real threat, prompting Erdogan to actively oppose Gulen. Ultimately, this political realignment resulted in the government’s attempt to blame the failed coup attempt on 15th July 2016 on the so-called ‘Fetullah Terrorist Organization’ (FETO) as a ploy to forcefully rebrand the Gulen movement as a threat to society.[vi]

The failed coup gave Erdogan what he has referred to as ‘a gift from God’ that allowed the AKP to conduct a witch-hunt-style attack on Hizmet schools. This inquisition began in Turkey, with many members facing human rights abuses and even imprisonment, but quickly spread internationally as the government called upon foreign governments to close the schools, especially those based in Africa.[vii] Such an attack obviously detrimentally impacted students who gained a high-quality and valuable education from the Hizmet schools. In many impoverished locations, the schools raised the standard of education and living. Nonetheless, in an attempt to quash the Gulen movement, the Turkish government created the pseudo-entity known as the ‘Maarif Foundation’ just weeks before the failed coup and equipped it with a mixture of public-private authority to either close or replace Hizmet schools.[viii]

The next section of this report shall briefly analyse the function of the Maarif Foundation, followed by a section commenting on the chronological takeover of Hizmet schools in Belarus, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Guinea by the Foundation. Then, the report will analyse Turkey’s shift from a soft power stance of economic diplomacy towards a harder form of power that risks transferring the consequences of Turkey’s domestic politics to other states. Lastly, the final section will conclude with some brief observations and recommendations.

THE MAARIF FOUNDATION’S MECHANISMS

On 17th June 2016, the then prime Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu, announced the implementation of the law numbered 6721 that founded the Maarif Foundation, ‘Maarif’ meaning ‘education’ or ‘instruction’. President Erdogan and his government appointed its 12 members: 4 chosen by the President, three by the cabinet, and the rest by the ministries of education, foreign affairs, and the economy in conjunction with the Higher Education Council.[ix] The Foundation was granted the powers:

“to provide scholarships, schools, education and facilities such as schools, education institutions, and dormitories, to provide them with scholarships in all the processes of education, from pre-school to university education in order to develop and develop education and distribution services, only to be able to afford the institutions that can take part in institutions, the Turkish Maarif Foundation, which is in central Istanbul to conduct scientific research and research, develop and develop methods and carry out the activities of the country in which it operates, to carry out the activities of the country.”[x]

 

These terms of reference indicate that the Foundation is a government entity, receiving its budget and directives from public officials. It was distinguished from other foundations by its additional capacity to perform its functions abroad “by founding or taking over companies possessing private law legal entity,” which falls clearly within the remit of the status held by Hizmet schools founded abroad.[xi] The true, underlying intention of the Foundation started soon after the failed coup a month later, when Erdogan requested that the Foundation “be in 193 countries (…) [and] prioritise countries where FETO is more effective and known. Do not let the FETO schools be called ‘Turkish schools’”.[xii] To a certain extent, this demonstrates that Turkey continues to rely on private and semi-public actors abroad that had established and maintained relations with other states in the past, as noted above with the Gulen movement.

 

The primary barrier to the Foundation’s attempts to expropriate the physical property of Hizmet schools is the fact that domestic authorities must first agree to dispossess these schools to the Foundation, often leading to grueling and time-consuming trials in court, as recently seen in Ethiopia.[xiii] Despite facing resistance in its attempts to convince other countries to close down Hizmet schools or hand over the facilities, the Turkish government has achieved the most success in Africa by using what can be called the ‘stick approach’. In this approach, Turkey uses “sticks,” or hard power, rather than “carrots,” or soft power, to threaten a country’s socio-economic progress and infrastructural projects via economic and investment pressure. Dipama & Dal (2019) discuss Turkey’s use of the stick approach, describing how Turkey can exploit its links with particular African states through business, import, export, and foreign direct investment to its own benefit.[xiv] The next section will focus on the relationship between the Foundation and these select African countries before comparing the Foundation’s success in Belarus and mainland Europe.

 

THE MAARIF FOUNDATION IN BELARUS, BURUNDI, CAMEROON, CHAD, DJIBOUTI, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ETHIOPIA, GABON, AND GUINEA-CONAKRY

 

One of the first African countries to acquiesce to the Turkish government’s demands was Gabon. Public officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the vice president of the Maarif Foundation, Hasan Yavuz, to cede three Hizmet schools to the Foundation, consisting of a total of 200 students.[xv] Chad also acquiesced to transfer Hizmet schools, but the extent of the takeover was only documented later in 2017 when a kindergarten, primary schools, dormitory, and secondary schools were expropriated and transferred to the Maarif Foundation for management ahead of a visit by President Erdogan.[xvi] The Education Minister of Chad at the time, Ahmad Khazali Acyl, considered it a step forward in Chadian-Turkish relations. From an outside, objective perspective, however, this can also be considered further erasure of Gulen’s influence in Africa to advance Erdogan’s agenda, which has painted the Hizmet schools as a ‘sham’ quality of education. It is important to note that “[m]any African countries, immediately after the coup attempt, deported [Hizmet] members and transferred the schools run by the group to our Maarif Foundation.”[xvii]

During 2017, the Maarif Foundation made significant headway in Africa, particularly in Guinea-Conakry, Djibouti, and Burundi. A total of 10 schools in the capital of Guinea were transferred to the Foundation following a three-month-long process of public authorities canceling Hizmet licenses to teach and own the private facilities. Once the Foundation took over former Hizmet schools, they were frequently remodeled with new names linked to political martyrs allegedly killed by supposed Gulenists during the coup attempt. [xviii]  Turkish officials officially inaugurated the schools at events that mimicked the humanitarian and charitable functions of the former Hizmet owners. Likewise, Joel Nkurabagaya, the then Burundian ambassador to Turkey, stated in 2017 that Burundi was working towards allowing the Foundation to open its own schools following the transfer of numerous Hizmet schools. These developments were precipitated by Hasan Yuvuz’s visit to Burundi in May 2017, ostensibly to discuss education but during which Burundian and Turkish officials introduced other political and economic interests. For example, during Yuvuz’s visit, the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, requested that Turkish Airlines open direct flights to Burundi.[xix] Similarly, Djibouti transferred a facility to the Foundation to use as a kindergarten and elementary school. It was additionally one of the first countries in Africa to grant the Foundation a 5-hectare plot of land to build its own Maarif educational institution. This trend would later take shape across Africa.[xx]

By January 2018, the Foundation had signed agreements with a total of 26 African states, with 16 having transferred schools over to the Foundation, consisting of nearly 9,000 students under the influence of President Erdogan’s Islamist ideology and political agenda.[xxi] These states were joined by Equatorial Guinea in September 2018, when Sebnem Cenk, Turkey’s ambassador in Malabo, and Fabiola Angono Miko, the deputy minister of Youth and Sports and Foreign Ministry, agreed to transfer a Hizmet school based in the capital, Malabo, to the Foundation under the new name of ‘Maarif Malabo College’.[xxii] In early 2019, the Foundation also managed to gain the cooperation of the Cameroonian government to close down and transfer Hizmet schools. The re-opening ceremony was attended by numerous distinguished officials from Cameroon and Turkey, with the Turkish ambassador to the country, Ayşe Saraç, commenting that:

“Cameroon supported our country and became our friend and ally in our struggle with [Hizmet]. Maarif Schools are more and more active in the international arena and have achieved significant successes. The Turkish Maarif Foundation will open new schools in Cameroon in the coming period. We keep following and supporting all works carried out in this regard.”[xxiii]

One of the most critical battlegrounds in taking over Hizmet schools can clearly be seen with respect to Ethiopia. This dynamic started in mid-2019 when the first Hizmet school, located in Harar, was expropriated and transferred to the Foundation, which met three years of legal challenges before attaining a second school located in Sebata Town.[xxiv] These legal challenges were prolonged by an investigation conducted by Ethiopian federal and state attorneys into terrorism and money laundering at the school that the Maarif Foundation was attempting to acquire. According to the Stockholm Center for Freedom in 2021, the STEM Education Private Limited Company, composed of several German investors based in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, owned the school.[xxv] The manager of the school, Dr. Norbert Helmut Dinse, explained that the school was foreign-owned within the educational sector of Ethiopia and that:

“Initially, the company was established by Turkish Investors. Through time, the three German investors acquired the investment following all procedures required under the law. German investors stepped in and took over the parent company again in full compliance with the requirements of the laws of the land.”[xxvi]

At first, it seemed that the Ministry of Education in Ethiopia would support the Hizmet school and its STEM owners due to the legitimate proof of its status as a privately owned school, even approving its school license for the 2020-2021 academic year. However, this changed after the Oromia and Sebata Education Bureau and several armed police officers trespassed onto school grounds, illegally installing the Turkish staff of the Maarif Foundation to begin teaching at the school instead.[xxvii] A representative of the Foundation, Levent Sahin, stated that “[a]fter the investigation, state attorney generals decided to suspend education licenses of the Stem company belonging to the terror organization. We want to see that this will be an example for the other schools.” By mid-August 2021, the Foundation took control of eleven more schools formerly run by Hizmet in Ethiopia, consisting of 2,000 students. Although staff and students mounted additional legal obstacles to stop these acquisitions, the Foundation utilized sympathetic parent-teacher associations to quash these legal attempts and sway educational bureaucracy in its favor.[xxviii]

At the moment of writing, there is a lack of credible information about the single institution that was either transferred or opened in Belarus. Nonetheless, this development occurred shortly after the opening of two schools in Bucharest, Romania, and Elbasan, Albania, in late 2019. Both replaced the Hizmet schools that existed in the respective countries.[xxix]

 

ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES

By March 2021, the Maarif foundation had taken control of 216 Hizmet schools in 44 countries, stating that it had signed a further 77 protocols to oversee the management of schools in 45 other countries.[xxx] Over half of the remaining schools managed by Hizmet staff are located in the U.S. and Europe, the former hosting a total of 312 schools, four universities, and 155 charter schools, with the largest facilities in the federal states of Texas, Ohio, California, and Florida.[xxxi] The rapid activity with which the Foundation has attained control over Hizmet schools poses many risks on various levels: for the children and their parents, for the domestic societies within which the Maarif schools operate, and at a bilateral level between Turkey and the host countries.

Toguslu (2017) explained these risks firstly at a bilateral level, correctly foreseeing that once the diplomatic tensions of 2016 and 2017 died down, African countries had paved the way for Turkey’s hard power capabilities to expand further into Africa by using the schools as an extension, as seen in Senegal.[xxxii] On the surface, the Foundation wants countries to believe that the quality of education and facilities offered at Maarif schools are of a higher standard and that the Foundation will discontinue the so-called maligned or flawed education previously offered in Hizmet schools. This superficial presentation is evident from the Secondary Education Minister of Cameroon, Nalova Lyonga, statement that:

“students will learn French and English as well as Turkish, and will develop a different culture and the habit of living together. We give importance to the different languages as part of culture and welcome the Turkish education with joy. I believe that Turkish culture will add a lot to us.”[xxxiii]

At a deeper level, the reality is that Turkey is using the Maarif Foundation to expand its political influence. This trend is evident from past behaviour, namely the export of Turkish teachers and imams to Europe to gather intelligence on diaspora communities and ensure that the diaspora follows the directives and ideology of the AKP party.[xxxiv] Akgun & Ozkan (2020) have also reported on the Foundation’s aspirations to move beyond the educational field and make a larger contribution towards Turkey’s foreign policy and diplomatic relations via the educational sector.[xxxv]

Furthermore, there are significant risks associated with the eradication of Hizmet schools. Hizmet teachers offered a higher than average educational quality to students in their host countries. This is evident from the academic excellence attributed to students and the high rate of satisfaction shown by parents; Hizmet schools were recognized to the point that state officials preferred to send their children to Hizmet education.[xxxvi] International organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have also found that Turkey’s education system underperforms compared to other states. In particular, there is a known risk of sexual harassment in educational institutions and in Turkey more generally, demonstrated by the scandals surrounding the Ensar Foundation, which was closely linked to President Erdogan.[xxxvii] Turkey itself does not provide quality education to its students, and yet it is exporting its own educational systems and values to other countries. This poses a fundamental risk to the countries that import Turkish education by lowering the bar for education in host countries, preventing children from receiving the quality education they deserve. By extension, this could negatively impact the economic development of host countries by preventing the cumulation of human capital via quality education.

A major risk is the possibility that the Maarif Foundation could advance Erdogan’s goal to become the leader of the Islamic world by using investment as a means to ingratiate himself and his agenda to non-Turkish Muslims living abroad.[xxxviii] This ambition is dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, the ‘coexistence’ and expressive approach of Hizmet schools to dialogue with different ethnicities, especially religions, is in stark contrast to the closed and exclusive ideology of Erdogan, who in the past has openly stated that Muslims and Christians should not engage with one another. Secondly, Africa has unique issues with terrorism, such as the proliferation of ISIS in Mozambique, Uganda, and the DRC, as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Should the Maarif Foundation take over a significant sector of the education system in many African countries, these issues may worsen as schools disseminate Erdogan’s ideology, which founds politics on religious principles.[xxxix] Dr. Dinse expressed his concern about the risk of destabilising African societies, saying:

“What has happened to our investment is odd for any listener (…) [i]n a country with a strong system of the rule of law and hosting the Head Office of African Union, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and many diplomatic communities, it is unbelievable that foreign investment can be taken forcefully without recourse Rule of Law.”

The Hizmet Schools were insulated from this risk because they lacked a formal link to Gulen and thus never attempted to create a global movement based solely on Gulen’s ideology. Neither the schools nor the students attempted to defend Gulen after the failed coup, nor did they directly oppose the actions of Erdogan.[xl] The schools thus remained education institutions rather than political tools. The only political activity causally linked to the Hizmet schools was protesting in defense of the schools’ autonomy and legality in the face of the Maarif Foundation’s attempted acquisitions. G. Angey (2018) documented this pushback in a case study of Senegal, wherein civil society, parents, and public officials—rather than Turks or Hizmet staff—publicly challenged the attempted transfers in court, citing the risks of losing cherished educational opportunities.[xli]

There is no possible way for the Maarif schools to be insulated from politics because the Foundation is an institution of the state and because Turkey maintains economic leverage over African governments. Hence, even if African civil society, public officials, and state bodies mobilize against the schools in more substantive ways than previously described, African governments will still be forced to comply and cooperate with Erdogan’s demands due to the economic threat of souring relations with Turkey. For instance, the Ethiopian Investment Commission notes that Turkey is the second largest investor in Ethiopia, with $2.5 billion in direct investment. Turkish companies are also the single largest employers, providing roughly 30,000 jobs.[xlii] These facts give Erdogan the power to influence—for better or for worse—the socioeconomic progress of Ethiopia, and thus the power to demand political actions from the Ethiopian government.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the Turkish government has shifted its foreign policy goals toward exporting education, especially to Africa. Initially, this shift was a product of the Gulen movement, which supported the teaching of moderation, humanitarianism, and multiculturalism. The Gulen movement inspired Hizmet schools, which lacked any explicit link to Gulen and certainly were not willed by Gulen, although they sought to continue his innovative ethos. These schools paved the way for private investment, cultural links, and educational diplomacy prior to the entrance of public representatives of the Turkish government; however, it is also true that the Hizmet schools relied on the Turkish government’s goodwill, using official networks of communication to open more schools across Africa. The rise and fall of Hizmet is, therefore, a tragedy resulting from the fluid identity of the schools. They were both a product of Turkey, since they were inspired by Gulen, financed by Turkish businessmen, and enabled by connections with public officials, and a product of local society, which, over time, came to respect and own the institutions where their children received such a high quality of education. This localisation of formal and informal ownership made the schools adopt an identity that was more African or European than Turkish. This dynamic is evident from the local, rather than international, struggle against the expropriation of the Hizmet schools.

The narratives relating to the schools are divergent, however. Many of the sources referenced in this report support the narrative that the Hizmet schools were a direct extension of the Gulen movement that intended to isolate Turkey and the AKP with a view to overthrow the government. Others support the counter-narrative that the movement and the schools are facing persecution by the Turkish government as part of its campaign for political dominance and disregard for human rights. This report advances this counter-narrative, noting the Turkish government’s escalation of propaganda against Gulen and the Hizmet schools abroad, which recalled the pre-existing fears of terrorism and instability pervasive throughout Africa and Europe. The establishment of the Maarif Foundation furthered these fears by instilling within societies where Hizmet had been successful the idea that Hizmet schools disseminated anti-government sentiment and provided a poor quality of education. The Foundation offered its own Maarif schools as an alternative, claiming they were both educationally superior and more aligned with host countries’ political goals. But the reality is that the Foundation is an extended arm of the Erdogan regime that aims to eradicate the Hizmet system, regain control over foreign relations, and acquire influence over other countries and dignitaries under the auspices of foreign civil society.

 

[i] Toguslu, E. (2017) ‘The Turbulence between AKP and Hizmet: The African Case’. Centre for Hizmet Studies, p. 9; see also BBC (2016) ‘Tukey coup: What is Gulen movement and what does it want?’. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846 [Accessed 09/07/2022]; see also Norton, J. & Kasapoglu, C. (2016) ‘Turkey’s post-coup crackdown hits ‘Gulen schools’ worldwide’. BBC. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37422822 [Accessed 09/07/2022].

[ii] Toguslu, pp. 8-9.

[iii] Ibid., pp. 10-11 & 13; see also Dipama, S. & Dal, E. P. (2019) ‘Assessing the Turkish “Trading State” in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Dal, E. P. (eds.) (2019) Turkey’s Political Economy in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham., pp. 250-253; see also Angey, G. (2018) ‘The Gulen Movement and the Transfer of a Political Conflict from Turkey to Senegal’. Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 19(1), p. 53 (“By 2013, the Gülen Movement had over 100 schools in 50-odd countries across Africa and was collaborating closely with the Turkish state on the ground.”)

[iv] Toguslu, pp. 16-17; see also Akgun, B. & Ozkan, M. (2020) ‘Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Foundation’. Insight Turkey, Vol. 22(1), p. 60.

[v] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021a) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation took over 216 Gulen-linked schools in 44 countries, chairman says’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-maarif-foundation-took-over-216-gulen-linked-schools-in-44-countries-chairman-says/ [Accessed 16/07/2022] (In order to dissuade his followers regarding these charges, Erdogan began designated the Gulen movement as a terrorist organisation, and that these charges are merely a conspiracy to take down and usurp the government).

[vi] Dr. Sezgin likens Erdogan to Mephisto from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust, explaining that Erdogan’s corrupt nature could have stopped much earlier but instead progressed towards the pinnacle moment when he felt the zeal of the public supporting him and recognized that without support, he would face persecution. The series of charges led to Erdogan committing still more corruption and criminal activity, feeding his growing paranoia and need to collect constant intelligence, growing into a vicious cycle of corruption, crimes, and lies.

[vii] Ibid., p. 7-8; see also Angey, pp. 57-58; see also Akgun & Ozkan, pp. 64-65; see also Stockholm Center for Freedom (2018) ‘Erdogan’s Islamist Maarif Foundation pushes further to replace Gulen science schools in Africa’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/erdogans-islamist-maarif-foundation-pushes-further-to-replace-gulen-science-schools-in-africa/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[viii] Toguslu, p. 19.

[ix] Ibid.; see also Angey, p. 58.

[x] Abstract taken from the official law: https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/turkey/3393423/turkey-maarif-foundation-law.html [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xi] Toguslu, p.; Angey, p. 59.

[xii] Toguslu, pp. 19 & 20 19 (the author notes that “What the Education Ministry should be doing is being handed over to a foundation” which further indicates that the government wishes to continue acting via actors that hold a semi-public status of not exactly representing the government but still carrying out the tacitly approved conduct of its public officials); see also Angey, pp. 59-60; see also Akgun & Ozkan, p. 65 (Despite the nature of propaganda in this article, it is interesting to see how the domestic perspective of the Gulen movement’s and Hizmet schools’ respective images. It state that “In the past, the brand of ‘Turkish schools’ abroad was mostly used, popularized and even hijacked by FETO” and that the Foundation’s activities aim at “reclaiming [the] educational soft power for Turkey.”)

[xiii] Toguslu, p. 21; see also Angey, pp. 60-61; see also Donelli, p. 10; see also Tigli, I. et al. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation takes over2nd FETO-linked school in Ethiopia’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkeys-maarif-takes-over-2nd-feto-linked-school-in-ethiopia/2305135 [Accessed 10/07/2022]; see also Daily Sabah (2021) ‘Tukey’s Maarif Foundation takes over all FETO schools in Ethiopia’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkeys-maarif-foundation-takes-over-all-feto-schools-in-ethiopia [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xiv] Angey, p. 60; see also Dipama & Dal, pp. 245-246, 249, and 257-263.

[xv] Daily Sabah (2016) ‘Maarif Foundation takes over FETO schools in Gabon’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/12/22/maarif-foundation-take-over-feto-schools-in-gabon [Accessed 10/07/2022]

[xvi] Halil, I. & Kazanci, H. (2017) ‘Turkey takes over FETO terror group schools in Chad’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-takes-over-feto-terror-group-schools-in-chad/1014315 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] Paksoy, Y. (2017) ‘FETO-free era of national education begins in Guinea’. Daily Sabah. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/02/02/feto-free-era-of-national-education-begins-in-guinea [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xix] Yuzbasioglu, N. (2017) ‘Burundi transferring FETO schools to Turkish Foundation’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burundi-transferring-feto-schools-to-turkish-foundation/908418 [Accessed 10/07/2022]; see also Tih, F. K. (2017) ‘Burundi to transfer FETO schools to Turkey’s Maarif’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burundi-to-transfer-feto-schools-to-turkey-s-maarif/825981 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xx] Daily Sabah (2017) ‘Djibouti gives Turkey’s Maarif Foundation green light to build schools’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/education/2017/03/07/djibouti-gives-turkeys-maarif-foundation-green-light-to-build-schools [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xxi] Stockholm Centre for Freedom (2018).

[xxii] Durul, T. (2018) ‘FETO-linked school in E.Guinea handed over to Maarif Foundation’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/feto-linked-school-in-eguinea-handed-over-to-maarif-foundation/1255942 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xxiii] Turkiye Maarif Vakfi (2019) ‘Official Opening of Maarif Schools in Cameroun’. Available online from: https://turkiyemaarif.org/post/7-official-opening-of-maarif-schools-in-cameroun-615?lang=en [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxiv] Tigli, I. et al. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif takes over 2nd FETO-linked school in Ethiopia’. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkeys-maarif-takes-over-2nd-feto-linked-school-in-ethiopia/2305135 [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxv] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021b) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation illegally seized German-run schools in Ethiopia, says manager’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-maarif-foundation-illegally-seized-german-run-school-in-ethiopia-says-manager/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Ibid.

[xxviii] Daily Sabah (2021).

[xxix] Daily Sabah (2019) ‘Maarif Foundation opens its first school in EU’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2019/09/18/maarif-foundation-opens-its-first-school-in-eu [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxx] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021a).

[xxxi] Usta, B. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif resumes activities at full speed, taking over 214 schools across world’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkeys-maarif-resumes-activities-at-full-speed-taking-over-214-schools-across-world [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxii] Toguslu, p. 21.

[xxxiii] Turkiye Maarif Vakfi.

[xxxiv] Toguslu, p. 21; see also Pitel, L. (2021) ‘Erdogan’s great game: Soldiers, spies and Turkey’s quest for power’. Financial Times. Available online from: https://www.ft.com/content/8052b8aa-62b9-40c9-a40c-d7187d5cd98a [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also San, S. (2021) ‘Turkish spies are abducting Erdogan’s political opponents abroad’. Open Democracy. Available online from: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/turkish-spies-are-abducting-erdogans-political-opponents-abroad/ [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also Vidino, L. (2019) ‘Erdogan’s Long Arm in Europe’. Foreign Policy. Available online from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/07/erdogans-long-arm-in-europe-germany-netherlands-milli-gorus-muslim-brotherhood-turkey-akp/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxv] Akgun & Ozkan, p. 68.

[xxxvi] Toguslu, pp. 21-22; see also Angey, pp. 62 & 65; see also Donelli, p. 7.

[xxxvii] Toguslu, p. 22; see also Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (2018) ‘Result from PISA 2018 – Turkey’. Available online from: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_CN_TUR.pdf [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also Nordic Monitor (2019) ‘Turkey’s Ensar Foundation, caught up in child sexual abuse, became OIC partner’. Available online from: https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/09/turkeys-ensar-foundation-caught-up-in-child-sexual-abuse-became-oic-partner/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxviii] Toguslu, pp. 23-24; see also Stockholm Center for Freedom (2018)

[xxxix] Toguslu, pp. 22-23 & 24.

[xl] Angey, p. 65.

[xli] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[xlii] Daily Sabah (2021); see also Dipama & Dal, p. 260.

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