In 2018, negotiations regarding Turkey’s accession the European Union (EU) came to a standstill as no further chapters could have been discussed for the foreseeable future. However, both parties maintained an amicable relationship, working toward a future where they could collaborate on common interests. In March of 2021, the European Commission expressed its readiness to cooperate with Turkey on joint areas such as counterterrorism, food security, migration trade and energy. To date, Turkey remains a key partner of the EU in its facilitated dialogue between Russia and Ukraine in the agreement on the export of grains. However, tension in the Eastern Mediterranean remains high with the EU urging Turkey to encourage stability within the region.
This summary discusses the 2022 EU Enlargement policy report as communicated by the European Commission in its 2022 Enlargement package. The report tackles multiple areas in which the EU has expressed concern such as fundamental freedoms and democracy in Turkey. The summary will also relay the report’s findings when it comes to education, culture and employment policies. All of which reflect on Turkey’s accession to the EU.
Fundamental Rights
Freedom of expression and association
Of the most crucial rights that spark controversy in Turkey, freedom of expression has been under scrutiny by the government of Turkey which did not go unnoticed. The 2022 Turkey report states that currently Turkey is in the early stages of taking a European-based human right approach when it comes to the dissemination of opposition voices and freedom of expression. Many instances regarding criminal cases and convictions of journalists, students, lawyers and human rights defenders continue in the country.
For instance, the legislative environment regarding the internet, anti-terrorism and the Criminal Code limit the exercise of freedom of expression. There have been reports of selective and arbitrary application of legislation raise concerns regarding the rule of law and the right to a fair trial. The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers strongly urged the Turkish authorities to consider changes to the Criminal Code as many cases related to freedom of expression have been lodged to the European Court of Human Rights.
As for freedom of assembly and association, the report states that there had been some serious backsliding by the Turkish government as implementation and legislation are not in line with the Turkish constitution, European standards or the international conventions which Turkey is party to. Many human rights defenders have been detained or arrested due to their exercise of their freedom of association. This included prominent non-governmental organisations such as Human Rights Association which were subjected to police raids.
Women’s and Children’s rights
It had been evident that the regression concerning the right of women and girls in Turkey has had tangible effects in the country. The presidential decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence had been met with serious backlash from the public. Turkey is in the process of implementing The Fourth National Action Plan for Combating Violence against Women (2021-2025) yet, there had been 339 killing of women in 2021 alone. Turkey lacks a robust system for data collection to assess the nature of this issue. There are numerous concerns regarding women’s right as hate speech increased against independent women organizations and women’s participation in politics and decision making is low. On the other hand, some penalties were increased for violence against women who are or were the spouse of the perpetrator in July 2021.
In the area of the rights of the child, Turkey needs to improve its juvenile justice system. There has been reports of continuous juvenile arrests on charges of membership to terrorist organizations and often, detained in non-juvenile institutions. Turkey had shown limited progress in tackling and reducing core issues related to child marriages and gender-based violence against children. Additionally, the effects of COVID-19 have been tangible when it came to the decreased education of the Roma children.
Rights of persons with disabilities
Turkey has started its National Action Plan on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which will be its implementation tool for its 2030 Barrier Free Vision Document. Turkey needs an independent implementation and monitoring framework as required by the UN Conventions on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This is also true for mental health and Turkey does not have a concrete foundation for mental health monitoring and implementation in the country. Moreover, community-based care services, including foster care and adoption, need to be expanded for minors with disabilities who are in need of state protection.
Education and culture
In Early Childhood Education (ECE) in Turkey, the net enrolment rate (NER) for preschool education largely decreased from 71.22 % in 2019-2020 to 56.89 % in 2020-2021 and the combined NER for Turkish children between 3 and 5 years old decreased from 41.78 % to 28.35 %. It is important to note that as the country’s efforts to improve accessibility to persons with disabilities, the number of students in special education increased from 425 774 in 2020 to 425 816 in 2021. For persons with special needs, Turkey continued to invest towards inclusive education instead of segregated settings, yet the school closures due to COVID-19 have affected the access of such students to education. It is worth to note that Turkey is in an advanced stage in implementing the Bologna measures despite the disparity in quality of education between Turkey’s 207 higher education institutions.
In 2022, Turkey had declared the year as the Year of Youth Participation. Turkey also participates in the European Year of the Youth. Turkish youth organisations showed high levels of interest in the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes, which continue to be major sources of funding for international youth exchange activities in Turkey.
In the post-pandemic era, Turkey’s cultural sector suffered from inadequate and unsustainable funding. Non-governmental cultural actors were hindered by the insufficient cultural infrastructure, lack of professionalism and limited management capacities. Also, the number of books obtaining the warning “harmful for minors/ +18” has increased. Six publications were declared “obscene” in 2021. The books were focused on gender-based rights, gender identity or included LGBTQI characters, and such measures pose a threat to freedom of publication.
Social policy and employment
The labour market situation in Turkey has slightly improved. The employment rate (15+) increased to 45.2 % in 2021 from 42.7 % in 2020. The rate increased for men to 62.8 % from 59.4 %, for women to 28 % from 26.2 %. Unemployment rate (15+) decreased from 13.1 % to 12 % in 2021. The unemployment rate for women remained almost at the same level with 14.7 %. The youth unemployment rate (15-24) decreased from 24.9 % in 2020 to 22.6 % in 2021. The rate of young people neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET) aged 15-24 decreased from 28.4 % in 2020 to 24.7 % in 2021; however for women, the rate is still quite high at 32.4 %. Turkey adopted its first National Youth Employment Strategy and Action Plan (2021-2023) in October 2021.
In the area of social inclusion and social protection, Turkey still requires a policy framework for poverty reduction. The accelerating inflation levels pose risks for vulnerable segments of the population. It is worth to note that social assistance payments amounted to TRY 97.8 billion or 1.74% of the GDP. Furthermore, Turkey needs a solid strategy and action plan for non-discrimination in employment and social policy. Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity is not prohibited by law. The role of Human Rights and Equality Institution (HREI) and the Ombudsman remained limited in combating discrimination in employment. Employment of persons with disabilities in the private sector is reported to be challenging, partly due to limited physical accessibility, prejudices and skills mismatch. Efforts are needed to prevent discrimination for LGBTIQ in employment and social policy.
In employment and social policy, the gender gap in the labour market has remained high. Legislation needs to be improved for a better work-life balance. To achieve this, half-time work allowances were paid to 4,841 beneficiaries in 2021. The employment rate for women (18-64 age group) in case there are children in the household remained below the EU average. Women’s employment is hindered due to insufficient access to quality and affordable formal care services and the gender bias in caring responsibilities and discriminatory stereotypes. Some programmes supporting employment of mothers with children were terminated by the end of 2021.
In conclusion, Turkey lacks concrete implementation of polices regarding its fundamental rights such the freedom of speech and association. The situation concerning social policy, discrimination and the juvenile justice system need to have proper monitoring framework. There was some progress in terms early education and youth participation in the EU programmes. Still, Turkey needs to align its goals with its intent to accede the European Union.
Over 20 years, Israel has seen some significant developments connected to its education system. These advancements, by 2019, led to Israel becoming one of the highest spenders on primary, secondary, and post-secondary non-tertiary education as a share of GDP amongst OECD countries (Israel: 6.7%, OECD average: 4.9%),[i] with more than half of the population holding tertiary attainment between age 25 and 64.[ii] Furthermore, Israel’s fast technological developments put the country on the list of the top 20 most innovative countries in the world.[iii]
Despite all successes, Israel is still behind in ensuring some basic human rights regarding access to education for all its citizens and residents. Following brief overview of Israel’s ethnic composition and education system, this article highlights some of the most urgent issues in the country’s education sector by looking at educational differences along ethnic groups and socioeconomic classes, analysing the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as investigating what is going on in Area C of the occupied territories of the West Bank.
The Composition and Historical context of Ethnic Groups in Israel
Israel is a multi-ethnic, multinational, and multicultural state; 74% of the population is Jewish, 21% is Arab, 1.5% is Ethiopian, and the remaining 3.5% are identified as “others”. The composition of the Arabic-speaking population can be further categorised according to religious beliefs: 85% of them are Muslim, 7.5% are Christian, and the remaining 7.5% are Druze.
The ethnic composition of the Israeli population is crucial to discussing issues in the country since many problems stem from discrimination and clashes among ethnic groups, and the Israeli education system reflects these issues too. Conflict among these ethnic (and religious) groups frequently have deep historical roots, particularly in the case of clashes between the Jewish and the Arabic groups. Their conflict dates back to the very creation of Israel as a state, and the several wars throughout the 20th century, such as the 1948 Arab-Israel War, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, further complicated the relationship of the two sides.
The Arabic-speaking minorities’ national identity rarely associate with Israel, whose political leadership stresses the state’s Jewish character, while refusing to recognise Arab or Palestinian national identities. Moreover, Israel frequently applies discriminatory practices towards these ethnic groups (also in the education sector) because state authorities frequently perceive them as a security threat due to the historical Arab-Israel conflicts.[iv]
The Younger the Better – The Israeli Education System
From its very foundation in 1948, the State of Israel has been closely monitoring and regulating its education system because they have been considering education as a way to ensure social mobility. The 1949 Compulsory Education Act was the first official legal action taken in Israel to enforce compulsory education which ensured free school attendance for children for 9 years from age 5.[v] Later amendments further expanded the Act, and, by 2009, compulsory education was extended until grade 12, while, by 2016, compulsory school entrance age was lowered to age 3.[vi] The successes of the Israeli education system are further reflected in the fact that despite compulsory education starting at age 3, 47% of children are already enrolled in an educational institution before age 2.[vii] Furthermore, 99% of the child population between age 3 and 5 was enrolled in an educational institution in 2019.[viii]
State-funded Israeli general education works along a four-stream system to satisfy all cultural, religious, and ethnic demands of its population. Consequently, the state provides secular, religious, and ultra-orthodox (Haredi) educational institutions for Jewish Israelis, while Arab schools serve the needs of Arab, Bedouin, Christian Arab, and Druze Israeli minorities.[ix] Along these ethnic and cultural lines, Hebrew-speaking schools are managed by Jewish principals while schools teaching in Arabic are coordinated by Arab principals. However, all principals are subjugated to centralised Israeli administration, funding, and curriculum which ensure similar requirements and control teacher-salaries.[x]
‘Some are More Equal Than Others’[xi] – Ethnic Discrimination in Education
Although the four-stream school system seemingly satisfies different types of cultural and religious demands, the curricula of Arab schools are largely organized by a Zionist narrative which omit Arab historical, geographical, and cultural perspectives.[xii] Arabs are underrepresented in governmental educational decision-making bodies, as well as in educational planning and supervision positions, which prevents the interest of the Arabic-speaking community from being asserted both on national and on local levels.[xiii] Thus, despite the wide-range of official responsibilities of the Arab schools’ leaders, they have little influence on decisions concerning their institutions as most educational policies are top-down determined.[xiv]
Inequality is also prominent between Jewish and Arab schools when it comes to budget allocation for advance learning programmes, and to provide programmes supporting students who have fallen behind or children with disabilities.[xv] Moreover, an approximately 30% smaller budget is allocated to the Arab school system in population ratio. Differences in school budgets are tightly connected to inequality of opportunity and quality issues, as Arab schools often have ‘fewer classrooms, libraries, laboratories, and qualified teachers’.[xvi] These factors also result larger classes which hinder the learning of students because they have less individual attention from their teachers. In addition, Arabic-speaking students are required to learn Hebrew too, which is an additional subject for Arab students on top of all other compulsory subjects, yet schools do not receive extra funding to support their learning. [xvii]
The abovementioned factors negatively influence the learning outcomes of Arabic-speaking students which is indicated by the average lower achievement of Arab pupils and students on both national and international exams.[xviii] Arab students are 30% less likely to receive a matriculation certificate (Bagrut) which is needed to enter higher education and certain courses or even jobs.[xix]
Ethiopian students also experience significant discrimination. Although most of them attend Jewish religious schools, particularly the Orthodox Jewish community in particular questions the legitimacy of the minority’s Jewish identity due to their relatively recent presence in Israel and often also because of their darker skin colour.[xx] Racial discrimination, sometimes even by teachers, combined with low socioeconomic background widens the educational gap between Jewish and Ethiopian Israelis and results a considerably large dropout rate (10.5% official dropout and 23% hidden dropout) among Ethiopian students.[xxi] The issues Ethiopian students face are so severe that only ‘30% of twelfth-grade Ethiopian students earn the Bagrut at the level required for university entrance, compared to 65% of the general Jewish student population’ which further hinders Israeli Ethiopeans’ social mobility.[xxii]
Haim Zach / Government Press Office, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
Innovation But Not Equal Distribution –Socioeconomic Obstacles in Education
In Israel, socioeconomic inequalities majorly exist along ethnic and religious lines: Arabs and Haredi Jews together constitute approximately 30% of the Israeli population but make up 60% of the poor in the country.[xxiii] The reason behind this overrepresentation varies for the two groups.
As mentioned before, historical hostility between Arabs and Jewish Israelis are still prominent and often result in discrimination towards Arabs. Haredi Jews, on the other hand, are stuck in lower socioeconomic positions because of their strictly orthodox religious lifestyle in which men dedicate their life for reading the Torah and the community lives in relative segregation.[xxiv]
Figure 2 Israel Sci-Tech Schools. “Haredi Schools and Villages.” Friends of Israel Sci-Tech Schools. https://www.israel-scitech-schools.com/pioneering-models/haredi-schools-and-villages/. (Accessed: 15 October 2022).
While Jewish Israelis usually receive quality education for years and live in families where both parents work, Arab and Haredi communities frequently lack quality education, have lower paid jobs, and live in families where either one or both parents are unemployed.[xxv] Low socioeconomic background is generally in negative correlation with dropout rates, while the parents’ level of education is also a significant factor; the higher the number of years the parents attended school, the lower their children’s chances to drop out.[xxvi] This shows a vicious circle of social immobility which widens the educational and socioeconomic gap between the ethnic and religious groups in Israel.
However, not only are parents’ financial and educational statuses determinant in dropout rates. Since funding for general education institutions is allocated by local governments, schools in less affluent areas are frequently underfunded and cannot always provide quality education. This means that funding for Arab schools in Arab neighbourhoods can be 10 or even 20 times lower than in wealthier areas.[xxvii] Moreover, the population of Arab areas is increasing, which means a significant rise in student numbers in Arab schools.
In light of the above, the redistribution and reconsideration of funding allocation is becoming urgent to ensure quality education to all students in these areas.[xxviii] Financial issues affect the quality of Arab schools negatively, which can have a demotivating effect on Arabic-speaking student to continue or finish their studies. It gives some hope, however, that dropout rates have significantly declined since 2003 among Arabic-speaking students and fallen from 15.8% to 8.1% thanks to some reforms targeting the Arab education sector.[xxix]
When it comes to the Haredi community, boys from age 14 often transfer to yeshiva schools which are not supervised by the Israeli Ministry of Education. These schools follow a specific curriculum which rather focuses on religious studies and gives little space to regular school subjects. This means that Haredi students usually perform worse than other Jewish Israelis on international exams neither do they attain the Bagrut, which prevents them from entering higher education.[xxx]
However, recently the Israeli government has shown some admirable efforts in assisting yeshiva schools to ensure more regular subjects being taught, and thus increasing the chances of young Haredi Jews to pursue higher education and higher paid jobs. The state offered to cover 100% of the funding with an additional stipend for each student at every Haredi school that adopts core subjects in its curriculum, like mathematics or English.[xxxi]
Lacking Technology in the 15th Most Innovative Country – Issues During the Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic further widened the educational gap along socioeconomic lines. Israel has closed its educational institutions due to the pandemic in March 2020 and continued providing education through remote teaching.
However, many households lacked basic facilities needed for online education (computers, internet access, or even electricity) and even if they had access to them, families often could not afford multiple devices and facilities to support the learning of all their children.[xxxii]
The seriousness of these issues is exacerbated by the fact that students with low socioeconomic statuses are more likely to need assistance or extra attention from teachers which they rarely had the chance to get through online teaching, especially that some teachers also had difficulties adapting to remote teaching.[xxxiii] While some only struggled with getting used to the online platforms, others simply did not have access to appropriate facilities necessary for remote teaching.
In addition, online teaching was problematic in the Haredi Jewish community also because they traditionally avoid using internet, and although the number of internet users in the community is increasing, it is still not without obstacles for some children to participate in online education. A few Haredi schools simply refused to stop in-person teaching.[xxxiv]
Troubled Territories – Area C
Eventually, it is important to take a look at the West Bank territories (the majority of Palestine’s territory) occupied by Israel with almost only Arab residents. Legal, administrative, and governmental (and so many other) statuses of this region are complex and cluttered, but it is clear that Israel have significant influence over the region in every aspect.
The occupied West Bank territories were divided into three administrative regions in 1995, Area A, B and C.[xxxv] To put it simply, Area A is majorly governed by the Palestinian Authority (PA), while in Area B the PA has similar responsibilities, except for the security of the area which is managed by Israeli authorities. Area C, which means roughly 60% of the West Bank’s territories, is under Israeli control apart from certain civilian issues such as education and healthcare.
Figure 3 Welcome to Palestine. “Everything You Need to Know about Areas A, B and C.” Welcome To Palestine, July 21, 2017. https://www.welcometopalestine.com/article/areas-a-b-c-explained-west-bank-israel-gaza-palestine/. (Accessed: 15 October 2022).Figure 4 Kadman, Noga. “Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, the West Bank.” B’TSELEM. June 2013. https://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201306_acting_the_landlord. (Accessed: 19 September 2022).
Despite it seems that Israel does not have much to do with education in the West Bank, they do have a tremendous amount of indirect influence over these civilian sectors just by controlling land or constructions in Area C. Besides, international law also identifies some responsibilities for Israel as it states that territorial occupants need to ensure human rights and dignified living conditions for people subjected to occupation.[xxxvi]
The education sector in Area A and B are affected by the overwhelming control of Israeli authorities in Area C, since the isolated regions with no airport or bay can only get supplies through Area C. However, this article primarily focuses on Area C as the education sector faces the most severe problems there.
Area C of the occupied West Bank territories hosts approximately 325 thousand Jewish Israelis, 180 thousand Palestinians, and 20 thousand Bedouin and other shepherding Israelis.[xxxvii] Israeli control limits non-Israeli settlement and certain activities, such as construction and infrastructural matters. These measures often leave non-Jewish villages without basic utilities and services, such as water, electricity, healthcare, education, or appropriate public transportation and roads.[xxxviii] Moreover, Israeli authorities have the right to demolish Palestinian and Bedouin settlements along Israeli interest and relocate their population.[xxxix] Some Bedouin villages are demolished simply because the Israeli authorities do not acknowledge them as official settlements. [xl]
Despite the lack of direct Israeli influence on education, these conditions prevent mostly Palestinian and Bedouin children from attending school among appropriate conditions, or even from attending at all. The demolition of settlements endangers educational institutions as well, while new schools can rarely be built due to the restriction of non-Jewish construction. This leaves entire villages without any form of educational services. In 2012 alone, 37 schools were facing demolition because they were built without a permit from Israeli authorities.[xli]
The lack of infrastructure is also challenging for non-Jewish children to physically get to school, as public transportation and school buses are limited in the area.[xlii] 189 out of 532 settlements do not even have a primary school at all,[xliii] which means that many children have to walk up to two hours each way to get to school.[xliv] This often becomes impossible when weather conditions are hostile.[xlv]
In addition, it is often unsafe for small children to travel alone to school due to frequent atrocities targeting Palestinian and Bedouin children, some of which is committed at military checkpoints where children often need to cross to get to school.[xlvi] During school raids, the Israeli military frequently arrests several students and confiscate school equipment. These dangers discourage parents to send their children to school, especially their daughters. [xlvii]
Girls’ education is particularly endangered as some traditional societal norms prohibit them to travel alone and when no male family member can accompany them on the way, they cannot attend school.[xlviii] In addition, early marriage, or the need for them to stay home to help take care of their grandparents or disabled siblings, for instance, also results in many girls never attending or failing to finish their education. [xlix] However, it is not genuine to girls to potentially drop out or miss school to help out their parents.[l] As the socioeconomic gap widens between Jewish Israelis and non-Jewish citizens and residents, some families become unable to afford school equipment, basic needs like shoes,[li] or public transportation, thus they cannot send their children to school despite education itself is free.[lii]
These circumstances negatively influence the quality of education which results in common disinterest in education among children in Area C which can result in children leaving school, while the ones who can continue with their studies often do this in poor-equipped educational institutions.[liii] Dropout rates are particularly high among Bedouin children: only 32% of them get a matriculation certificate compared to 68% of the Israeli population (excluding the Haredi community). [liv] These issues were exacerbated by schools shifting to online teaching during COVID-19, as Bedouins frequently live in tents without any electricity, internet access, and computers.[lv] ‘About 100,000 Bedouin students and about 2,000 Bedouin college students from the Negev’ had severe difficulties to attend school during the pandemic. [lvi]
Finally, it is also important to highlight that education in Area C lacks the adequate financial resources. Most financial support arrive from international organisations, such as the USAID, UNRWA, and the Middle East Quartet.[lvii] However, both these organisations and the PA need to complete prolonged bureaucratic procedures to finance projects and receive permit from Israeli authorities. The difficulties frequently result in organisations abandoning their projects or lead to subsequent delays in project implementation.[lviii]
Final Remarks
Israel inarguably has some admirable achievements regarding its education sector. However, policymaking and policy implementation face severe difficulties not only in terms of creating effective and inclusive policies for its ethnically and religiously diverse population, but also because of (unresolved) historical conflicts among the country’s ethnic groups. These clashes are reflected in Israel’s education system where the disadvantage of, for example, Arab or Ethiopian Israeli students is significant compared to Jewish Israeli students. These inequalities are partly indicated by the generally worse performance of Arab or Ethiopian students on both international and domestic exams.
Tackling educational inequalities (or any discriminatory practices embedded into a social, political, or economic system) is a multi-generational project. However tedious, slow, or impossible it seems sometimes to carry on with such an initiative, the current state of the Israeli education will lead to further damage if inequality issues are left unresolved. The vicious circle of poverty, closely intertwined with ethnic lines, cannot break without mutual cooperation, understanding, and the recognition of each other’s grievances. The Israeli government in cooperation with civil society actors must bridge societal gaps and the wide-spread disconnection between ethnic groups and between socioeconomic classes, to build an empathetic and harmonious society.
Of course, issues are more complex than simply setting up a few educational programmes or giving some extra funding for Arabic-speaking schools, for instance. But change must start somewhere, and maybe it has already in the six Hand in Hand Arabic-Jewish schools.[lix] The bilingual privately funded schools work with a multicultural curriculum that aims to advance inclusion and equality in the Israeli society. Hand in Hand does not only initiate productive discussion between ethnic groups but also facilitate their harmonious cohabitation and cooperation to build a healthier society and a peaceful future.
[x] Da’as, Rima’a, and Alexander Zibenberg. “Conflict, control and culture: implications for implicit followership and leadership theories.” Educational Review 73, no.2 (2021): 199.
[xi] Orwell, George. Animal Farm. 1945. Reprint, Boston ; New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Corp, 1945.
[xii] Reingold, Roni, and Lea Baratz. “Arab School Principals in Israel – between Conformity and Moral Courage.” Intercultural Education 31, no. 1 (November 20, 2019): 88.
[xiii] Da’as, Rima’a and Alexander Zibenberg. “Conflict, control and culture: implications for implicit followership and leadership theories.” Educational Review 73, no.2 (2021): 189.
[xiv] Reingold, Roni, and Lea Baratz. “Arab School Principals in Israel – between Conformity and Moral Courage.” Intercultural Education 31, no. 1 (November 20, 2019): 89.
[xv] Da’as, Rima’a and Alexander Zibenberg. “Conflict, control and culture: implications for implicit followership and leadership theories.” Educational Review 73, no.2 (2021): 199.
[xvi] Zeedan, Rami, and Rachel Elizabeth Hogan. “The Correlation between Budgets and Matriculation Exams: The Case of Jewish and Arab Schools in Israel.” Education Sciences, 12, no.554 (2022): 2.
[xvii] Resh, Nura, and Nachum Blass. “Israel: Gaps in Educational Outcomes in a Changing Multi- Ethnic Society.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Race and Ethnic Inequalities in Education, edited by Peter A. J. Dworkin and A. Gary Stevens, 631–94. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019; 671.
[xviii] Da’as, Rima’a and Alexander Zibenberg. “Conflict, control and culture: implications for implicit followership and leadership theories.” Educational Review 73, no.2 (2021): 199.
[xix] Zeedan, Rami, and Rachel Elizabeth Hogan. “The Correlation between Budgets and Matriculation Exams: The Case of Jewish and Arab Schools in Israel.” Education Sciences, 12, no.554 (2022): 2.
[xx] Resh, Nura, and Nachum Blass. “Israel: Gaps in Educational Outcomes in a Changing Multi- Ethnic Society.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Race and Ethnic Inequalities in Education, edited by Peter A. J. Dworkin and A. Gary Stevens, 631–94. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019; 659.
[xxiii] OECD. “Israel: A Divided Society – Results of a Review of Labour-Market and Social Policy.” OECD. OECD, 2010. https://www.oecd.org/els/44394444.pdf (Accessed 20 September 2022).
[xxiv] Black, Shlomo, Itschak Trachtengot, and Gabriel Horenczyk. “Community Post-Traumatic Growth: Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Coping with Coronavirus.” Contemporary Jewry 42, no. 1 (March 2022): 86, 90.
[xxv] OECD. “Israel: A Divided Society – Results of a Review of Labour-Market and Social Policy.” OECD. OECD, 2010. https://www.oecd.org/els/44394444.pdf (Accessed 20 September 2022).
[xxvi] Yanay, Guy, Hadas Fuchs, and Nachum Blass. “Staying in School Longer, Dropping out Less: Trends in the High School Dropout Phenomenon.” Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, 2019; 19.
[xxix] Yanay, Guy, Hadas Fuchs, and Nachum Blass. “Staying in School Longer, Dropping out Less: Trends in the High School Dropout Phenomenon.” Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, 2019; 9, 11-12.
[xxxi] Shain, Yossi. “Régóta esedékes változás következik a Haredi iskolarendszerben – Vélemény.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, 2022. július 2. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-711008. (Accessed: 28 September 2022).
[xxxiii] Sabag, Ziba, and Shirly Cohen. “The Influence of the COVID-19 Epidemic on Teaching Methods in Higher Education Institutions in Israel”. Journal of Research in Higher Education 1 (2020):44-71.
[xliii] OHCHR. “United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory | Access to Education in Area c of the West Bank.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory, July 4, 2017. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/access-education-area-c-west-bank. (Accessed 20 September 2022).
[xlvi] OHCHR. “United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory | Access to Education in Area c of the West Bank.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory, July 4, 2017. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/access-education-area-c-west-bank. (Accessed 20 September 2022).
[lii] Kadman, Noga. “Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, the West Bank.” Edited by Yael Stein. B’TSELEM. The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, June 2013. https://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201306_acting_the_landlord. (Accessed 19 September 2022); 52.
[liii] UNICEF. “State of Palestine: Country Report on Out-of-School Children.” UNICEF, July 2018, 3.; Kadman, Noga. “Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, the West Bank.” Edited by Yael Stein. B’TSELEM. The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, June 2013. https://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201306_acting_the_landlord. (Accessed 19 September 2022); 82.
Taliban means suppression of women. Taliban means degrading a woman’s qualities, place and role in society. Taliban means no education or work for women other than housework and childbearing. Taliban means deprivation of women’s fundamental human rights, living in fear and without dignity.
Most Afghans, including some Taliban, do not support excluding women and girls from the education system and are seriously concerned about the consequences for the whole nation.
After the Taliban’s announcement to ban female students from university, male university students walked out of their exam in protest against the Taliban’s decision, and several male professors resigned.
Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Qatar, have voiced their sorrow at the university ban and urged the Taliban authorities to withdraw their decision.
“There is no religious or cultural justification for it,” said 26-year-old Husna Jalal, a Political Sciences graduate from Kabul.
Jalal fled Afghanistan in August last year after the Taliban took over the city of Kabul. Jalal has been working for four years in Kabul after graduating from university, but like many working Afghan women predicted the strict Sharia would be implemented soon after the Taliban took over the country.
“It’s heartbreaking to see my sisters being violated of their fundamental human rights. I saw them marching in the streets crying out for freedom and equality, and how Taliban security forces used violence to break up the group and stop them from practising their freedom of speech”, said Jalal. “People worldwide need to raise their voices for my sisters; the Taliban have taken all our hopes.”
The Taliban, known as the Talib, who sought to end warlordism in Afghanistan through stricter adherence to Sharia since 1996, took control of Afghanistan as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by force in 2021.
For decades, the role of Sharia has become an increasingly contested topic worldwide. The International European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECHR) ruled in several cases that Sharia is “conflicting with the fundamental principles of democracy”. Some traditional practices comprise severe human rights violations, especially on women and their freedom of education.
When the Taliban came, they abolished the Ministry of Women. Women were gradually withdrawn from television screens. Tens of thousands of women were unemployed in different branches. They were forbidden to go anywhere exceeding 72 km without a mahram. Women are being pulled out of social life. The health services offered to them are limited, their employment opportunities are limited, and their right to education has been taken away.
Taliban’s recent announcement to immediately suspend until further notice women from universities across the country is a blatant violation of their human equal rights consecrated in multiple international treaties worldwide.
“The first commandment of Islam is “read”. Islam urges both men and women to seek knowledge. While the Qur’an addresses human beings, it advises men and women to gain knowledge, find the truth, reveal and develop their own potential, and become perfect human beings,” said PhD holder from Islamic Theology, Dr Ali Unsal in a recent interview for Broken Chalk.
Dr Ali Unsal is an experienced writer, researcher, teacher, and preacher with a strong background in Islamic Theology and Islamic Jurisprudence. Dr Unsal earned his PhD in Islamic Theology and Master and Bachelor of Divinity from top divinity schools in Turkey. He has lived in the US for several years, where he enhanced his academic and professional studies and experience by engaging with both Muslim and non-Muslim Americans via seminars, workshops, counselling, local community services and academic writing. He headed the Institute of Islamic and Turkish Studies (IITS) in Fairfax, VA.
Dr Unsal organizes panels, seminars and discussions with academicians from different countries, and he is fluent in English, Turkish, Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia and Tatar.
According to Dr unsal, Hz. Muhammad encouraged the education and upbringing of girls, who were especially despised and undervalued throughout history. “For example, in one of his Hadiths, “Whoever raises and disciplines two girls until they reach adulthood, we will be together with that person on the Day of Judgment,” explains Dr Unsal.
“When women came to him and said that he constantly taught men in the mosque and conveyed the message of Allah, but that women were deprived of this, he gave them a special time and gave them a kind of education.
Hz. Aisha, the wife of Muhammad, became one of the most prominent scholars of her society with what she learned from her. Everyone would come and learn from him what he was missing. In the history of Islam, women occupied a significant place in scientific and cultural life. Continuing education in an unofficial structure in the Islamic world and being attached to the teacher rather than to the school made it easier for women to receive education from scholars in their close circles. Among the masters of Tâceddin es-Subki, one of the great Islamic scholars, who listened and learned hadiths, 19 women are mentioned. Suyûtî learned hadith from 33, İbn-i Hacer 53 and İbn-i Asâkir 80 women,” said Dr Unsal.
On August 24th last year, the foreign ministers of the G-7 group of states – an intergovernmental political forum- urged the Taliban to retract the bans on women’s education, warning that “gender persecution may amount to a crime against humanity that will be prosecuted.”
Several media sources reported Taliban forces outside Kabul universities since the ban, stopping women from entering the buildings while allowing men to go in and finish their work.
The Minister of Higher Education, Nida Mohammad Nadim, a former provincial governor, police chief and military commander stands firmly against women’s education, saying it is against Islamic and Afghan values.
“In my opinion, it has nothing to do with Islam,” said Dr Unsal. “Because it totally goes against Pashtun traditions. In that tradition, a woman should only stay at home, cook her food, give birth to a child, and not go out unless necessary. This has nothing to do with Islam. Because the Prophet’s wife, Hatice, was a big businesswoman. Women were present in all areas of social life. In the market, in the mosque. Hz. Ömer appointed a woman named Şifa as an inspector to supervise the bazaar.”
Minister Nadim also told the media that the ban was necessary for several reasons: to prevent the mixing of genders in universities, that women did not comply with the dress code, that female students went to other provinces and lived without their families, and because the study of specific subjects and courses being taught violated the principles of Islam. These reasons do not seem convincing to the world’s public opinion.
Why does the Taliban restrict women’s education? Islam Doesn’t Deny Women Education, So Why Does the Taliban?
“In my opinion, there could be two reasons.,” explains Dr Unsal. “First, there is no state experience. They cannot read the dynamics of society correctly. They still have a tribal mentality. This makes them do very wrong things. They cannot embrace all segments of society.
The second is a kind of shift of perspective or a kind of ignorance. They interpret Islam in line with their own tribal culture. Unfortunately, this is both contrary to the universality of Islam and far from responding to the needs of modern times. Therefore, they act with a radical and marginal interpretation.”
Across the country, the Taliban have banned girls from school beyond the sixth grade, blocked women from their jobs and ordered them to wear a burqa or head-to-toe clothing in public. Women have also been banned from parks and gyms.
“Many young girls are traumatized when held. Some families in the news say that their daughter is constantly crying and cannot be comforted. Young people and families are worried about their future,” said Dr Unsal.
“Our sisters, our men have the same rights; they will be able to benefit from their rights … of course, within the frameworks that we have,” said Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid. Despite initial promises to a more moderate Sharia rule and to respect women’s rights, the Taliban have implemented their interpretation of Islamic law/Sharia since they took control in August 2021, and evidence continues to emerge that the Taliban are violating the rights of women.
So how can the international community help Afghanistan females?
“EU should stop funding the Taliban’s business. Children from Taliban families should be sent back to Afghanistan to study there, not abroad, said Jalal.
“International donors should identify and exert the leverage they have on the Taliban, whether it’s through diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, aid, political pressure, and other means. They should use it to press for concrete commitments on women’s rights that will be meaningful to women and girls and measurable through monitoring,” said Jalal.
According to Dr Unsal, sanctions from international donors might not work. The Taliban has a holding and rugged character. The correct thing would be that Muslim societies, such as the organization of the Islamic Conference or Organisation of Islamic Cooperation or the communities of Islamic scholars do something in collaboration with human rights organizations which will yield faster results.
“The Taliban are disturbed by the world’s criticism of their decisions for their society and the demand for their mistakes to be corrected. They say, “Don’t interfere in our internal affairs”.
Some international universities or organizations may offer training opportunities and provide free lectures, courses and diplomas.
Another thing is that some countries with which the Taliban, not from the Western world, but from the Islamic world, can cooperate can help ease this tension through their scholars,” suggested Dr Unsal.
“Women in Afghanistan are tired of talking and sharing their stories with the foreign press and organizations. They feel like no one is going to help or can’t help,” said Jalal.
Education is an internationally recognized human right essential to Afghanistan’s economic growth and stability. The Taliban are obliged under International Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to respect women’s rights fully. Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2003.
The Taliban inherits Afghanistan’s obligations under that Convention, including “pursuing by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women.
Women now need a male guardian to travel more than 48 miles or to undertake basic tasks such as entering government buildings, seeing a doctor or taking a taxi. They are banned from nearly all jobs except medical professions and, until Wednesday, teaching. Women also can no longer visit public parks.
Taliban’s ban on women and girls from education has permanently sentenced Afghan females to a darker future without opportunities.
“Half of society consists of men, and the other half is women. Therefore, girls have the same right to education as boys. There are vital roles that women can play in all areas of life. In some areas, they can do better jobs than men. This decision of the Ministry of National Education of Afghanistan is both a violation of human rights and a misfortune for Afghanistan,” said Dr Unsal.
*The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a milestone document in the history of human rights. Drafted by representatives with different legal and cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world, the Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217 A) as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. It sets out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally protected and it has been translated into over 500 languages. The UDHR is widely recognized as having inspired, and paved the way for, the adoption of more than seventy human rights treaties, applied today on a permanent basis at global and regional levels (all containing references to it in their preambles).
This paper summarizes and analyses how Turkey has extended its mission to close down Hizmet schools in African and European countries via the public-private entity known as the Maarif Foundation
Some articles referenced in this report show a certain political bias and propaganda by referring to the Gulen movement as the ‘Fetullah Terrorist Organization’ (FETO).
It is important to note that the Turkish government adopted this label as a scapegoating mechanism to pin the 15th July 2016 failed coup attempt upon the Gulen movement and its members. This label sought to create a narrative the Gulen movement had the sole aim of overthrowing the government; however, the reality is that the movement and the schools are facing persecution by a government threatened by legal charges and scandals, one that relied on scapegoating innocent lives and families.
vz
INTRODUCTION
During his time in Turkey in the 1960s and ’70s, Fetullah Gulen was a well-renowned Imam who preached that English-taught education builds morality and character as much as, if not more, than modesty, altruism, and hard work. He emphasized that education was essential for Turkey’s emergence into the globalized era.[i] In furtherance of this ideology, the Gulen movement of the 1980s was aided by funding from the so-called conservative ‘Anatolian tigers’ to create schools that would carry out such education founded upon, but not formally linked to, the principles espoused by Gulen. These schools were referred to globally as Hizmet schools. ‘Hizmet’ indicated that the schools taught about light, philosophy, reflection, dialogue, and tolerance.[ii] The schools were first formed voluntarily by business people within Turkey and staffed by educators seeking to engage in humanitarian work and charity. They soon expanded to various locations abroad in the ‘90s, including North America, Central Asia, Europe, Australia, and especially Africa. [iii] More often than not, these schools were the first informal instance of Turkey establishing economic, cultural, and political links with foreign governments.
Although the Turkish government initially tacitly supported these schools, this became more complicated after the Presidential Crisis of 2007. As a result of this crisis, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured control of the country’s political handle, forming an administration wary of leaving too much control over national and foreign affairs in the hands of external, private actors within and outside of Turkey.[iv] In a series of talks with the co-founder and executive director of the Centre for Hizmet Studies, Dr. Ismail M. Sezgin outlined how the government’s perception of the schools changed over time. It initially saw advantages in associating with the schools because the Gulen movement’s credibility was well-received by the Turkish population. But this perception changed as the Gulen movement became increasingly critical of the government amid changing political dynamics reflected in the 2012 elections.[v] This election round targeted then-Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, resulting in corruption charges, a departure from Western ideals of democracy, and halted plans to join the European Union (EU). The Gulen movement condemned the government during this time, leading the government to reevaluate its perception of the movement. Dr. Sezgin explains that when more corruption charges emerged in 2014, Gulen became a real threat, prompting Erdogan to actively oppose Gulen. Ultimately, this political realignment resulted in the government’s attempt to blame the failed coup attempt on 15th July 2016 on the so-called ‘Fetullah Terrorist Organization’ (FETO) as a ploy to forcefully rebrand the Gulen movement as a threat to society.[vi]
The failed coup gave Erdogan what he has referred to as ‘a gift from God’ that allowed the AKP to conduct a witch-hunt-style attack on Hizmet schools. This inquisition began in Turkey, with many members facing human rights abuses and even imprisonment, but quickly spread internationally as the government called upon foreign governments to close the schools, especially those based in Africa.[vii] Such an attack obviously detrimentally impacted students who gained a high-quality and valuable education from the Hizmet schools. In many impoverished locations, the schools raised the standard of education and living. Nonetheless, in an attempt to quash the Gulen movement, the Turkish government created the pseudo-entity known as the ‘Maarif Foundation’ just weeks before the failed coup and equipped it with a mixture of public-private authority to either close or replace Hizmet schools.[viii]
The next section of this report shall briefly analyse the function of the Maarif Foundation, followed by a section commenting on the chronological takeover of Hizmet schools in Belarus, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Guinea by the Foundation. Then, the report will analyse Turkey’s shift from a soft power stance of economic diplomacy towards a harder form of power that risks transferring the consequences of Turkey’s domestic politics to other states. Lastly, the final section will conclude with some brief observations and recommendations.
THE MAARIF FOUNDATION’S MECHANISMS
On 17th June 2016, the then prime Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu, announced the implementation of the law numbered 6721 that founded the Maarif Foundation, ‘Maarif’ meaning ‘education’ or ‘instruction’. President Erdogan and his government appointed its 12 members: 4 chosen by the President, three by the cabinet, and the rest by the ministries of education, foreign affairs, and the economy in conjunction with the Higher Education Council.[ix] The Foundation was granted the powers:
“to provide scholarships, schools, education and facilities such as schools, education institutions, and dormitories, to provide them with scholarships in all the processes of education, from pre-school to university education in order to develop and develop education and distribution services, only to be able to afford the institutions that can take part in institutions, the Turkish Maarif Foundation, which is in central Istanbul to conduct scientific research and research, develop and develop methods and carry out the activities of the country in which it operates, to carry out the activities of the country.”[x]
These terms of reference indicate that the Foundation is a government entity, receiving its budget and directives from public officials. It was distinguished from other foundations by its additional capacity to perform its functions abroad “by founding or taking over companies possessing private law legal entity,” which falls clearly within the remit of the status held by Hizmet schools founded abroad.[xi] The true, underlying intention of the Foundation started soon after the failed coup a month later, when Erdogan requested that the Foundation “be in 193 countries (…) [and] prioritise countries where FETO is more effective and known. Do not let the FETO schools be called ‘Turkish schools’”.[xii] To a certain extent, this demonstrates that Turkey continues to rely on private and semi-public actors abroad that had established and maintained relations with other states in the past, as noted above with the Gulen movement.
The primary barrier to the Foundation’s attempts to expropriate the physical property of Hizmet schools is the fact that domestic authorities must first agree to dispossess these schools to the Foundation, often leading to grueling and time-consuming trials in court, as recently seen in Ethiopia.[xiii] Despite facing resistance in its attempts to convince other countries to close down Hizmet schools or hand over the facilities, the Turkish government has achieved the most success in Africa by using what can be called the ‘stick approach’. In this approach, Turkey uses “sticks,” or hard power, rather than “carrots,” or soft power, to threaten a country’s socio-economic progress and infrastructural projects via economic and investment pressure. Dipama & Dal (2019) discuss Turkey’s use of the stick approach, describing how Turkey can exploit its links with particular African states through business, import, export, and foreign direct investment to its own benefit.[xiv] The next section will focus on the relationship between the Foundation and these select African countries before comparing the Foundation’s success in Belarus and mainland Europe.
THE MAARIF FOUNDATION IN BELARUS, BURUNDI, CAMEROON, CHAD, DJIBOUTI, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ETHIOPIA, GABON, AND GUINEA-CONAKRY
One of the first African countries to acquiesce to the Turkish government’s demands was Gabon. Public officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the vice president of the Maarif Foundation, Hasan Yavuz, to cede three Hizmet schools to the Foundation, consisting of a total of 200 students.[xv] Chad also acquiesced to transfer Hizmet schools, but the extent of the takeover was only documented later in 2017 when a kindergarten, primary schools, dormitory, and secondary schools were expropriated and transferred to the Maarif Foundation for management ahead of a visit by President Erdogan.[xvi] The Education Minister of Chad at the time, Ahmad Khazali Acyl, considered it a step forward in Chadian-Turkish relations. From an outside, objective perspective, however, this can also be considered further erasure of Gulen’s influence in Africa to advance Erdogan’s agenda, which has painted the Hizmet schools as a ‘sham’ quality of education. It is important to note that “[m]any African countries, immediately after the coup attempt, deported [Hizmet] members and transferred the schools run by the group to our Maarif Foundation.”[xvii]
During 2017, the Maarif Foundation made significant headway in Africa, particularly in Guinea-Conakry, Djibouti, and Burundi. A total of 10 schools in the capital of Guinea were transferred to the Foundation following a three-month-long process of public authorities canceling Hizmet licenses to teach and own the private facilities. Once the Foundation took over former Hizmet schools, they were frequently remodeled with new names linked to political martyrs allegedly killed by supposed Gulenists during the coup attempt. [xviii] Turkish officials officially inaugurated the schools at events that mimicked the humanitarian and charitable functions of the former Hizmet owners. Likewise, Joel Nkurabagaya, the then Burundian ambassador to Turkey, stated in 2017 that Burundi was working towards allowing the Foundation to open its own schools following the transfer of numerous Hizmet schools. These developments were precipitated by Hasan Yuvuz’s visit to Burundi in May 2017, ostensibly to discuss education but during which Burundian and Turkish officials introduced other political and economic interests. For example, during Yuvuz’s visit, the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, requested that Turkish Airlines open direct flights to Burundi.[xix] Similarly, Djibouti transferred a facility to the Foundation to use as a kindergarten and elementary school. It was additionally one of the first countries in Africa to grant the Foundation a 5-hectare plot of land to build its own Maarif educational institution. This trend would later take shape across Africa.[xx]
By January 2018, the Foundation had signed agreements with a total of 26 African states, with 16 having transferred schools over to the Foundation, consisting of nearly 9,000 students under the influence of President Erdogan’s Islamist ideology and political agenda.[xxi] These states were joined by Equatorial Guinea in September 2018, when Sebnem Cenk, Turkey’s ambassador in Malabo, and Fabiola Angono Miko, the deputy minister of Youth and Sports and Foreign Ministry, agreed to transfer a Hizmet school based in the capital, Malabo, to the Foundation under the new name of ‘Maarif Malabo College’.[xxii] In early 2019, the Foundation also managed to gain the cooperation of the Cameroonian government to close down and transfer Hizmet schools. The re-opening ceremony was attended by numerous distinguished officials from Cameroon and Turkey, with the Turkish ambassador to the country, Ayşe Saraç, commenting that:
“Cameroon supported our country and became our friend and ally in our struggle with [Hizmet]. Maarif Schools are more and more active in the international arena and have achieved significant successes. The Turkish Maarif Foundation will open new schools in Cameroon in the coming period. We keep following and supporting all works carried out in this regard.”[xxiii]
One of the most critical battlegrounds in taking over Hizmet schools can clearly be seen with respect to Ethiopia. This dynamic started in mid-2019 when the first Hizmet school, located in Harar, was expropriated and transferred to the Foundation, which met three years of legal challenges before attaining a second school located in Sebata Town.[xxiv] These legal challenges were prolonged by an investigation conducted by Ethiopian federal and state attorneys into terrorism and money laundering at the school that the Maarif Foundation was attempting to acquire. According to the Stockholm Center for Freedom in 2021, the STEM Education Private Limited Company, composed of several German investors based in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, owned the school.[xxv] The manager of the school, Dr. Norbert Helmut Dinse, explained that the school was foreign-owned within the educational sector of Ethiopia and that:
“Initially, the company was established by Turkish Investors. Through time, the three German investors acquired the investment following all procedures required under the law. German investors stepped in and took over the parent company again in full compliance with the requirements of the laws of the land.”[xxvi]
At first, it seemed that the Ministry of Education in Ethiopia would support the Hizmet school and its STEM owners due to the legitimate proof of its status as a privately owned school, even approving its school license for the 2020-2021 academic year. However, this changed after the Oromia and Sebata Education Bureau and several armed police officers trespassed onto school grounds, illegally installing the Turkish staff of the Maarif Foundation to begin teaching at the school instead.[xxvii] A representative of the Foundation, Levent Sahin, stated that “[a]fter the investigation, state attorney generals decided to suspend education licenses of the Stem company belonging to the terror organization. We want to see that this will be an example for the other schools.” By mid-August 2021, the Foundation took control of eleven more schools formerly run by Hizmet in Ethiopia, consisting of 2,000 students. Although staff and students mounted additional legal obstacles to stop these acquisitions, the Foundation utilized sympathetic parent-teacher associations to quash these legal attempts and sway educational bureaucracy in its favor.[xxviii]
At the moment of writing, there is a lack of credible information about the single institution that was either transferred or opened in Belarus. Nonetheless, this development occurred shortly after the opening of two schools in Bucharest, Romania, and Elbasan, Albania, in late 2019. Both replaced the Hizmet schools that existed in the respective countries.[xxix]
ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES
By March 2021, the Maarif foundation had taken control of 216 Hizmet schools in 44 countries, stating that it had signed a further 77 protocols to oversee the management of schools in 45 other countries.[xxx] Over half of the remaining schools managed by Hizmet staff are located in the U.S. and Europe, the former hosting a total of 312 schools, four universities, and 155 charter schools, with the largest facilities in the federal states of Texas, Ohio, California, and Florida.[xxxi] The rapid activity with which the Foundation has attained control over Hizmet schools poses many risks on various levels: for the children and their parents, for the domestic societies within which the Maarif schools operate, and at a bilateral level between Turkey and the host countries.
Toguslu (2017) explained these risks firstly at a bilateral level, correctly foreseeing that once the diplomatic tensions of 2016 and 2017 died down, African countries had paved the way for Turkey’s hard power capabilities to expand further into Africa by using the schools as an extension, as seen in Senegal.[xxxii] On the surface, the Foundation wants countries to believe that the quality of education and facilities offered at Maarif schools are of a higher standard and that the Foundation will discontinue the so-called maligned or flawed education previously offered in Hizmet schools. This superficial presentation is evident from the Secondary Education Minister of Cameroon, Nalova Lyonga, statement that:
“students will learn French and English as well as Turkish, and will develop a different culture and the habit of living together. We give importance to the different languages as part of culture and welcome the Turkish education with joy. I believe that Turkish culture will add a lot to us.”[xxxiii]
At a deeper level, the reality is that Turkey is using the Maarif Foundation to expand its political influence. This trend is evident from past behaviour, namely the export of Turkish teachers and imams to Europe to gather intelligence on diaspora communities and ensure that the diaspora follows the directives and ideology of the AKP party.[xxxiv] Akgun & Ozkan (2020) have also reported on the Foundation’s aspirations to move beyond the educational field and make a larger contribution towards Turkey’s foreign policy and diplomatic relations via the educational sector.[xxxv]
Furthermore, there are significant risks associated with the eradication of Hizmet schools. Hizmet teachers offered a higher than average educational quality to students in their host countries. This is evident from the academic excellence attributed to students and the high rate of satisfaction shown by parents; Hizmet schools were recognized to the point that state officials preferred to send their children to Hizmet education.[xxxvi] International organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have also found that Turkey’s education system underperforms compared to other states. In particular, there is a known risk of sexual harassment in educational institutions and in Turkey more generally, demonstrated by the scandals surrounding the Ensar Foundation, which was closely linked to President Erdogan.[xxxvii] Turkey itself does not provide quality education to its students, and yet it is exporting its own educational systems and values to other countries. This poses a fundamental risk to the countries that import Turkish education by lowering the bar for education in host countries, preventing children from receiving the quality education they deserve. By extension, this could negatively impact the economic development of host countries by preventing the cumulation of human capital via quality education.
A major risk is the possibility that the Maarif Foundation could advance Erdogan’s goal to become the leader of the Islamic world by using investment as a means to ingratiate himself and his agenda to non-Turkish Muslims living abroad.[xxxviii] This ambition is dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, the ‘coexistence’ and expressive approach of Hizmet schools to dialogue with different ethnicities, especially religions, is in stark contrast to the closed and exclusive ideology of Erdogan, who in the past has openly stated that Muslims and Christians should not engage with one another. Secondly, Africa has unique issues with terrorism, such as the proliferation of ISIS in Mozambique, Uganda, and the DRC, as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Should the Maarif Foundation take over a significant sector of the education system in many African countries, these issues may worsen as schools disseminate Erdogan’s ideology, which founds politics on religious principles.[xxxix] Dr. Dinse expressed his concern about the risk of destabilising African societies, saying:
“What has happened to our investment is odd for any listener (…) [i]n a country with a strong system of the rule of law and hosting the Head Office of African Union, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and many diplomatic communities, it is unbelievable that foreign investment can be taken forcefully without recourse Rule of Law.”
The Hizmet Schools were insulated from this risk because they lacked a formal link to Gulen and thus never attempted to create a global movement based solely on Gulen’s ideology. Neither the schools nor the students attempted to defend Gulen after the failed coup, nor did they directly oppose the actions of Erdogan.[xl] The schools thus remained education institutions rather than political tools. The only political activity causally linked to the Hizmet schools was protesting in defense of the schools’ autonomy and legality in the face of the Maarif Foundation’s attempted acquisitions. G. Angey (2018) documented this pushback in a case study of Senegal, wherein civil society, parents, and public officials—rather than Turks or Hizmet staff—publicly challenged the attempted transfers in court, citing the risks of losing cherished educational opportunities.[xli]
There is no possible way for the Maarif schools to be insulated from politics because the Foundation is an institution of the state and because Turkey maintains economic leverage over African governments. Hence, even if African civil society, public officials, and state bodies mobilize against the schools in more substantive ways than previously described, African governments will still be forced to comply and cooperate with Erdogan’s demands due to the economic threat of souring relations with Turkey. For instance, the Ethiopian Investment Commission notes that Turkey is the second largest investor in Ethiopia, with $2.5 billion in direct investment. Turkish companies are also the single largest employers, providing roughly 30,000 jobs.[xlii] These facts give Erdogan the power to influence—for better or for worse—the socioeconomic progress of Ethiopia, and thus the power to demand political actions from the Ethiopian government.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Turkish government has shifted its foreign policy goals toward exporting education, especially to Africa. Initially, this shift was a product of the Gulen movement, which supported the teaching of moderation, humanitarianism, and multiculturalism. The Gulen movement inspired Hizmet schools, which lacked any explicit link to Gulen and certainly were not willed by Gulen, although they sought to continue his innovative ethos. These schools paved the way for private investment, cultural links, and educational diplomacy prior to the entrance of public representatives of the Turkish government; however, it is also true that the Hizmet schools relied on the Turkish government’s goodwill, using official networks of communication to open more schools across Africa. The rise and fall of Hizmet is, therefore, a tragedy resulting from the fluid identity of the schools. They were both a product of Turkey, since they were inspired by Gulen, financed by Turkish businessmen, and enabled by connections with public officials, and a product of local society, which, over time, came to respect and own the institutions where their children received such a high quality of education. This localisation of formal and informal ownership made the schools adopt an identity that was more African or European than Turkish. This dynamic is evident from the local, rather than international, struggle against the expropriation of the Hizmet schools.
The narratives relating to the schools are divergent, however. Many of the sources referenced in this report support the narrative that the Hizmet schools were a direct extension of the Gulen movement that intended to isolate Turkey and the AKP with a view to overthrow the government. Others support the counter-narrative that the movement and the schools are facing persecution by the Turkish government as part of its campaign for political dominance and disregard for human rights. This report advances this counter-narrative, noting the Turkish government’s escalation of propaganda against Gulen and the Hizmet schools abroad, which recalled the pre-existing fears of terrorism and instability pervasive throughout Africa and Europe. The establishment of the Maarif Foundation furthered these fears by instilling within societies where Hizmet had been successful the idea that Hizmet schools disseminated anti-government sentiment and provided a poor quality of education. The Foundation offered its own Maarif schools as an alternative, claiming they were both educationally superior and more aligned with host countries’ political goals. But the reality is that the Foundation is an extended arm of the Erdogan regime that aims to eradicate the Hizmet system, regain control over foreign relations, and acquire influence over other countries and dignitaries under the auspices of foreign civil society.
[i] Toguslu, E. (2017) ‘The Turbulence between AKP and Hizmet: The African Case’. Centre for Hizmet Studies, p. 9; see also BBC (2016) ‘Tukey coup: What is Gulen movement and what does it want?’. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846 [Accessed 09/07/2022]; see also Norton, J. & Kasapoglu, C. (2016) ‘Turkey’s post-coup crackdown hits ‘Gulen schools’ worldwide’. BBC. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37422822 [Accessed 09/07/2022].
[iii]Ibid., pp. 10-11 & 13; see also Dipama, S. & Dal, E. P. (2019) ‘Assessing the Turkish “Trading State” in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Dal, E. P. (eds.) (2019) Turkey’s Political Economy in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham., pp. 250-253; see also Angey, G. (2018) ‘The Gulen Movement and the Transfer of a Political Conflict from Turkey to Senegal’. Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 19(1), p. 53 (“By 2013, the Gülen Movement had over 100 schools in 50-odd countries across Africa and was collaborating closely with the Turkish state on the ground.”)
[iv] Toguslu, pp. 16-17; see also Akgun, B. & Ozkan, M. (2020) ‘Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Foundation’. Insight Turkey, Vol. 22(1), p. 60.
[v]Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021a) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation took over 216 Gulen-linked schools in 44 countries, chairman says’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-maarif-foundation-took-over-216-gulen-linked-schools-in-44-countries-chairman-says/ [Accessed 16/07/2022] (In order to dissuade his followers regarding these charges, Erdogan began designated the Gulen movement as a terrorist organisation, and that these charges are merely a conspiracy to take down and usurp the government).
[vi] Dr. Sezgin likens Erdogan to Mephisto from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust, explaining that Erdogan’s corrupt nature could have stopped much earlier but instead progressed towards the pinnacle moment when he felt the zeal of the public supporting him and recognized that without support, he would face persecution. The series of charges led to Erdogan committing still more corruption and criminal activity, feeding his growing paranoia and need to collect constant intelligence, growing into a vicious cycle of corruption, crimes, and lies.
[xii] Toguslu, pp. 19 & 20 19 (the author notes that “What the Education Ministry should be doing is being handed over to a foundation” which further indicates that the government wishes to continue acting via actors that hold a semi-public status of not exactly representing the government but still carrying out the tacitly approved conduct of its public officials); see also Angey, pp. 59-60; see also Akgun & Ozkan, p. 65 (Despite the nature of propaganda in this article, it is interesting to see how the domestic perspective of the Gulen movement’s and Hizmet schools’ respective images. It state that “In the past, the brand of ‘Turkish schools’ abroad was mostly used, popularized and even hijacked by FETO” and that the Foundation’s activities aim at “reclaiming [the] educational soft power for Turkey.”)
Turkish police detained 543 of 704 arrest warrants as part of an investigation into the financial activities of followers of the Gülen movement, according to the ministry of internal affairs, citing the country’s interior minister. The operation is carried out simultaneous across 59 cities. (1)
Interior Minister stated that the operation, which started in the morning after 8 months of meticulous work, was carried out to decipher the current structure of the Gulen Movement, the supply of new personnel and financial resources. According to Interior Minister Soylu, the operation was carried out by the Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department (KOM), the Counterterrorism Bureau (TEM) and the Cybercrime Department in coordination with the Security General Directorate’s intelligence unit and the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK). (1)
Interior Minister Soylu made a statement on the operation together with Turgut Aslan, the Chief Advisor to the President. Soylu said, “This money transfer, which took place over 8 months, both via cargo, ATM and people who do not know each other, is entire of foreign origin. Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) really has a great contribution here, the successful follow-up of each of the security units separately. This systematic and regular money transfer has been determined as a result of an operational and operational understanding. There is a system that is transferred to the members of this organization by the managers of the organization abroad, between 3 and 6 thousand liras (160 to 320 euros), in order to keep the organization in Turkey alive and to maintain the financial structure of the organization. Among the methods are cardless transactions, hiding in cargo and physical meetings.(2)
The suspects are accused of distributing or receiving financial aid sent by Gülen followers abroad to the families of those imprisoned or suspended from public office for affiliation with the Gülen movement.
After the coup attempt, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency and carried out a major purge of state institutions under the pretext of fighting the coup. More than 130,000 public officials, including 4,156 judges and prosecutors, as well as 29,444 members of the armed forces, were summarily dismissed from their jobs for alleged membership of or affiliation with “terrorist organizations”, with the emergency decree laws that are not subject to neither judicial nor parliamentary control. .
Victims of Turkey’s post-coup oppression say that they and their families face serious financial and psychological problems because of what the government and its supporters call hate speech, which prevents them from living a normal life, finding a job and supporting their families.
Human Rights activist and Deputy HDP Omer Faruk Gergeelioglu shows his reaction against the operation with the following words
“We are experiencing fires in our hearts for the young people who committed suicide, they are trying to break the hands reaching out to those who can commit suicide!!!
We call it a “crime against humanity”, they are killing the last crumbs of their humanity with their hands!!!”
Biz, intihar eden gençlerden yana yüreğimizde yangınlar yaşıyoruz, onlar, intihar edebileceklere uzanan elleri kırmaya çalışıyor!!!
Biz “insanlığa karşı suç” diyoruz, onlar insanlıklarının son kırıntılarını elleriyle bitiriyor!!!
The 1949 Compulsory Education Act was the first official legal action taken in Israel to enforce compulsory education, ensuring free school attendance for children, for 9 years, from age 5. In 2009, compulsory education was extended until grade 12, and in 2016 compulsory school enrolment was lowered to age 3.
State-funded Israeli general education works along a four-stream system, which provides secular, religious, and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) educational institutions for Jewish Israelis. There are Arabic schools for the Arab, Bedouin, Christian Arab, and Druze Israeli minorities.
Hebrew-speaking schools are managed by Jewish principals while schools teaching in Arabic are coordinated by Arab principals. However, all principals are subjugated to a centralised Israeli administration, funding, and curriculum which ensures similar requirements and teacher-salaries.
Despite compulsory education starting at age 3, 47% of children are already enrolled in an educational institution before age 2. 99% of children between 3 and 5 was enrolled in an educational institution in 2019.
It is commendable that more than half of the population, between 25 and 64 years-old, held tertiary attainment in 2019.
Broken Chalk is pleased to note that Israel spends 6.7% of its GDP on education which is above the 4.9% OECD average.
Between 2003 and 2017 dropout rates have fallen from 9.9% to 7.6% which is particularly remarkable since it ‘occurred primarily among the weakest students in the system’.
Despite all the investments and successes, the Israeli educational sector does show severe issues. Problems in the system are often related to the inequalities of the four-stream educational system, socioeconomic inequalities, and discrimination based on ethnicity.
For instance, Israel has one of the highest gaps in achievement, based on the best and worst performing students in PISA, among OECD countries.
Furthermore, enrolment numbers decline as studies proceed: enrolment amounted to 96.5% between age 6 to 14, while it was of 66.1% between age 15 to 19, in 2019.
As Israel has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC] in 2005, the state must commit to carry out its duties and obligations which include the insurance of free compulsory education and equal opportunity for all children. Thus, Broken Chalk urges Israel to address all issues which prevent the realisation of the rights enshrined in the CRC.
Overview of the previous UN UPR cycle
In its national report prepared for the 2018 UN UPR, Israel particularly emphasized its efforts to ensure human rights in its territories, including access to education. Israel promised to work for closing educational gaps, and for the integration of minorities into the Israeli society, also through education. Efforts are reflected in the Resolution project from 2014-2017 targeting Druze communities to improve their education, and in the efforts to provide state funded higher education for the Arab communities through the CHE academic colleges.
Israel took further steps in expanding the number of years spent in education by lowering the obligatory school entrance age to age 3 and expanding after-school day-care services in 2017.
In the previous UPR cycle, Israel received 5 recommendations regarding the right to education, focusing on narrowing the inequality gap among different ethnicities. Israel supported 3 of these recommendations, however it rejected 2 which regarded the issues existing in Area C of the occupied territories in West Bank (see section IV.).
This report is a contribution by Brokenchalk to the fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Broken Chalk is an Amsterdam-based NGO established in 2020 and focused on raising awareness and minimizing human rights violations in the educational field. Our goal is to work together with global partners to remove barriers to access to education and to take concrete steps to ensure universal access to education. Therefore, this report will focus on human rights violations in regards to education in the UAE.
In the third session of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the UAE accepted 100 recommendations from the Council in full, partially accepted 7 recommendations and took note of 54 recommendations. In regards to education, recommendations referred to the explicit prohibition of child violence in schools (Estonia) and in all settings (Montenegro), non-discrimination and advancement of equal opportunities in schools, mandatory and free primary education for all children on the territory (Peru) and the promotion of human rights through the curricula in schools (Egypt). There were 4 other recommendations, which referred to the issue of providing “better services to persons with disabilities, in particular in education” (Singapore).
Since the last cycle, the UAE has undergone ambitious educational developments and reforms under the 2017-2021 education strategy, Vision 2021. The plan has prioritized six main objectives: a safe society, a fair judicial system, a sustainable environment, an integrated infrastructure, and a shift towards a knowledge-based economy, assisted by the creation of a first-rate education system.
The Ministry of Education has prioritized the development of the highest global educational standards for students and teachers, based on innovation and competitiveness. In line with this, the UAE Vision 2021 states that the new National Agenda aims to “promote an inclusive environment that integrates all segments of society while preserving the UAE’s unique culture […]”.
This report will signal the major issue areas regarding the protection of human rights in education and it will furthermore acknowledge the attempts to promote human rights regarding education. Lastly, it will provide the appropriate comments and recommendations.
Turkey has been a key partner for the European Union via an Association Agreement since 1964 and the establishment of a Customs Union in 1995. Turkey was granted the status of a candidate country in December 1999 and accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened and one of these was provisionally closed. The General Affairs Council conclusions of June 2019 reiterated the Council’s position of June 2018 that under the current circumstances, Turkey’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill, no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing. Over the reporting period, the Turkish government did not reverse the negative trend as regards the reform agenda despite the Turkish government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU accession. The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed. There was further backsliding in many areas. Relations with the EU deteriorated until December 2020, mostly due to actions taken by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, directly challenging the rights of the Republic of Cyprus in its maritime zones. This summary will focus on the area of education.
Chapter 26 Education and Culture
The EU encourages collaboration in education and culture through funding programs and the open method of coordination, which allows Member States to coordinate their policies. Member States must also avoid discrimination and guarantee that children of migrant workers, including those from poor families, receive a high-quality education. Turkey is moderately equipped in terms of education and culture, and some progress has been made in this area, such as the smooth operation of the national qualifications system, the inclusion of culture in development policies, and the promotion and protection of the country’s cultural heritage.
In the coming year, the EU commission has recommended Turkey to (1) continue the improvement of inclusive education, focusing on including girls and disadvantaged children and reduce the proportion of school drop-outs, (2) further ensure the good functioning of the Turkish Qualifications Framework and Turkish Higher Education Quality Council, (3) take steps to implement the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
With regards to education, access to early childhood education (ECE) in Turkey varies by age group and region. While the net enrolment rate for pre-school education (age 5) further increased from 68.3 % to 71.2 % during the 2019-2020 school year (70.4 % for girls, 72 % for boys), the combined net enrolment rate for children in Turkey aged between 3 and 5 remains low at only 41.8 %. Flexible and community-based ECE models need to be implemented, guided by clear targets and strategies, which cover vulnerable children and the overall quality of ECE services requires improvement. The net enrolment rate in primary schools grew slightly from 92.1 % to 93.6 %, with 93.5 % for girls and 93.7 % for boys. In lower secondary school, the net enrolment rate grew from 93.3 % to 95.9 %, with a rate of 96.1 % for girls and 95.7 % for boys. In upper secondary education net enrolment increased from 84.2 % to 85.0 % (84.9 % for girls, 85.2 % for boys). In higher education, the net enrolment rate decreased from 44.1 % to 43.4 % (46.3 % for girls, 40.6 % for boys). Both the number and the rate of students in special education (students with special needs who are in regular classes) increased slightly in 2020, from 398 815 in 2019 to 425 774 in 2020, which represents an increase from 1.65 % to 1.74 %. However, there is a noticeably large disparity between the number of girls and boys with special needs in education (269,897 male versus 155,877 female students).
Since 2004 Turkey has participated in EU education programs. Applications for the Erasmus+ programme climbed from 12 467 in 2019 to 13 079 in 2020, demonstrating the program’s ongoing popularity among Turkish education stakeholders. In 2020, 497 new projects for 124 million euros were contracted. Furthermore, applications for the European Solidarity Corps (ESC) program surged from 349 in 2019 to 896 in 2020; EU funding was allocated to 269 projects totalling EUR 6.12 million (181 volunteering initiatives and 88 solidarity projects) with over 2000 participants. Turkey implemented the recommendations of the European Commission to limit the detrimental effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on both beneficiaries and future beneficiaries of Erasmus+ and the ESC.
Turkey is at an advanced stage of implementing the Bologna process, although significant quality differences persist among Turkey’s 207 higher education institutions. The reorganisation of the Turkish Higher Education Quality Council (THEQC), the national authority evaluating Turkish higher education institutions, led to greater administrative and financial independence. THEQC became a member of the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) in April 2020. THEQC added an institutional accreditation programme to its quality assurance activities in 2020. Relevant higher education regulation and procedures need to be further adapted to THEQC regulations in order to guarantee its effectiveness. In addition, THEQC should aim to further increase the size of permanent staff in order to strengthen its operational independence.
Implementation of a national vocational qualifications system by the Vocational Qualifications Authority (VQA) is ongoing. VQA, the competent authority for preparing national occupational standards and national qualifications and for authorising certification bodies, is also in charge of implementing the Turkish Qualifications Framework (TQF). As of June 2021, the number of occupational standards and qualifications approved by the VQA increased satisfactorily for the functional implementation of the Turkish Qualification Framework; however, the number of vocational qualifications certificates still needs to be increased substantially. Studies regarding the full implementation of TQF continued under the coordination of the VQA. Private education certificates were integrated within the framework of VQA certificates. Although the European Qualifications Framework is referenced within the TQF, Turkey needs to ensure that principles and procedures relating to quality assurance, credit systems, inclusion of qualifications, and validation of non-formal and informal learning are fully in place. In the formal vocational education and training sector, implementing the modular curricula and credited module system, instead of the current class passing system, remains an important issue for the effective implementation of the TQF.
This report was drafted by Broken Chalk to contribute to the call for inputs based on the invitation of the Government of Turkey for the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences in preparation for the visit by Ms. Reem Alsalem on 18 – 27 July 2022. Broken Chalk is an organisation that fights against violations of Human Rights and improving the quality of education around the globe. This report will discuss the main challenges Turkey faces in regards to women’s rights violations, what are some issues that could be improved, and finally Broken Chalk will offer some recommendations for Turkey based on the raised issues.
The main issues in education in Bahrain include violations of freedom of expression, sexual abuse, social stigmas, access to educaiton and the quality of education. The Bahrain authorities practice sectarian discrimination against opponents, violating in turn the right to education of many people according to the Bahrain Center of Human Rights.
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