Written by Uilson Jones

The declaration of Belarussian independence on August 25th, 1991, ushered in an era of unprecedented parliamentary debate over the official state language policy. Stemming from centuries of repression and Russification during the periods of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Tsarist Empire preceding it, there existed a powerful desire for self-determination. Policies that disadvantaged the Belarussian ethnolinguistic identity were pushed, whilst a bias towards Russian language and culture for centuries has given precedence to a weaker ethnolinguistic identity amongst Belarusians. The newly found independence marked a national re-awakening, leading to the initial decision to opt for the promotion of the Belarussian language, declaring it as the only official state language. 

As such, during the years 1990-1994, Belarus had its sole experiment with restrictive language policy, legislating around other national minority languages, including Russian, Polish, and Lithuanian. The article delves into the ensuing trajectory of Belarussian language policy up to and including the contemporary status quo, with a particular focus on the right to native instruction for national minorities in educational facilities. 

The Tumultuous 90s

The post-Soviet period of the 1990’s was plagued by legislative inconsistencies, political corruption, and ethnolinguistic tensions. The historical trajectory of the East Slavic states (Belarus, Ukraine and Russia) began somewhat similarly, arising from the powerful desire for independence, particularly from the domineering presence of Moscow. As a result, a policy overwhelmingly beneficial to the Belarussian language was created in the immediate aftermath of independence. Belarussian was declared as the sole state language, meaning schools, public institutions, the government and its agencies were obliged to speak Belarussian. This policy, however, was far from uncontested by various political factions in the country.

The national awakening in Belarus, in regard to pursuing a national language policy, proved to be rather unpopular. Polls that surfaced in 1993 referenced the fact that “less than 25% of Belarussians knew their native tongue well and less than 50% were willing to promote the knowledge of it” (Brown, 2007). As such, following the 1994 Belarussian Presidential Election, which resulted in a landslide victory for Alexander Lukashenko, the final blow to the policy of Belarussianization had been dealt. The elections symbolized a crucial reinvigoration of the language debate. 

The high levels of ethnolinguistic polarization necessitated a referendum, which was organized later in the same year. The topic on the agenda was whether the Russian minority language should be considered an official state language alongside Belarussian. With a turnout of 64.8%, the referendum resulted in the granting of equal status to the Russian language with a staggering 86.8% in favor (Nohlen & Stover, 2010). This represented a major pivot from the previous course of action.

However, as opposed to malicious interference in the internal affairs of Belarus, the attitude of the Belarussian people was for the most part that of indifference, if not outright support for the usage of Russian in official institutions (Brown, 2007). There are numerous variables that promote descriptions of why public opinion is the way that it is in Belarus. The key explanation rests in the historical trajectory. After centuries of Russification, the Belarussian identity was heavily weakened. Choosing to conceptualize itself in the political-territorial sense, as opposed to the ethnocultural, as stipulated by Brubaker’s framework for post-Soviet relations (Brubaker, 1994). As such, very little attention gets paid to the cultural development and preservation of Belarussian language, culture, and traditions. 

Legislative Hypocrisy in Minority Native Instruction 

The full recognition of the Russian language throughout the 2000s, into the 2010s, and up until today has produced rather skewed statistics in terms of educational instruction in the full variety of national minority languages in Belarus, which are referenced below. What began with a fruitful language policy, providing the opportunity for students from national minority backgrounds, such as Polish and Lithuanian communities to study in their own languages, ended with the total domination of Russian linguistic institutions. This shift has occurred in congruence with Belarussian historical trajectory. A combination of utility in economic prospects, as well as comfort in conversing in Russian has yielded powerful incentives for Belarussian to utilize Russian. Whereas Belarussian is construed as out-of-date and unuseful for the current reality in Belarus and beyond.

According to the 2022 United Nations Minority Rights Report on Belarus, the observations of the rapporteur have highlighted rather concerning developments in the educational and linguistic rights of such communities. As it currently stands, Polish and Lithuanian schools have faced widespread closure (BHC, 2022). This development went hand in hand with the conversion to either Belarussian or Russian linguistic schools, virtually eliminating the right to native instruction for national minorities.  

Although the ethnic Russian minority makes up only 7.5% of Belarus’ population, the Russian language is considered a dominant language thus phasing out ethnic Polish and Lithuanian linguistic education (UNECE, 2024). The relative size of the Russian minority, despite being significantly larger in respect to the Poles and Lithuanians, cannot alone describe the harsh linguistic discrimination observed in the educational field. Although potentially accounting for a part of the bias, it is likely that other variables are at stake. 

What differentiates the Russian minority from the Polish and Lithuanian? The immediate answer is found in the work of Fernand De Varennes (2017) who argues that the “proximity and status of the kinstate [of the national minority in question]” is of utmost importance. In other words, the significance of the Russian minority lies in the deep ties it has to its kinstate, owing to its symbiotic relation to that source of power. Thus, the pressure exerted by a far more powerful neighbor has produced a spillover effect leading to emphasis on Russia as opposed to the much weaker states of Poland and Lithuania (speaking in relative terms).  

The Status of Belarussian 

Having considered the state of the national minority languages of Belarus, what can be said of the status of the Belarussian language? Despite being a formal state language as well as the official ethnolinguistic identity of the Belarussian people, the on-the-ground reality could not be further from this. The Belarussian language has been long stigmatized as a backwater village language and is considered as more of a dialect of Russian as opposed to its own language, particularly by the so-called big brother in the East (Komorovskaya, 2016). Centuries’ worth of aggressive Russification has nipped the development of a Belarussian ethnolinguistic identity in the bud and with the granting of official language status to Russian, this development has not only not slowed down but assumed its prior breakneck speed.  

The amended language policy culminated in the replacement of Belarussian and thus Russification continued apace. As it stands, for every 250 schools only five teach in Belarussian. This highlights the fact that Belarussian people are not guaranteed education in their native language, despite Belarussian being acknowledged as the official titular language (BHC, 2022). 

Virtually every aspect of society, including all of the major urban centers utilize Russian at work, at home, in education, and in daily life. The upgrading of the Russian language has culminated in the downgrading of the Belarussian language, in the manner of a destructive dialectic, leading to the virtual erasure of Belarussian ethnolinguistic identity. This is reinforced by the overwhelmingly better economic prospects one has access to if they opt for Russian education, as opposed to the niche Belarussian. The political situation, with Lukashenko’s dictatorship cozying up with that of Putin’s, only worsens the status of Belarussian and puts it at risk of complete erasure.   

Concluding Remarks

This article has covered the ethnolinguistic development of Belarus and its national languages. The upgrading of Russian to official state language status has dealt an irreparable blow to the cultural development of not only the Polish and Lithuanian communities, but also of Belarussian – the official ethnolinguistic identity in Belarus. Despite possessing an equal status on paper, Belarussian is threatened by complete decimation in the face of the ever-expanding usage of Russian in virtually all fields of life. This can in no way be considered as the free development of cultures. 

If Belarussian, Polish and Lithuanian communities want to preserve their right to native instruction in educational facilities, where the majority of early life socialization happens, there needs to be a swift and direct response to the predominance of Russian. This would require the toppling of the totalitarian nature of Lukashenko’s regime. 

References:

• BHC (2022). UNHRC Advisory Committee.  
• Brown, N. A. (2007). Status language planning in Belarus. Language Policy, 6(2), 281–301.  
• Brubaker, R. (1994). Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutionalist account. Theory and Society, 23(1), 47-78. 
• Nohlen, D. & Stover, P. (2010). Elections in Europe. doi.org/10.5771/9783845223414. 
• Komorovskaya, V. (2016). The future of the Belarussian language: Is it doomed to extinction? Acta Philologica, 48, 15-28. 
• UNECE. (2024). The 2019 census of population of the Republic of Belarus: Migration and ethnocultural characteristics. https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/7.Census%20WP14%20BEL%20Vasilevskaya%20ENG.pdf
• Cover Image via Unsplash