La corruzione in Azerbaigian: una guida alle sfide educative

Educational Challenges in Azerbaijan

L’Azerbaigian è un paese situato nella regione del Caucaso e, fino alla sua indipendenza nel 1991, è stato governato dall’Unione Sovietica. Nonostante la vastità delle risorse naturali dell’Azerbaigian, essa soffre di infrastrutture inadeguate che incidono su numerosi settori, in particolare quello educativo.

Anche se l’istruzione è gratuita nelle scuole pubbliche, un’ istruzione più avanzata è determinata dalla situazione finanziaria della famiglia.[1] Il reddito annuo di una famiglia media azera è di 4250 manat (2500$), il quale di conseguenza colpisce il bilancio educativo o le famiglie regolari. Assumere tutor privati e pagare per i materiali scolastici richiede un budget più ampio rispetto a quello che le famiglie possono attualmente permettersi. I sistemi di istruzione superiore tendono a optare per l’ammissione di studenti provenienti da ambienti ricchi e licenziare studenti provenienti da famiglie rurali e a basso reddito.[2]

Quando si tratta della qualità del sistema educativo, il fatto che le scuole secondarie non riescano a preparare adeguatamente gli studenti per le ammissioni universitarie porta molti studenti a non riuscire negli esami di ammissione universitari a causa delle basse prestazioni.[3] Considerando il sistema educativo imperfetto, i genitori provenienti da ambienti più ricchi assumono tutor privati al fine di garantire un’istruzione di qualità. Coloro che traggono beneficio dalla situazione sono élite governative, poiché le loro opzioni per fornire una migliore istruzione ai loro figli sono molto più alte. Questi bambini vengono talvolta inviati all’estero in paesi come gli Stati Uniti, il Canada e i paesi dell’Europa occidentale, per continuare a perseguire un’istruzione di buona qualità. Coloro che non possono permettersi questo sono lasciati indietro con livelli di istruzione insufficienti.

L’accesso a materiali educativi come libri, articoli, riviste, ecc, è minimo, specialmente quelli in lingua azera.  Le biblioteche universitarie mancano delle risorse necessarie per scopi educativi, e gli studenti si lamentano del contenuto di tali materiali che sono obsoleti e irrilevanti per oggi.

Uno dei motivi principali per la carenza di materiali e risorse educative è la mancanza di sostegno del governo per la ricerca accademica e la traduzione. Le proposte di bilancio per lo sviluppo del settore dell’istruzione e il limitato aiuto finanziario e il sostegno alla ricerca accademica lasciano il paese in una carenza intellettuale. Questo è associato al fatto che il più delle volte, gli accademici migrano verso paesi più sviluppati che forniscono loro migliori incentivi per la ricerca.

L’istruzione post-laurea in Azerbaigian necessita cambiamenti significativi nel suo sistema. Ha bisogno di molta attenzione e sviluppo in quanto i programmi post-laurea non forniscono agli studenti la professionalità di cui hanno bisogno per diventare più specializzati nel loro campo. Richard D. Kortum, professore emerito alla East Tennessee State University, descrive la scarsa istruzione nell’istruzione dei master dell’Azerbaigian “Gli studenti del Master in Azerbaigian di solito devono frequentare lo stesso corso, lo stesso istruttore, lo stesso libro, lo stesso materiale per le lezioni, gli stessi test degli studenti universitari”.[4] Un altro grave problema esistente in Azerbaigian al momento è la corruzione. Anche se illegale nella Costituzione, è diventato un modo normalizzato di sopravvivenza all’interno della popolazione. La popolazione non ha altra scelta che pagare tangenti per accedere a tutti i settori, tra cui istruzione, sanità, servizi governativi, occupazione, tra gli altri. I capi di queste istituzioni beneficiano di queste tangenti mettendo le persone in una situazione in cui devono pagare per risolvere qualsiasi problema.

Secondo l’UNESCO Institute for Statistics, l’Azerbaigian ha ottenuto il più basso tasso di iscrizione all’istruzione post-secondaria (terziaria) rispetto ad altri paesi della regione del Caucaso e dell’Asia centrale, in quanto il 77% degli azeri che si diplomano non si iscrivono alle università. Ciò è probabilmente dovuto “al sistema di assegnazione delle quote di stato mal concepito e altamente centralizzato”.[5] La tabella 1 mostra la percentuale di studenti che hanno fatto domanda per le università dal 2010 al 2014 in Azerbaigian, Armenia, Georgia e Kazakistan.[6]

By Zinat Asadova

Translated by Camilla Rosso from https://brokenchalk.org/educational-challenges-in-azerbaijan/

 

Sources:

[1] Souce: Mammadova, S., Guliyev, F., Wallwork, L. and Azimli, N., 2016. Human Capital Development in Azerbaijan. Caucasus Analytical Digest, (90), pp. 8,. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/30431942/The_Quality_of_Education_in_Azerbaijan_Problems_and_Prospects>

[2] Mammadova, S., Guliyev, F., Wallwork, L. and Azimli, N., 2016. Human Capital Development in Azerbaijan. Caucasus Analytical Digest, (90), pp.8,. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/30431942/The_Quality_of_Education_in_Azerbaijan_Problems_and_Prospects>

[3] Mammadova, S., Guliyev, F., Wallwork, L. and Azimli, N., 2016. Human Capital Development in Azerbaijan. Caucasus Analytical Digest, (90), pp. 7,. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/30431942/The_Quality_of_Education_in_Azerbaijan_Problems_and_Prospects>

[4] Richard D. Kortum, “Emerging Higher Education in Azerbaijan”, Journal of Azerbaijani Studies, 12, 2009.

[5] Mammadova, S., Guliyev, F., Wallwork, L. and Azimli, N., 2016. Human Capital Development in Azerbaijan. Caucasus Analytical Digest, (90), pp. 7,. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/30431942/The_Quality_of_Education_in_Azerbaijan_Problems_and_Prospects>

[6] Souce: Mammadova, S., Guliyev, F., Wallwork, L. and Azimli, N., 2016. Human Capital Development in Azerbaijan. Caucasus Analytical Digest, (90), pp. 8,. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/30431942/The_Quality_of_Education_in_Azerbaijan_Problems_and_Prospects>

VIOLAZIONI DEI DIRITTI UMANI NELLE PRIGIONI TURCHE

Il governo turco sta violando il diritto interno e internazionale consolidato, trattenendo arbitrariamente i prigionieri gravemente malati. I prigionieri in Turchia stanno lottando contro la violenza sessuale e fisica, come le perquisizioni a nudo, le molestie e i pestaggi brutali, nonché contro molte violazioni dei diritti, come le mense eccessivamente costose, i raid di mezzanotte nei reparti, restrizioni del libro, negazione della medicina e punizioni arbitrarie[1].  Questo articolo farà luce su alcuni casi di violazione dei diritti umani che si verificano oggi nelle carceri turche.

 

Dopo il tentativo di colpo di stato nel 2016, il numero di detenuti è aumentato in modo massiccio, al punto che il sovraffollamento carcerario è diventato un problema prevalente. Tuttavia, il sovraffollamento non è l’unica questione che riguarda le carceri in tutta la Turchia, ma i maltrattamenti e le violazioni dei diritti umani che si verificano nelle decine di migliaia di prigionieri sono un problema serio che deve essere affrontato immediatamente.

 

Il presidente turco Recep Tayyip Erdogan ha preso di mira i seguaci del momento Gülen, un gruppo di fede ispirato dal clero turco Fethullal Gülen, da quando una serie di indagini sulla corruzione ha avuto luogo nel dicembre 2013, implicando Erdogan, i suoi parenti e il suo circolo interno.[2]  Tra i bersagli ci sono molti politici dell’opposizione, giornalisti, avvocati e difensori dei diritti umani. Yusuf Bekmezci (82), un prigioniero gravemente malato che era in custodia nella prigione F-Type di Kırıklar a Izmir, è morto dopo 47 giorni in terapia intensiva.[3]  Fu arrestato nel gennaio 2020 come parte delle indagini sul movimento Fetullah Gülen. Bekmezci è stato condannato a 17 anni e 4 mesi di reclusione il 9 aprile 2021 con l’accusa di essere un “manager di un’organizzazione”.[4]  Saadet Aytekin, sua nipote e avvocato ha dichiarato che il suo “caso del nonno era alla Corte Suprema. La sua sentenza non era stata ratificata. Tuttavia, la corte ha stabilito che ‘dovrebbe continuare a scontare la sua pena in ospedale’ come se la sua condanna fosse stata ratificata. Ha avuto malattie durante i suoi due anni di detenzione, ma si sono rifiutati di rilasciare un uomo attaccato alle tube in terapia intensiva perché era un “rischio di fuga”.”[5]  Infatti, il Consiglio turco di medicina forense (ATK) ha emesso un rapporto medico affermando che Bekmezci non era in grado di rimanere in carcere, ma la corte ha respinto la relazione affermando che era a “rischio di fuga”.[6]  Sua figlia, Şeyma Bekmezci, ha dichiarato l’incapacità di suo padre di capire i procedimenti giudiziari alla luce del suo avanzato Alzheimer, che di conseguenza gli ha reso impossibile difendersi. Ha suggerito che la mancanza di un’adeguata assistenza sanitaria mentale in carcere è stato uno dei fattori che hanno causato il suo deterioramento: “si dimentica completamente in tribunale ed è in una posizione vulnerabile”. [7]

 

L’Associazione per i diritti umani (İHD) ha dichiarato che, a partire da giugno 2020, il numero di detenuti malati rinchiusi dietro le sbarre in Turchia ammontava a 1.605, di cui circa 600 erano in condizioni critiche. Il governo permise la loro detenzione anche se la maggior parte di loro aveva rapporti forensi e medici che li ritenevano inadatti a rimanere in carcere. Le autorità hanno rifiutato il loro rilascio sulla base del fatto che rappresentano un potenziale pericolo per la società. Il mancato rilascio di prigionieri gravemente malati in tempo per ricevere cure mediche adeguate ha provocato cinque morti nei primi otto mesi del 2020. Dopo la pandemia, il governo ha rilasciato i prigionieri accusati di omicidio, ma ha deciso di mantenere i prigionieri politici nonostante i rischi della pandemia. Mugla morì dopo aver contratto Covid-19. [8]

 

Durante novembre e dicembre 2021, diversi prigionieri persero la vita mentre erano detenuti nelle prigioni di tipo T e F. I prigionieri Garibe Gezer e İlyas Demir furono trovati morti nelle celle imbottite dove erano stati isolati.[9] Alcuni prigionieri, come il trentatreenne Bangin Muhammed e il sessantacinquenne Abdülrezzak Şuyur sono deceduti a causa del mancato rilascio nonostante la loro grave malattia e, in quest’ultimo caso, il cancro avanzato.[10] Altre persone sono state trovate morte nelle loro celle e l’amministrazione ha informato le loro famiglie del suicidio.[11]

 

 

Il 20 gennaio 2022, 43 associazioni di avvocati e giuristi, nonché organizzazioni per i diritti umani a livello nazionale e internazionale, hanno firmato una lettera urgente per i titolari del mandato speciale delle Nazioni Unite per richiamare l’attenzione sull’imminente rischio per la salute e la vita del prigioniero malato Aysel Tugluk, detenuto nel carcere F-Type di Kocaeli Kandira dal dicembre 2016. [12] Tugluk è stato diagnosticato con demenza e continua imprigionato nonostante le chiamate da parte di rapporti medici che dimostrano il suo stato precario e peggioramento della salute, esacerbato dalla pandemia Covid-19. Fornendo informazioni supplementari sulle questioni sistemiche relative al trattamento dei prigionieri in Turchia, La lettera chiede che le procedure speciali esortino il governo turco a rilasciare immediatamente Aysel Tugluk e tutti i prigionieri gravemente malati in linea con gli standard nazionali e internazionali per quanto riguarda il trattamento dei prigionieri.[13]  Nonostante ciò, all’inizio di febbraio 2022, il detenuto Turgay Deniz (39) ha sofferto di insufficienza polmonare e ha perso la vita mentre era in detenzione arbitraria. Anche se i rapporti medici hanno sottolineato l’importanza di essere curato durante il ricovero, è rimasto in carcere.[14]La sua storia è una delle otto storie di persone che sono morte nelle prigioni turche negli ultimi tre mesi.[15] Nusret Mugla, 84 anni, è stato condannato e imprigionato per essere un simpatizzante del Gulen Movement. Il suo arresto non ha considerato la sua età, malattie cardiache e renali, e il cancro alla prostata, e come risultato dell’assistenza trascurata, è morto in carcere.

Il comunicato stampa della filiale di Istanbul ha rilevato che le gravi violazioni dei diritti nelle carceri stanno gradualmente diventando sistematiche e hanno raggiunto una situazione di stallo nel settore sanitario, nel diritto alla comunicazione, alla tortura e ai maltrattamenti.[16] Accedere alla giustizia è diventato senza speranza per molti prigionieri in Turchia. Le organizzazioni per i diritti umani hanno espresso preoccupazione per il fatto che “è ormai visto come un normale incidente nel paese che il cadavere di una persona viene portato fuori di prigione in qualsiasi momento.” [17]

 

Riferendosi ai dati di İHD,nel marzo 2021, c’erano almeno 1.605 prigionieri malati, 604 dei quali erano in condizioni precarie al momento della pubblicazione della dichiarazione.[18] Le organizzazioni per i diritti umani sono a conoscenza di almeno 38 prigionieri che dovrebbero essere rilasciati con urgenza, poiché le loro condizioni stanno ulteriormente peggiorando. Ad oggi, tuttavia, le autorità non hanno risposto alle chiamate degli attivisti per i diritti umani o delle famiglie.

 

A nome di Broken Chalk, rivolgo un appello urgente a tutte le comunità e organizzazioni internazionali affinché agiscano contro le ingiustizie e i trattamenti inumani contro i prigionieri politici intrapresi da Erdogan e dal suo regime, e per assisterli nel loro rilascio dalle condizioni degradanti in cui sono detenuti.

 

Written by Olga Ruiz Pilato

Translated from https://brokenchalk.org/human-rights-violations-in-turkish-prisons/

Sources;

[1] Duvar English, MHP submits social media proposal, seeks penalties for fake accounts, February 2022 <accessible at https://www.duvarenglish.com/mhp-submits-social-media-proposal-seeks-penalties-for-fake-accounts-news-60333>.

[2] Turkish Minute, Turkish court rejects ailing philanthropist’s appeal for release from prison, January 2022 <accessible at  https://www.turkishminute.com/2022/01/12/kish-court-rejects-ailing-philanthropists-appeal-for-release-from-prison/>.

[3] MedyaNews, Turkey: Severely ill octogenarian prisoner dies, January 2022 <accessible at https://medyanews.net/turkey-severely-ill-octogenarian-prisoner-dies/>.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Turkish Minute, Turkish court rejects ailing philanthropist’s appeal for release from prison, January 2022 <accessible at  https://www.turkishminute.com/2022/01/12/kish-court-rejects-ailing-philanthropists-appeal-for-release-from-prison/>.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Politurco, Gulenm sympathisers are dying in prisons under the ruling of the Erdogan regime, February 2022 <accessible at  https://politurco.com/gulen-sympathizers-are-dying-in-prisons-under-the-ruling-of-the-erdogan-regime-84-year-old-nusret-mugla-was-one-of-the-many-and-died-most-recently.html>.

[9] English Bianet, At least 59 ill prisoners lost their lives in Turkey in a year, January 2022 <accessible at  https://m.bianet.org/english/human-rights/256124-at-least-59-ill-prisoners-lost-their-lives-in-turkey-in-a-year>.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] International Federation for Human Rights, Turkey must immediately release Aysel Tugluk and other severely ill prisoners, January 2022 <accessible at https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/turkey/turkey-must-immediately-release-aysel-tugluk-and-other-severely-ill>.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] English Bianet, At least 59 ill prisoners lost their lives in Turkey in a year, January 2022 <accessible at  https://m.bianet.org/english/human-rights/256124-at-least-59-ill-prisoners-lost-their-lives-in-turkey-in-a-year>.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

Nuriye Gülmen: O luptă de șase ani împotriva abuzului sistemic

Nuriye Gulmen

Acum șase ani, pe 15 julie 2016, Turcia a fost tulburată de tentativa de lovitură de stat. O zi după tentativă, guvernul Turciei a declarat stare de urgență și a adoptat decretul executiv de urgență Nr. 667-676 care cenzura, în principal, jurnaliștii și mass-media,[i] dar și mii de funcționari publici, polițiști, personal din armată și profesori de universitate. Numele acestora a fost adnotat în anexa Decretului 179, pe 6 ianuarie 2017.[ii] Acești oameni, peste 150,000 la număr, și-au pierdut locul de muncă, accesul la servicii publice și li s-a îngrădit libertatea de mișcare pe motivul suspiciunii din partea guvernului că ar fi avut legătură cu cel care ar fi instigat lovitura de stat, Fetullah Gulen. Fetullah este un intelectual cleric turc care trăiește în exil în America din propria decizie, din 1999. El a negat că ar fi avut vreo legătură cu tentativa de lovitură de stat.[iii]

Una dintre persoanele afectate este Nuriye Gülmen, fostă profesoară de literatură la universitatea Selçuk din Turcia și, înainte de tentativă, în 2015, asistentă de cercetare la universitatea Eskişehir Osmangazi. [iv] Gülmen are vastă experiență în activism, cu un bagaj de confruntări legale împotriva abuzului instituțiilor turcești după ce a fost reținută 109 de zile din cauza poziției politice. [v] Ziua în care a fost eliberată și ar fi trebuit să se întoarcă la muncă, la universitatea Eskişehir, a coincis cu ziua tentativei loviturii de stat, lucru care a rezultat în întreruperea ei la universitate a doua zi.[v] Acesta a fost rezultatul noului decret, prin care a fost acuzată, împreuna cu alte mii de oameni, că ar fi fost membră FETO, o așa-zisă organizație care îl simpatizează pe Gulen, desemnată ca fiind organizație teroristă de către guvernul Erdogan. Așa a început a doua fază a istoriei ei de activism, începând să protesteze împotriva suspensiei și refuzurilor, cerându-și slujba înapoi în fiecare zi în fața Monumentului Drepturilor Omului din Ankara, unde se află Consiliul pentru Educație Superioară.[vi] Gülmen este determinată sa urmeze “tradiția revoluționară” a activismului de a obține ce vrei prin atenție politică, de data aceasta cerând să se oprească starea de urgență, să permită lucrătorilor revoluționari democratici să se întoarcă la locul de muncă, să asigure cei 13,000 de asistenți în cercetare și să ofere siguranța locului de muncă pentru toți cei care lucrează în educație și cercetare.[vii] Gülmen a început protestele pe cont propriu și a fost arestată de 26 de ori în total, lucru care poate fi atribuit atenției din surse internaționale, dar și spectatorilor domestici care îi citeau povestea pe blog. In a 50-a zi de protest, a fost numită de CNN ca fiind una dintre cele mai remarcabile femei din 2016. [viii]

Atenția din partea publicului s-a mărit și mai mult în ianuarie 2017, când a fost respinsă, nu doar suspendată, de Eskişehir, rezultând în decizia de a face greva foamei în martie, 2017. Ea a explicat că strategia din spatele grevei consta în faptul că protestele verbale sunt norma activismului și nu stimulează atenția autorităților, dar greva foamei este o acțiune suficient de radicală ca autoritățile să se simtă mai tare presiunea unei schimbări. [x]

Cu toate acestea, reacția autorităților a fost să le acuze pe Gülmen și Özakça, o altă profesoară care se alăturase protestelor, că ar fi fost implicate în activități ilegale ale Partidului Revoluționar al Liberarii (DHKP-C) și să le dețină la închisoarea Sincan din Ankara pe parcursul lunii mai din 2017.[xi] Justiția le-a găsit vinovate sub explicația că “dacă nu ar fi fost reținute, ar fi deteriorat cursul justiției”. Totuși, aceasta declarație devine contradictorie lângă faptul ca nu a existat nicio probă pentru condamnarea lor, iar avocatul celor doua a publicat cazierul lor ca dovadă a faptului că nu există nicio legătur între cele doua profesoare și Partidul Revoluționar.[xii]

A fost temut ca cele doua profesoare să fie supuse la mai multe violări ale drepturilor umane, deoarece gardienii de închisoare și doctorii au puterea legală de a întrerupe greva foamei fără acordul lor. De asemenea, ei pot interveni și daca persoanele sunt inconștiente, sub Articolul 82 a Legii de Execuție a Judecății No. 5275, care ar viola libertatea de exprimare și ar rezulta într-un tratament inuman și degradant.[xiii] În timpul unei vizite ale președintelui Ankara Bar Association, Gülmen a descris situația în care se afla împreuna cu colega ei ca “justiția dispare la fel ca mușchii [ei]”, fiind incapabilă să își miște gâtul, brațele sau să țină un stilou fără ajutor. Ca răspuns la situația celor doua femei, președintele asociației a cerut guvernului să opreasca greva prin reconciliere și negociere cu cei impactați de decretele de urgență. [xiv]  La mijlocul anului 2017, cele două activiste au înaintat un proces cu Curtea Constituțională și Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului să finalizeze detenția pe motivul faptului că greva le supune la riscuri majore de sănătate. Cu toate acestea, Curtea le-a respins aplicația cu explicația ca riscurile nu le puneau în pericol viața și cele două beneficiază de măsurile medicale corespunzătoare în caz de nevoie. [xv]

Starea de sănătate a lui Gülmen s-a înrăutățit în septembrie 2017 și a fost mutată la o celulă spitalul Numune. Curtea a condamnat-o la 6 ani și 3 luni de închisoare, dar a fost eliberată din detenție la începutul lui decembrie 2017 sub control judiciar. În ciuda eliberării, Gülmen și Özakça și-au continuat protestele în fața Monumentului Drepturilor Omului. Eventual, au fost nevoite să înceteze greva in ianuarie 2018, după ce li s-a respins cererea să le fie evaluat cazul. În schimb, s-au concentrat eforturile pe acțiunile sistemului judiciar, evidențiind că lupta lor nu se oprește aici. După 324 zile de grevă, Gülmen a ajuns de la 59 de kg la 33,8- lucru care arată nivelul de seriozitate cu care a luptat pentru drepturile ei.

 

Următoarea dată când Gülmen a preluat atenția publica a fost când a fost arestată din nou, pe 11 August 2020, în timpul unei razii de poliție. Motivul arestării rămâne necunoscut [xix]. Mai târziu în același an, Gülmen și alți colegi au fost expulzați din Uniunea Angajaților pentru Educație și Știință din cauza reputației lor ca revoluționari.[xx] In 2021, Gülmen și Özakça au înaintat un alt proces cu Curtea Constituțională prin care argumentau că autoritățile judiciare nu au fost imparțiale și nici independente în timpul procesului din 2017, violeazând drepturile la libertate și securitate. Curtea le-a respins cazul pe motiv ca cele două nu aveau suficiente probe să le susțină acuzarea. [xxii]

 

Ce este cel mai evident din toată povestea de activism a lui Nuriye Gülmen este că, din 2016, guvernul Turciei a vizat sute de miii de indivizi îmntr-un mod injust, bazat pe argumente și retorici nefondate. Mai mult, a demonstrat că cei care își apără drepturile în fața activităților opresive ale guvernului sunt mai departe intimidați prin sistemul legal. Organizația BrokenChalk condamnă guvernul Turcesc și face apel la autoritățile în faptă să își reconsidere serios acțiunile care au lăsat mii de oameni fără securitatea locului de muncă sau opțiunea de a părăsi țara să își găsească de lucru. Brokenchalk insistă în special la reluare actviității de muncă ale lui Nuriye Gülmen și Semih Özakça în sfera educației.

Written by Karl Baldacchino

Edited by Erika Grimes

Translated by Bianca Balea from:

 

Surse:

[i] Grabenwarter, C. et al. (2017) ‘Draft Opinion on the Measures Provided in the Recent Emergency Decree Laws with Respect to Freedom of the Media’. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Available online from: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2017)006-e [Accessed on 08/03/2022], pp. 3-4.

[ii] Decree-Law No. 679 (6th January 2017) ‘Measures Regarding Public Personnel’. Available online from: https://insanhaklarimerkezi.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2017/02/09/KHK_679_ENG.pdf [Accessed 08/03/2022], p. 1.

[iii] Jones, T. (2018) ‘Two Turkish Teachers End Almost 11-Month Hunger Strike’.  DW. Available online from: https://www.dw.com/en/two-turkish-teachers-end-almost-11-month-hunger-strike/a-42318478 [Accessed 08/03/2022]; Işık, A. (2017) ‘In Turkey, Hope for ‘Justice is Fading Away Just like my Muscles’’. DW. Available online from: https://www.dw.com/en/in-turkey-hope-for-justice-is-fading-away-just-like-my-muscles/a-39482207 [Accessed 08/03/2022].

[iv] Halavut, H. (2017) ‘Interview with Nuriye Gülmen: ‘I Have More Hope Today Than I Did on the First Day’’.  5 Harliler. Available online from: https://www.5harfliler.com/interview-with-nuriye-gulmen/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.; see also Gülmen, N. (2016) ‘DİRENİŞİN TALEPLERi’. Available online from: https://nuriyegulmendireniyor.wordpress.com/2016/11/08/basin-aciklamasina-cagri/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also Wikipedia (2022) ‘Nuriye Gülmen’. Available online from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuriye_G%C3%BClmen#cite_note-18 [Accessed 08/03/2022].

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.; see also Amnesty International (2017) ‘Urgent Action: Fear for Hunger Strikers’ Wellbeing’. Available online from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/EUR4463402017ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[x] Ibid.

[xi] ‘Urgent Action: Fear for Strikers’ Wellbeing’.

[xii] Cumhuriyet (2017) ‘Criminal Record of Gülmen and Özakça, Declared ‘Terrorists’ by Minister Soylu’. Available online from: https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/bakan-soylunun-terorist-ilan-ettigi-gulmen-ve-ozakcanin-adli-sicil-kaydi-748105 [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also NTV (2017) ‘Statements by Minister Soylu about Semih Özakça and Nuriye Gülmen’. Available online from: https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bakan-soyludan-aclik-grevi-yapan-nuriye-gulmenle-ilgili-aciklamalar,Jg2i0I634EyPWqK_cXdIbg [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also Milliyet (2017) ‘The Unending Scenario of a Terrorist Organisation: “The Truth of Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça”’. Available online from: https://web.archive.org/web/20170813220846/http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bir-teror-orgutunun-bitmeyen-senaryosu-ankara-yerelhaber-2179760/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xiii] ‘Urgent Action: Fear for Strikers’ Wellbeing’; see also ‘In Turkey, Hope for ‘Justice is Fading Away Just like My Muscles’.

[xiv] ‘In Turkey, Hope for ‘Justice is Fading Away Just like My Muscles’.

[xv] Armutcu, O. (2017) ‘The Constitutional Court Rejected the Appeal Against the Detention of Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça’ Hurriyet. Available online from: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/anayasa-mahkemesi-nuriye-gulmen-ve-semih-ozakcanin-tutukluluguna-yapilan-itirazi-reddetti-40503721 [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also Cakir, A. (2017) ‘ECHR Rejects Semih Özakça and Nuriye Gülmen’s Application’. Voice of America. Available online from: https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/aihm-semih-ozakca-ve-nuriye-gulmen-in-basvurusunu-reddetti/3969669.html [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xvi] Bianet (2017) ‘Nuriye Gülmen Released’. Available online from: https://bianet.org/english/human-rights/192100-nuriye-gulmen-released [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xvii] ‘Two Turkish Teachers End Almost 11-Month Hunger Strike’.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Duvar English (2020) ‘Dismissed Turkish Academic, Known for Hunger Strike, Arrested Again’. Available online from: https://www.duvarenglish.com/human-rights/2020/08/11/dismissed-turkish-academic-known-for-hunger-strike-arrested-again [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xx] Yeni Bir Mecra (2020) ‘Critical Decisions in Eğitim-Sen: Nuriye Gülmen was Expelled’. Available online from: https://yeni1mecra.com/egitim-sende-kritik-kararlar-nuriye-gulmen-ihrac-edildi/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xi] Duvar English (2021) ‘Turkey’s Top Court Rules Dismissed Educators’ Rights Not Violated’. Available online from: https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkeys-top-court-rules-rights-of-dismissed-educators-nuriye-gulmen-and-semih-ozakca-not-violated-news-59436 [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xii] Ibid.

انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان في السجون التركية

تنتهك الحكومة التركية القانون المحلي والدولي الراسخ باحتجاز السجناء المصابين بأمراض خطيرة بشكل تعسفي. يعاني السجناء في تركيا من العنف الجنسي والجسدي مثل التفتيش العاري والتحرش والضرب الوحشي. بالإضافة إلى العديد من انتهاكات في حقوقهم مثل المقاصف الباهظة الثمن ومداهمات منتصف الليل في الأجنحة والقيود على الكتب والحرمان من الأدوية والعقوبات التعسفية.[1] يلقي هذا المقال الضوء على بعض قضايا انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان التي تشهدها السجون التركية اليوم.

عقب محاولة الانقلاب في عام ٢٠١٦، ارتفعت أعداد المعتقلين بشكل كبير لدرجة أن اكتظاظ السجون أصبح مشكلة سائدة. ومع ذلك، فإن الاكتظاظ ليس هو الأمر الوحيد الذي يثير قلق السجون في جميع أنحاء تركيا، ولكن سوء المعاملة وانتهاكات حقوق الإنسان التي يتعرض لها عشرات الآلاف من السجناء هي مشكلة خطيرة يجب معالجتها على الفور.
كان الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان يستهدف أتباع لحظة غولن، وهي جماعة دينية مستوحاة من رجل الدين التركي فتح الله غولن، منذ سلسلة من تحقيقات الفساد في ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، تورط أردوغان وأقاربه ودائرته الداخلية. [2] ومن بين المستهدفين العديد من السياسيين المعارضين والصحفيين والمحامين والمدافعين عن حقوق الإنسان. توفي يوسف بكمزجي (٨٢عامًا) ، وهو سجين شديد المرض كان محتجزًا في سجن كيركلار إف في إزمير ، بعد ٤٧يومًا في العناية المركزة. [3] اعتقل في يناير ٢٠٢٠ في إطار التحقيقات مع حركة فتح الله غولن. تم حبس بيكميجي في سجن إزمير كيركلار إف، وحُكم عليه بالسجن لمدة ١٧عامًا و ٤ أشهر في ٩ أبريل ٢٠٢١بتهمة كونه “مدير منظمة”. [4] قالت سعدت أيتكين ،حفيدته ومحاميته، إن قضية “جدها كانت في المحكمة العليا. لم يتم التصديق على عقوبته. ومع ذلك ، قضت المحكمة بأنه “يجب أن يستمر في قضاء عقوبته في المستشفى” كما لو تم التصديق على إدانته. ان يعاني من المرض طوال فترة احتجازه التي استمرت عامين ، لكنهم رفضوا إطلاق سراح رجل مثبت بأنابيب في العناية المركزة لأنه كان “خطرًا على الهروب”. [5] في الواقع، أصدر المجلس التركي للطب الشرعي (ATK) تقريرًا طبيًا تقرير يفيد بأن بيكمزجي لم يكن لائقًا للبقاء في السجن ، لكن المحكمة رفضت التقرير بقولها إنه معرض “لخطر الهروب”. [6] صرحت ابنته ، شيما بيكمزجي ، بعدم قدرة والدها على فهم إجراءات المحكمة في ضوء إصابته بمرض ألزهايمر المتقدم ، مما جعل من المستحيل عليه الدفاع عن نفسه. وأشارت إلى أن الافتقار إلى الرعاية الصحية العقلية المناسبة في السجن كان أحد العوامل التي أدت إلى تدهور حالته: “إنه ينسى نفسه تمامًا في المحكمة وهو في وضع ضعيف”. [7]

أعلنت جمعية حقوق الإنسان (İHD) أنه اعتبارًا من يونيو ٢٠٢٠، بلغ عدد السجناء المرضى المحبوسين خلف القضبان في تركيا ١٦٠٥ سجينًا ، منهم حوالي ٦٠٠ في حالة حرجة. وسمحت الحكومة باحتجازهم رغم أن لدى معظمهم تقارير الطب الشرعي والطبية التي تعتبرهم غير لائقين للبقاء في السجن. رفضت السلطات إطلاق سراحهم على أساس أنهم يشكلون خطراً محتملاً على المجتمع. عدم الإفراج عن السجناء المصابين بأمراض خطيرة في الوقت المناسب لتلقي العلاج الطبي المناسب أدى إلى وفاة خمسة أشخاص خلال الأشهر الثمانية الأولى من عام ٢٠٢٠. بعد تفشي الوباء، أطلقت الحكومة سراح السجناء المتهمين بالقتل ولكنها قررت الاحتفاظ بالسجناء السياسيين على الرغم من مخاطر الوباء. مات موغلا بعد إصابته بمرض كوفيد-١٩.
خلال شهري نوفمبر وديسمبر ٢٠٢١، فقد العديد من السجناء حياتهم أثناء احتجازهم في سجون من النوع T و Type F. تم العثور على السجينين غاريب جيزر وإلياس دمير ميتين في الزنازين المبطنة التي تم عزلهما فيها. [9] توفي بعض السجناء، مثل بانجين محمد البالغ من العمر ٣٣ عامًا وعبد الرزاق شيور البالغ من العمر ٦٥عامًا بسبب عدم الإفراج عنهم على الرغم من مرضهم الشديد وفي الحالة الأخيرة، مرض السرطان المتقدم. تم العثور على آخرين ميتين بشكل مثير للريبة في زنازينهم، وأبلغت الإدارة عائلاتهم بأنهم انتحروا. [11]
في العشرين من يناير ٢٠٢٢ وقعت ٤٣ نقابة محامين ومحامين ومنظمات حقوق الإنسان على الصعيدين الوطني والدولي رسالة عاجلة للمكلفين بولايات خاصة للأمم المتحدة للفت الانتباه إلى الخطر الوشيك على صحة وحياة السجين المريض أيسل توغلوك ،محتجز في سجن كوكالي كانديرا من النوع إف منذ ديسمبر ٢٠١٦. [12] تم تشخيص إصابة توغلوك بالخرف ولا يزال مسجونًا على الرغم من دعوات التقارير الطبية التي توضح حالته الغير المستقرة وتدهور حالته الصحية والتي تفاقمت بسبب جائحة كوفيد -١٩. قدمت الرسالة معلومات إضافية حول القضايا المنهجية المتعلقة بمعاملة السجناء في تركيا، وتطالب الإجراءات الخاصة الحكومة التركية بالإفراج الفوري عن أيسل توغلوك وجميع السجناء المصابين بأمراض خطيرة بما يتماشى مع المعايير المحلية والدولية على حد سواء فيما يتعلق بمعاملة السجناء. [13] على الرغم من هذا في بداية فبراير ٢٠٢٢، أصيب المسجون تورغاي دنيز (٣٩ عامًا) بفشل رئوي وفقد حياته أثناء الاحتجاز التعسفي. على الرغم من أن التقارير الطبية شددت على أهمية تلقي الرعاية طوال فترة مكوثه في المستشفى، إلا أنه ظل محتجزًا. [14] قصته هي واحدة من ثماني قصص لأشخاص ماتوا في السجون التركية في الأشهر الثلاثة الماضية. [15] أُدين نصرت موغلا البالغ من العمر ٨٤ عامًا وسجن بسبب تعاطفه مع حركة غولن. لم يراع اعتقاله سنه وأمراض القلب والكلى وسرطان البروستاتا، ونتيجة لإهمال المساعدة توفي محبوسًا.

وأشار البيان الصحفي الذي عقد في فرع اسطنبول إلى أن الانتهاكات الجسيمة للحقوق في السجون أصبحت منهجية تدريجياً ووصلت إلى طريق مسدود في مجال الرعاية الصحية والحق في التواصل والتعذيب وسوء المعاملة. [16] أصبح الوصول إلى العدالة ميؤوسًا منه بالنسبة للعديد من السجناء في تركيا. وأثارت المنظمات الحقوقية مخاوف من أن “يُنظر الآن على أنه حادث عادي في البلاد يتم فيه إخراج جثة شخص من السجن في أي وقت”. [17]
بالإشارة إلى بيانات معهد حقوق الإنسان، اعتبارًا من مارس ٢٠٢١، كان هناك ما لا يقل عن ١٦٠٥سجينًا مريضًا ، ٦٠٤ منهم كانوا في ظروف محفوفة بالمخاطر وقت نشر البيان. [18] تعرف منظمات حقوق الإنسان أن ٣٨ سجينًا على الأقل يجب الإفراج عنهم بشكل عاجل لأن أوضاعهم تتدهور أكثر. ومع ذلك، لم ترد السلطات حتى الآن على مكالمات من نشطاء حقوق الإنسان أو من العائلات.
نيابة عن Broken Chalk، أوجه دعوة عاجلة إلى جميع المجتمعات والمنظمات الدولية لاتخاذ إجراءات ضد الظلم والمعاملة اللاإنسانية بحق السجناء السياسيين التي يرتكبها أردوغان ونظام ، ومساعدتهم في إطلاق سراحهم من الظروف المهينة التي تم احتجازهم فيه.
بقلم أولغا رويز بيلاتو
ترجمة رويفة الريامية من

المصادر

[1] Duvar English, MHP submits social media proposal, seeks penalties for fake accounts, February 2022 <accessible at https://www.duvarenglish.com/mhp-submits-social-media-proposal-seeks-penalties-for-fake-accounts-news-60333>.

[2] Turkish Minute, Turkish court rejects ailing philanthropist’s appeal for release from prison, January 2022 <accessible at  https://www.turkishminute.com/2022/01/12/kish-court-rejects-ailing-philanthropists-appeal-for-release-from-prison/>.

[3] MedyaNews, Turkey: Severely ill octogenarian prisoner dies, January 2022 <accessible at https://medyanews.net/turkey-severely-ill-octogenarian-prisoner-dies/>.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Turkish Minute, Turkish court rejects ailing philanthropist’s appeal for release from prison, January 2022 <accessible at  https://www.turkishminute.com/2022/01/12/kish-court-rejects-ailing-philanthropists-appeal-for-release-from-prison/>.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Politurco, Gulenm sympathisers are dying in prisons under the ruling of the Erdogan regime, February 2022 <accessible at  https://politurco.com/gulen-sympathizers-are-dying-in-prisons-under-the-ruling-of-the-erdogan-regime-84-year-old-nusret-mugla-was-one-of-the-many-and-died-most-recently.html>.

[9] English Bianet, At least 59 ill prisoners lost their lives in Turkey in a year, January 2022 <accessible at  https://m.bianet.org/english/human-rights/256124-at-least-59-ill-prisoners-lost-their-lives-in-turkey-in-a-year>.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] International Federation for Human Rights, Turkey must immediately release Aysel Tugluk and other severely ill prisoners, January 2022 <accessible at https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/turkey/turkey-must-immediately-release-aysel-tugluk-and-other-severely-ill>.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] English Bianet, At least 59 ill prisoners lost their lives in Turkey in a year, January 2022 <accessible at  https://m.bianet.org/english/human-rights/256124-at-least-59-ill-prisoners-lost-their-lives-in-turkey-in-a-year>.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

Russlands Invasion in der Ukraine: Wer zahlt den Preis für diesen Krieg?

Mahmud Darwish sagte einmal über den Krieg:

„Der Krieg wird enden. Die Führer werden sich die Hände schütteln. Die alte Frau wird weiter auf ihren getöteten Sohn warten. Das Mädchen wird auf ihren geliebten Ehemann warten. Und diese Kinder werden auf ihren heldenhaften Vater warten. Ich weiß nicht, wer unser Heimatland verkauft hat, aber ich habe gesehen, wer den Preis dafür bezahlt hat.“ 

Im Laufe der Jahre sind viele Länder durch Krieg und Diktatur zerstört worden. Viele dieser Länder waren hinreichend zivilisiert, bevor der Krieg sie ruiniert hat; voller Kultur, Entwicklung und Zivilisation, wie Syrien, Palästina, Libyen, Afghanistan, der Irak, Somalia, Jemen und viele mehr. 

Die Gier und der Egoismus von Diktatoren und korrupten Politikern haben diesen Ländern nichts als Schaden zugefügt. Viele unschuldige Menschen haben ihr Leben verloren und viele leiden unter Armut als Folge der schlechten Regierungsführung durch tyrannische Regime. Die nationalen Infrastrukturen sind aufgrund von Kriegen zusammengebrochen, und auch die Umwelt wurde stark in Mitleidenschaft gezogen.

 

The Costs of War Project, Watson  Institut für internationale und öffentliche Angelegenheiten, Brown Universität, 2021

 

Die Ukraine hat sich nun der Reihe der Länder angeschlossen, die aufgrund der Gier der Diktatoren durch Krieg zerstört wurden. Vladimir Putin ist nicht nur in einen benachbarten souveränen Staat eingedrungen, sein Regime übt auch auf russischem Territorium eine vollständige Zensur aus. Unabhängige russische Medien und Journalisten, die sich gegen Putins Regime und darüber aussprechen, wie die Russen unter seiner Führung leiden, werden schikaniert, eingeschüchtert und rechtswidrig festgenommen. Die gleiche Behandlung widerfährt Demonstranten, die sich gegen Putin und die von seinem Regime in der Ukraine begangenen Verbrechen stellen. Ein Beispiel ist der Fakt, dass junge Russen dazu gezwungen werden, sich den Streitkräften anzuschließen, ohne darüber informiert zu sein, dass sie sich somit an der Invasion in die Ukraine beteiligen. All dies beschreibt treffend, wie ein „totalitärer Staat“ aussieht.

Wie hat sich der Krieg auf das Bildungswesen ausgewirkt?

Die Auswirkungen des Krieges sind im Bildungssektor deutlich sichtbar, da der Zugang zu Bildung aufgrund des Mangels an Bildungsmaterial eingeschränkt ist. Eine große Rolle spielen dabei Armut sowie die Propaganda, die von Diktatoren verbreitet wird, um eine Invasion oder die Verbrechen an ihren eigenen Bürgern zu rechtfertigen.

Viele Bildungseinrichtungen wie Schulen und Kindergärten wurden aufgrund des andauernden Krieges in der Ukraine zerstört und beschädigt, was die Zukunft der Kinder im Lande gefährdet und ihnen den Zugang zu Bildung verwehrt.  

UNICEF hat kürzlich einen Bericht über die Auswirkungen der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine veröffentlicht. Dem Bericht zufolge hat die Invasion dazu geführt, dass mehr als 350.000 Schulkinder keinen Zugang zu Bildung haben, da die schulische Infrastruktur beschädigt oder zerstört wurde. Zudem schränken mangelhafte Unterrichtsmethoden den Zugang zu Bildung ein, so dass es den Kindern an sicherer Unterkunft, Wasser und Bildung fehlt. 

Die Auswirkungen des Krieges auf ukrainische Flüchtlinge und internationale Studierende in der Ukraine:

Viele Ukrainer haben seit Beginn des Krieges in verschiedenen Ländern Zuflucht gesucht. Die Sorge um die Flüchtlingskinder und die Frage, wie sie in die Schulsysteme anderer Länder integriert werden können, ist groß, vor allem aufgrund von Sprachbarrieren. Die Schulen in Polen haben ukrainische Flüchtlingskinder aufgenommen, und polnische Lehrer haben diesen Schülern geholfen, die Sprachbarriere zu überwinden und sich an das polnische Bildungssystem anzupassen. Jedoch stehen die ukrainischen Flüchtlingskinder im Vereinigten Königreich vor einer großen Herausforderung, da die meisten Schulen im Vereinigten Königreich ihre Aufnahmekapazitäten überschreiten, wenn sie neue Schüler aufnehmen. Hinzu kommt, dass die unzureichende Finanzierung des Bildungssektors die Schulen unter großen Druck setzt, was dazu führt, dass Flüchtlingsschüler abgewiesen werden.

Auch internationale Studenten, die an ukrainischen Universitäten studierten und von denen viele aus Afrika, Südasien und dem Nahen Osten stammen, sind Opfer des anhaltenden Krieges. Viele von ihnen konnten ihr Studium nicht abschließen und waren gezwungen, in andere Länder zu fliehen, immer in der Hoffnung, dass sie bald in die Ukraine zurückkehren und ihr Studium beenden können.  Viele dieser ausländischen Studenten hatten große Mühe, Zuflucht zu finden oder zu fliehen. Am drastischsten ist, dass mindestens zwei Gaststudenten in den ersten Tagen des Krieges getötet wurden.   

 

Die Auswirkungen des Krieges auf die postsowjetischen Staaten und auf Russland:

Seit dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine haben die Bürger der postsowjetischen Staaten große Angst, dass Putins Kontrolle auch ihre Länder erreicht, insbesondere nachdem der aserbaidschanische Präsident Ilham Alijew ein Bündnisabkommen zwischen Russland und Aserbaidschan unterzeichnete. Das 43-Punkte-Abkommen beinhaltet eine Bildungs- und Wirtschaftsallianz, die die Kontrolle des Putin-Regimes in Aserbaidschan verstärken wird.     So wird beispielsweise die russische Sprache in den Bildungseinrichtungen obligatorisch werden, und zwar in stärkerem Maße, als dies bisher in den postsowjetischen Staaten der Fall war. 

In letzter Zeit hat das russische Bildungsministerium damit begonnen, im Online-Unterricht Propaganda zu verbreiten, um Kinder mit Ideologien zu beeinflussen, die Putins Führung verherrlichen und Russlands Einmarsch in die Ukraine rechtfertigen. In diesen Online-Lektionen wird versucht zu erklären, “warum die Befreiungsmission der Ukraine notwendig war”.  Es besteht ein hohes Risiko, dass dieser Unterricht dazu beiträgt, eine Generation heranzubilden, die zum Krieg aufruft und die Diktatur in Russland unterstützt, was eine Gefahr für die Zukunft der russischen Gesellschaft darstellt.

Gewiss wird der Tag kommen, an dem der Krieg zu Ende sein wird und die Vertriebenen in ihre Heimatländer zurückkehren werden, wo sie ihre Angehörigen zurückgelassen haben, um in anderen Ländern Zuflucht zu suchen. Die Staats- und Regierungschefs werden sich die Hände reichen, um Frieden in der Welt zu schaffen. Doch zu welchem Preis wird das geschehen, wenn schon so viel Schaden angerichtet wurde? Wie Mahmoud Darwish sagt: “Ich weiß nicht, wer unsere Heimat verkauft hat, aber ich habe gesehen, wer den Preis dafür bezahlt hat”.

 

Von Zinat Asadova

Übersetzt von/ translated by Vivien Kretz 

 

Sources;

  1. “The war will end” Poem by Mahmud Darwish
  2. Save the Children. (2022). Ukraine: Attacks on schools endangering children’s lives and futures. Retrieved from https://www.savethechildren.net/news/ukraine-attacks-schools-endangering-children-s-lives-and-futures
  3. UNICEF Europe & Central Asia Region (ECAR). (2022). Ukraine Situation Report – 24 February 2022 (p. 2). Retrieved from https://www.unicef.org/media/116031/file/Ukraine-Humanitarian-SitRep-24-February-2022.pdf
  4. Deutsche Welle (DW). (2022). Poland fights to give Ukrainian kids access to education [Video]. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/poland-fights-to-give-ukrainian-kids-access-to-education/av-61185207#:~:text=About%202%20million%20Ukrainians%20have,Poland’s%20education%20system%20is%20enormous.
  5. Abrams, F. (2022). Ukraine refugees may struggle to find places in English schools, councils say. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/education/2022/mar/05/ukraine-refugees-may-struggle-to-find-places-in-english-schools-councils-say
  6. Fallon, K. (2022). Foreign students fleeing Russia’s war on Ukraine hope to return. Aljazeera.com. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/5/they-told-us-to-go-home-student-recounts-ukraine-war
  7. International education’s continuing response to the war in Ukraine. ICEF Monitor – Market intelligence for international student recruitment. (2022). Retrieved from https://monitor.icef.com/2022/03/international-educations-continuing-response-to-the-war-in-ukraine/
  8. Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi. (2022). No:056/22, Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin Mətbuat xidməti idarəsinin məlumatı (AZ/RU). Retrieved from https://www.mfa.gov.az/az/news/no05622
  9. President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. (2022). Declaration on allied interaction between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. Retrieved from https://president.az/en/articles/view/55498
  10. Aliyeva, J. (2022). Azerbaijani president notes importance of Russian language. Report News Agency. Retrieved from https://report.az/en/foreign-politics/azerbaijani-president-notes-importance-of-russian-language/
  11. Russia’s Ministry of Education Official Page on Vkontakte. (2022). An Open lesson “Defenders of Peace” (Открытый урок «Защитники мира») [Video]. https://vk.com/video-30558759_456242419?list=8411aa6de207bc39a2

Ilham Tohti: Ein Aktivist, der der Ungerechtigkeit ins Gesicht lacht

Ilham Tohti*, ein ehemaliger uigurischer Wirtschaftsprofessor an der Pekinger Minzu-Universität, der kürzlich von der Zeitung The Guardian als „Chinas Mandela“ bezeichnet wurde, wurde am 14. Januar 2014 wegen Anstiftung zu Separatismus, ethnischem Hass und Unterstützung terroristischer Aktivitäten verhaftet. Dies kritisierte die chinesische Regierungspolitik offen. Das zweitägige Gerichtsverfahren fand am 17. und 18. September 2014 statt und führte zu seiner Verurteilung zu lebenslanger Haft führte. Seine Verurteilung war ein großer Schock für viele Beobachter, Freunde und Organisationen im In- und Ausland, die Ilham aufgrund seines herausragenden, einschüchternden und vor allem aktiven Einsatzes für die Autonomie und die sprachlichen, kulturellen und religiösen Rechte der ethnischen Minderheit der Uiguren unterstützt hatten. Die Uiguren sind eine turksprachige und in der Regel muslimische Gruppe, die hauptsächlich in der Autonomen Region Xinjiang-Uigurien (nachfolgend XUAR) lebt. Ilham wurde als „das Gewissen des uigurischen Volkes“ beschrieben.

Hintergrund

Ilhams Aktivismus begann 1994, als er damit anfing, über die von Uiguren in der XUAR erlittenen Rechtsverletzungen zu schreiben. Im Jahr 2006 verlagerte er seine Aufmerksamkeit ins Internet, als er zusammen mit anderen Wissenschaftlern die Website Uyghur Online unter uighurbiz.org gründete. Bei der Website handelte es sich um eine chinesischsprachige Plattform, die die anhaltende Spaltung zwischen der uigurischen Minderheit und den Han-Chinesen überbrücken sollte.  Die Plattform diente im Wesentlichen als ein Ort, an dem Ilham der Stimme der Uiguren im In- und Ausland Gehör verschaffen konnte. Sie befasste sich mit der Notlage der Uiguren, die sich von der allgemeinen Gesellschaft vernachlässigt und von der chinesischen Regierung in Bezug auf die sozioökonomische Entwicklung vergessen fühlten. Ilham lud die Han auf eine offene, friedliche und rationale Plattform ein, um ihre unterschiedlichen Ansichten zu diskutieren und zu erörtern, denn, wie er betonte, seien die Han nicht die Feinde der Uiguren, trotz ihrer diskriminierenden und oft gewalttätigen Haltung ihnen gegenüber. 

Auf seiner Website sprach sich Ilham für eine friedlichen und integrative Herangehensweise aus und rief nicht ein einziges Mal zur Gewalt auf oder ermutigte dazu. Er hütete sich davor, mit staatlichen Gesetzen oder grundlegenden Vereinbarungen, die in der Zivilgesellschaft existieren, in Konflikt zu geraten. Die Website zog jedoch allmählich den Zorn der chinesischen Regierung auf sich, die die Website im Juni 2008 vor den Olympischen Spielen in China zum ersten Mal stillegte. Die Regierung begründete diese Aktion damit, dass die Website Verbindungen zu so genannten uigurischen Extremisten im Ausland propagiere. Bei den großen ethnischen Unruhen in Ürümqi, der Hauptstadt der XUAR, und den Terroranschlägen am 5. Juli 2009, die durch eine aggressivere Auslegung des Islams inspiriert waren, wurden etwa 200 Menschen getötet, 18.000 festgenommen und 34 bis 37 Personen verschwanden. Daraufhin sprach Ilham offen über den Vorfall und veröffentlichte die Namen und Gesichter der Verschwundenen, was schließlich zu seinem Hausarrest und später am 14. Juli zu einer etwa fünfwöchigen Isolationshaft führte, bis er auf internationalen Druck hin freigelassen wurde. Ein weiterer entscheidender Moment fand statt, als Ilham und seine Tochter Jewher am Flughafen waren, um ein Flug mit Ziel in die USA zu besteigen, da Ilham eine Stelle als Gastwissenschaftler an der Indiana University antreten sollte. Er wurde von den Behörden angehalten, geschlagen und festgehalten und musste mit ansehen, wie Jewher allein einen Platz in dem Flieger in die USA bekam.  

Dieser Vorfall markierte den Gipfelpunkt von Ilhams Geschichte. Im Oktober 2013 verunglückte eine uigurische Familie mit ihrem Jeep auf der Jingshui-Brücke des Tiananmen Platzes, die in Brand gesetzt worden war. Die chinesische Regierung bezeichnete dies als Terroranschlag, was dazu führte, dass Ilham in den ausländischen Medien Großbritanniens, Frankreichs und der USA immer bekannter wurde. Am 2. November wurde Ilhams Auto von „politischen Aktivisten“ gerammt, als er auf dem Weg zum Flughafen war, um seine Mutter abzuholen. Die Behörden setzten Gewalt und Einschüchterung ein und drohten seiner Familie mit dem Tod, falls er nicht aufhöre, mit ausländischen Medien zu konversieren. Unter dem Druck, der auf Ilham ausgeübt wurde, damit er sich nicht mehr zu Wort meldete, begann er, gegenüber seinen Freunden seine Sorgen um seine Sicherheit zu äußern. In einer telefonischen Erklärung gegenüber Mihray Abdilim, einem Reporter des Uigurischen Dienstes von Radio Free Asia, erklärte er, dass die Überwachung durch Agenten der Staatssicherheit zugenommen habe und er das Gefühl habe, dass seine Stimme bald zum Schweigen gebracht würde. Aus dieser Sorge heraus bat er darum, dass seine letzten Worte aufgezeichnet und erst nach seiner Verhaftung veröffentlicht werden sollten. 

Verhaftung, Verstöße und ein Schauprozess

Im Januar 2014 stürmten rund 20 Polizeibeamte Ilhams Wohnung in Peking und schlugen ihn vor den Augen seiner beiden Kinder im Kleindkind Alter. Sie nahmen ihn in Gewahrsam und legten seine Website dauerhaft still. Am folgenden Tag erklärte Hong Lei, ein Sprecher des chinesischen Außenministeriums, dass er „auf kriminelle Weise festgenommen“ worden sei. Die Anklagepunkte für seine Verhaftung wurden im Februar bekanntgegeben, als das Büro für öffentliche Sicherheit seine formelle Verhaftung wegen „Separatismus“ (ein vager Begriff, auf den die Todesstrafe verhängt wird) und wegen der Anwerbung von Anhängern auf seiner Website bekanntgab. 

Seine Verhaftung löste eine Welle der Unterstützung für Ilham aus, da er sich deutlich gegen die Forderung nach Unabhängigkeit der XUAR ausgesprochen hatte und sich für den Verbleib der Region bei China aussprach. Die Website Foreign Policy veröffentlichte ihre Analyse mehrerer zwischengespeicherter Artikel Ilhams, die Teil seines Beweismaterials waren, und fand nirgends eine direkte oder indirekte Äußerung zu Separatismus oder Unabhängigkeit. Ilham wurde fünf Monate lang an einem nicht genannten Ort festgehalten, ihm wurde jeglicher Kontakt zu Familie oder Freunden verwehrt und er durfte seinen Anwalt Li Fangping erst am 26. Juni treffen. Li berichtete, dass Ilham in den ersten 20 Tagen seiner Haft dadurch entkräftet war, weil er gefesselt wurde. Des weiteren wurde ihm in den ersten zehn Tagen im März Halal-Essen verweigert. Diese Handlungen sind als Verstöße gegen das Völkerrecht zu bezeichnen und fallen höchstwahrscheinlich unter den Bereich der grausamen, unmenschlichen und erniedrigenden Behandlung oder Strafe. Viele glauben und befürchten, dass Ilham möglicherweise gefoltert worden ist. 

Ilham sah erst nach acht Monaten, die er damit verbracht hatte, in einem übereilten und unfairen Gerichtsprozess für sich zu kämpfen, seine Familie wieder. Er wurde am 23. September für schuldig befunden und zu lebenslanger Haft verurteilt, bestreitet aber alle gegen ihn erhobenen Vorwürfe.Während des Prozesses behauptete die Staatsanwaltschaft, dass Ilham in seinem Unterricht Terroristen als Helden darstelle, die „uigurische Frage“ internationalisiere und sich auf Zeugenaussagen von Schülern stütze, von denen angenommen wird, dass sie erzwungen wurden. Einige Studenten wurden nach Ilhams Verhaftung zwangsläufig einer Leibesvisitation unterzogen und inhaftiert. Einige von ihnen blieben lange Zeit verschwunden. Dies unterstreicht den Versuch der Staatsanwaltschaft, einen belastenden Fall zu konstruieren, in dem behauptet wird, Ilham sei nicht die friedliche Person, als die er sich ausgibt, sondern eine Gefahr in den Augen der chinesischen Sicherheitsbehörden. Deswegen solle er durch eine Inhaftierung zum Schweigen gebracht werden.

Hinter den Kulissen seines Kampfes

Doch worum geht es im Fall von Ilham Tohti wirklich? Spannungen zwischen Uiguren und Han gibt es seit der Gründung der Volksrepublik China (VRC), die von Zeit zu Zeit in Unruhen ausbrechen und somit eine härtere Politik gegen Uiguren auslösten, insbesondere nachdem Xi Jinping im März 2013 die Regierung übernahm und später im Dezember desselben Jahres den „großen strategischen Plan“ für die XUAR vorstellte. Im Bezug auf diesen Plan äußerte Ilham Tohti das Bedenken, dass der Druck auf die Uiguren zunehmen würde. Die chinesische Regierung bezeichnete dieses Thema als die „uigurische Frage“ oder das „Xinjiang-Problem“  und versuchte dieses durch einen Sinifizierungsprozess zu lösen, der seit vielen Jahrhunderten in der chinesischen Geschichte existiert und eher die Assimilation als die Integration fördert. Später ermutigte China die Han-Chinesen durch Richtlinien, die die Han gegenüber den Uiguren bevorzugte, dazu, in die Region einzuwandern, was zu einem Ungleichgewicht in der sozioökonomischen Entwicklung führte. Ilham wurde Opfer von Chinas Zensurtechnologien und -gesetzen, wo heute selbst ein einziger Beitrag auf der App Sina Weibo (ähnlich wie Twitter) seinen Verfasser ins Gefängnis bringen kann, wenn er die chinesische Regierung zu kritisieren scheint. Ilhams Inhaftierung beweist, dass die chinesische Regierung die Brücke zwischen den Uiguren und den Han nicht anerkennt. Als Reaktion auf den angeblichen Terroranschlag der Uiguren auf Han-Chinesen im Bahnhof von Kunming im März 2014 rief die Regierung einen “Volkskrieg gegen den Terror” aus und nahm das ganze Jahr 2014 über Wissenschaftler, Aktivisten, Journalisten, Schriftsteller und Menschenrechtsanwälte ins Visier. Der unterschwellige Widerspruch besteht darin, dass das Internet das wichtigste Instrument ist, das Menschen über geographische, soziale, kulturelle und sprachliche Grenzen hinweg miteinander verbindet und über das ein Großteil des heutigen Handels und der Kommunikation abgewickelt wird. Stattdessen blockiert die “Große Firewall” der chinesischen Regierung den Konsum ausländischer Inhalte in China. Sie nutzt das Internet als knüppelhartes Instrument zur Zensur und Kontrolle digitaler Inhalte entsprechend der erwünschten Darstellung des Images, der Interessen und der Politik Chinas, indem sie die Verbreitung von „Gerüchten“ im Internet kriminalisiert und eine Vorregistrierung für jedes Online-Konto vorschreibt, das politische Meinungen oder Äußerungen verbreitet.

 

Als Autor dieses Artikels und zusammen mit meinen Kollegen bei Broken Chalk fühle ich mich der tragischen Geschichte Ilham Tohtis und vielen anderen wie ihm sehr verbunden, da auch ich einen persönlichen Blog führe, in dem ich meine Sorgen über das aktuelle Weltgeschehen anspreche. Die Ausübung des Rechts auf freie Meinungsäußerung, wie es Ilham in seinem „Brücken-Blog“ getan hat, ist kein Verbrechen und sollte Ilham nicht zu Unrecht als Unterstützer des Terrorismus, als Drogenhändler, als Waffenverkäufer oder als amerikanischen Agenten abstempeln. Er hat wirklich versucht, Uiguren und Han dazu zu bringen, miteinander ins Gespräch zu kommen, ihre Unterschiede zu überwinden und sich als gemeinsames Volk zu vereinen. Er wählte friedliche und sachkundige Wege, um andere über die Uiguren aufzuklären, und widersetzte sich damit dem Narrativ, welches die Uiguren als Terroristen, bösartig, und bedrohend für die Sicherheit des Ethos oder die Basis der chinesischen Gesellschaft darstellt. Stattdessen wurde er zu einem politischen Märtyrer für die ethnischen Uiguren in der XUAR. Ilham erhielt zahlreiche Auszeichnungen für die Verteidigung und Ausweitung der Menschenrechte und Freiheiten  und wurde zu einem Leuchtturm, der seit 2017 und weiterhin Licht auf die prekäre Situation der Uiguren in Chinas Internierungslagern wirft, wo zahlreiche Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Form von Schlägen, Folter, Vergewaltigungen, Tötungen, Zwangsarbeit und der Sterilisierung von uigurischen Frauen begangen werden.

 

Letztendlich wird Ilham Tohti als sachkundig und mutig in Erinnerung bleiben und als eine Person, die mit Tatkraft und Entschlossenheit für die ethnischen Uiguren kämpfte und trotz der Ungerechtigkeit und Einschüchterung durch die chinesischen Behörden seinen Kopf nicht hängen ließ.

* Um mehr über Ilham Tohti zu erfahren, gibt es eine neue Publikation mit dem Titel ‘We Uyghurs Have No Say: An Imprisoned Writer Speaks’ (Verso Books)- ‘Wir Uiguren haben nichts zu sagen: Ein inhaftierter Schriftsteller spricht’. Dabei handelt es sich um eine Reihe von Essays und Artikeln, die Ilham vor seiner Inhaftierung verfasst hat. Eine Taschenbuch- und eine eBook-Version sind erhältlich unter: https://bit.ly/3wiP6Mv 

 

 

Text original: https://brokenchalk.org/ilham-tohti-an-activist-smiling-in-the-face-of-injustice/

 

Von Karl Baldacchino

Bearbeitet von Olga Ruiz Pilato 

Übersetzt von Vivien Kretz 

 

Sources:

[i] Kennedy, H. (2022) ‘We Uyghur’s Have No Say by Ilham Tohti Review – A People Ignored’. The Guardian. Available online from: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/09/we-uyghurs-have-no-say-ilham-tohti-review-background-genocide-china [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[ii] Makinen, J. (2014) ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’. Los Angeles Times. Available online from: https://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-detention-professor-20140117-story.html#axzz2qljh0LfJ [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Wong, E. (2014) ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’. The New York Times. Available online from: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/world/asia/separatism-trial-of-ilham-tohti-uighur-scholar-begins-in-china.html?_r=0 [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Wertime, D. (2014) ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/media/internet-where-nobody-says-anything [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Amnesty International, ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti: Levenslang Gevangengezet’. Available online from: https://www.amnesty.nl/wat-we-doen/themas/sport-en-mensenrechten/ilham-tohti [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also Denyer, S. & Rauhala, E. (2016) ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’. The Washington Post. Available online from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/to-beijings-dismay-jailed-uighur-scholar-wins-human-rights-award/2016/10/11/d07dff8c-8f85-11e6-81c3-fb2fde4e7164_story.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’. Available online from: https://pen.org/advocacy-case/ilham-tohti/ [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[iii] Woeser, T. (2009) ‘Interview with Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti’. YouTube. Available online from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQT0iN1nMk8 [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also Johnson, I. (2014) ‘”They Don’t Want Moderate Uighurs”’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/they-dont-want-moderate-uighurs [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[iv] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’; see also Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress. Available online from: https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/defending-freedom-project/prisoners-by-country/China/Ilham%20Tohti#:~:text=Biography%3A%20Ilham%20Tohti%20is%20a,regional%20autonomy%20laws%20in%20China. [Accessed on 19/03/2022].

[v] ) ‘Interview With Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti’; see also PEN America (2014) ‘Ilham Tohti: 2014 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award Winner’. YouTube. Available online from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gm6YLWrnKPw [Accessed 19/03/2022].

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[viii] known as 7/5 due to it being a sensitive date in China

[ix] ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also Tohti, I. (2013) ‘The Wounds of the Uyghur People Have Not Healed’. Radio Free Asia. Available online from: https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/wounds-07052013134813.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’.

[x] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’.

[xi] Ibid.; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also Tohti, I. (2013) ‘Uyghur Scholar Tohti Speaks About His Concerns Before Detention’. Radio Free Asia. Available online from: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/interview-02072014182032.html [Accessed on 19/03/2022]; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’.

[xii] ‘Uyghur Scholar Tohti Speaks About His Concerns Before Detention’; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’.

[xiii] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’; see also ‘Ilham Tohti’. United States Congress; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[xiv] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’

[xv] Ibid.; see also ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’; see also Cao, Y. (2014) ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’. China File. Available online from: https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/china-2014-through-eyes-human-rights-advocate [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[xvi] ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti: Levenslang Gevangengezet’; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes in Trial in China on Separatist Charges’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’.

[xvii] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’; see also ‘China’s Detention of Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Worries U.S.’; see also ‘They Don’t Want Moderate Uyghurs’; see also ‘To Beijing’s Dismay, Jailed Uighur Scholar Winds Human Rights Award’.

[xviii] PEN America, ‘Ilham Tohti’; see also European Foundation for South Asia Studies, ‘Language, Religion, and Surveillance: A Comparative Analysis of China’s Governance Models in Tibet and Xinjiang’. Available online from: https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/comparative-analysis-of-governance-models-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ [Accessed on 20/03/2022].

[xix] Ibid.; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’; see also ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’.

[xx] ‘An Internet Where Nobody Says Anything’; see also ‘China in 2014 Through the Eyes of a Human Rights Advocate’.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Ilham Tohti is the recipient of PEN America’s 2014 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award, the 2016 Martin Ennals Award for human rights defenders who show deep commitment and face great personal risk, Liberal International’s 2017 Prize for Freedom, was nominated in 2019 and 2020 for the Nobel Peace Prize, and awarded in 2019 Freedom Award by Freedom House, the Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.

[xxiii] ‘We Uyghur’s Have No Say by Ilham Tohti Review – A People Ignored’; see also ‘Academicus Ilham Tohti.

 

*copertă: https://www.omct.org/fr/ressources/declarations/ilham-tohti-2016-martin-ennals-award-laureate-for-human-rights-defender

Die Inhaftierung Unschuldigeri: Prof. Laçiner

Wer ist Sedat Laçiner?

Sedat Laçiner ist ein türkischer Professor, der in Kirkale, Türkei, geboren wurde. Er ist 49 Jahre alt und befindet sich seit Sommer 2016 in Haft. Der Bildungsweg von Professor Laçiner begann in der Türkei, wo er das Gymnasium absolvierte und seinen Bachelor-Studium in Ankara abschloss. Sein Masterstudium der Politikwissenschaften begann er in der Türkei, doch nachdem er ein Stipendium des Ministeriums für nationale Bildung erhalten hatte, schloss er sein Studium im Vereinigten Königreich ab. Nach Abschluss seines Masterstudiums im Jahr 2001 promovierte er am King’s College der Universität London. Im Jahr 1994 wurde Sedat Laçiner zum Korrespondenten des Ministerpräsidenten ernannt und hat bis heute zahlreiche Artikel verfasst. Er war Mitglied des Hochschulrats (YÖK) und des Nationalen Ausschusses für türkisch-armenische Beziehungen (TEİmK) und wurde 2003 zum Direktor des Zentrums für strategische Studien an der Onsekiz-Mart-Universität in Çanakkale ernannt. Von 2004 bis 2010 leitete er das Internationale Institut für Strategische Studien (USAK). Am 15. März 2011 wurde Laçiner im Alter von 38 Jahren zum Rektor der Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Universität (ÇOMU) ernannt, womit er der jüngste Rektor der Türkei wurde. Im Jahr 2006 wurde er mit dem Preis “2006 Young Global Leader” ausgezeichnet und ist bis heute die erste und einzige Person in der Türkei, die für einen Titel im Bereich “Intellektuelle” nominiert wurde. Professor Laçiner ist Autor von 26 Büchern in türkischer und englischer Sprache.

Der Putschversuch in der Türkei

Der Präsident der Türkei, Recep Erdogan, hat einen umstrittenen Führungsstil. Dieser führt zu einer zweifelhaften Form der Demokratie. Nach seinem Amtsantritt übernahm Erdogan die Medien, ließ die Anklagen gegen die zuvor verurteilten Minister und ihre Familien fallen und war in einen großen Korruptionsskandal verwickelt. Im Jahr 2014 klagte er Fethullah Gülen an, eine „parallele Staatsstruktur“ zu organisieren, was ein Akt der Ausschaltung von Konkurrenten war. Seine Handlungen haben zu einer weit verbreiteten Missbilligung und dem Wunsch nach Veränderung geführt. Im Jahr 2016 geschah das Unvermeidliche – ein Staatsstreich fand statt. Über einen Rundfunksender verkündete ein Teil der Armee, dass sie „die Macht ergriffen habe, um die Demokratie vor Recep Erdogan zu schützen“. Trotz des Scheiterns und des schnellen Abebbens des Putsches soll es über 1.400 Verletzte und einige Tote gegeben haben. Unter den 7.000 Verhafteten befanden sich u. a. hochrangige Soldaten, Richter und Lehrer. Verschiedenen Quellen zufolge scheiterte der Putsch an der mangelnden Unterstützung durch die Zivilbevölkerung, die den „Wandel“ vorantreiben sollte. Als Erdogan die Kontrolle über die Situation übernahm, beschuldigte er sofort den in den USA wohnhaften Fethullah Gülen. Der Putsch wird in erster Linie als Vorwand für den derzeitigen türkischen Präsidenten betrachtet, als ein Weg um seine Macht zu festigen. Fethullah Gülen ist frei, aber mehr als 2.000 Menschen sind weiterhin inhaftiert.

 

Warum ist Sedat Laçiner im Gefängnis?

Im Jahr 2018 wurde Sedat Laçiner zu 9 Jahren und 4 Monaten Haft verurteilt. Während des Prozesses forderten einige Staatsanwälte eine lebenslange Haftstrafe und es kamen Diskussionen über die Wiedereinführung der Todesstrafe auf. In einem der Briefe Laçiners an seine Familie schreibt der ehemalige Rektor: „Nach acht Monaten gibt es immer noch keinen einzigen juristischen Beweis für den Vorwurf, der mir gemacht wird, nämlich den Versuch, die Regierung Erdogans zu stürzen. Die Anklageschrift räumt sogar ein, dass ich keine gewaltsamen Handlungen oder Aktivitäten begangen habe oder gewalttätige Verhaltensweisen gezeigt habe.“ Außerdem habe er keinen Zugang zu einem Anwalt gehabt und seine Akte sei ihm vorenthalten worden, was eine Verletzung seines Rechts auf ein faires Verfahren und damit eines seiner grundlegenden Menschenrechte darstelle. Der Ex-Rektor wurde beschuldigt, der „Gülen“-Bewegung anzugehören und wurde in Haft gehalten, ohne dass ausreichende Beweise für seine Schuld vorlagen.

Nach Angaben von Laçiners Familie wurde er wegen terroristischer Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit der FETÖ – der Fethullah-Gülen-Terror-Organisation, wie die Regierung die Gülen-Bewegung nennt – angeklagt. Die FETÖ besteht aus Anhängern des gemäßigten islamistischen Predigers Fethullah Gülen und seinem Bruder Vedat, der ebenfalls Akademiker ist. Jedoch wurden keine Einzelheiten darüber genannt, was sie getan haben sollen, um eine Anklage rechtfertigen zu können. Beide werden im Typ E geschlossenen Gefängnis Çanakkale festgehalten (Malley, 2017). 

Die Anschuldigungen umfassen unter anderem, dass die Gülen-Bewegung ein „bewaffneter terroristischer Akt“ sei. Jedoch gibt es bis heute keine Beweise, um diese Anschuldigungen zu unterstützen. Trotz Erdogans Ansichten ergreifen viele Menschen auf die Welt Partei für die Menschen, die unter seinem „eisernen Faust“ Regime leiden. Leider sind über 2.000 unschuldige Menschen willkürlich inhaftiert – eine Zahl, die zeigt, dass die Unschuldsvermutung für die türkische Regierung kein Thema ist.  

 

Original Text von Ivan Evstatiev 

Bearbeitet von Olga Ruiz Pilato 

Übersetzt von Vivien Kretz

 

 

Quellen

Malley, B. M. (2017, April 6). Is imprisoned academic a victim of a mass witchhunt? University World News. Retrieved February 22, 2022, from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=2016111800050457

TurkeyPurge. (2017, September 25). Turkish professor Sedat Laciner, under pre-trial detention for 26 months, gets 9 years in jail | Turkey Purge. Turkeypurge.Com. Retrieved February 22, 2022, from https://turkeypurge.com/turkish-professor-sedat-laciner-under-pre-trial-detention-for-26-months-gets-9-years-in-jail

www.sabah.com.tr. (2016, July 23). Eski rektör Sedat Laçiner tutuklandı. Sabah. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/07/23/eski-rektor-sedat-laciner-tutuklandi

 

.نوريه غولمن: صراع دام ست سنوات ضد الانتهاكات المنهجية

Nuriye Gulmen

منذ ما يقرب من ست سنوات، هزت تركيا محاولة الانقلاب في ١٥يوليو ٢٠١٦. وبعد يومٍ من المحاولة، سرعان ما فرضت الحكومة التركية حالة الطوارئ وأصدرت المراسيم التنفيذية الطارئة رقم ٦٦٧ـ٦٧٦ التي فرضت بشكل رسمي الرقابة على وسائل الإعلام والصحفيين. [i] لكنها وسعت نطاق الرقلبة بعد ذلك إلى الآلاف من موظفي الخدمة المدنية وضباط الشرطة وأفراد القوات المسلحة وأساتذة الجامعات والموظفين في ملاحق المرسوم رقم ٦٧٩ الصادر في ٦ يناير ٢٠١٧.[ii] أدى ذلك إلى فقدان أكثر من ١٥٠ ألف موظف. وسقطت حقوقهم في الوصول إلى الخدمات الاجتماعية و حرية التنقل وشوهت حياتهم بسبب اتهام الحكومة بأنهم مرتبطون بالانقلاب الذي يُزعم أن فتح الله غولن تسبب فيه، رجل دين تركي يعيش في منفى ذاتي في الولايات المتحدة منذ عام ١٩٩٩ونفى باستمرار التهمة الواردة من أنقرة. [iii]
أحد هؤلاء الأشخاص المتأثرين في أعقاب هذه الأحداث هي نوريه غولمن، الأستاذة التركية السابقة للأدب المقارن في جامعة سلجوق في عام ٢٠١٢ والتي قبل محاولة الانقلاب، تم تعيينها كمساعد باحث في جامعة إسكي شهير عثمان غازي في عام ٢٠١٥. [iv ] غولمن ليست أكاديمية فحسب، بل لديها أيضًا تاريخ من النشاط والمعارك القانونية ضد إساءة استخدام المؤسسات في تركيا. بعد تعيينها كمساعد، أحتجزت لمدة ١٠٩ يوم بسبب دعوى قضائية سياسية مما أدى إلى تأخير دراستها وإعادتها إلى إسكي شهير. [v]

كان اليوم الذي تم تعيينها فيه مرة أخرى في منصبها البحثي هو يوم محاولة الانقلاب، التي أدت إلى تعليقها من إسكي شهير في اليوم التالي. كان هذا بسبب المراسيم الجديدة التي وجدت أنها متهمة مثل الآلاف معها بالانتماء إلى منظمة FETO ما يسمى منظمة أنصار غولن المنفي التي اتهمها أردوغان وحكومته بأنها منظمة إرهابية.
منذ ٩ نوفمبر ٢٠١٦ طالبت نوريه بإصرار وظيفتها في إسكي شهير في كل يوم أمام نصب حقوق الإنسان الواقع في شارع يوكسل، أنقرة. حيث احتجت على تعليق عملها وفصلها وعلى مجلس التعليم العالي أن يستجيب لمطالبها.
[vi] توضح غولمن أن هذا “تقليد ثوري” مصمم على جذب الانتباه والحصول على مبغاه. ويطالب في هذه الحالة بإنهاء حالة الطوارئ، والسماح للعمال العموميين الثوريين الديمقراطيين الذين تم طردهم وفصلهم من العمل بالعودة إلى وظائفهم و ضمان لـ ١٣ الف مساعد أبحاث OYP وطلب الأمن الوظيفي لجميع العاملين في مجال التعليم والعلوم. [vii] بدأت غولمن احتجاجها بمفردها و تم اعتقالها ٢٦ مرة في المجمل والتي يمكن أن تُعزى إلى الاهتمام المتزايد من قبل المتفرجين الأجانب والمحليين الذين يراقبون أفعالها وقراءة تجربتها على مدونة WordPress الخاصة بها على الإنترنت. وفي النهاية تم تسميتها بواسطة CNN كواحدة من ثماني نساء بارزات في عام ٢٠١٦ بحلول يومها الخمسين من الاحتجاج. [viii]

ازداد هذا الاهتمام بشكل كبير بعد مرسوم ٦ يناير لعام ٢٠١٧عندما تم طرد غولمن من إسكي شهير، مما أدى إلى تحول استراتيجيتها إلى المرحلة التالية من خلال الإضراب عن الطعام في ٩ مارس ٢٠١٧. احتجزت غولمن من قبل الشرطة إلى جانب مدرسة ابتدائية سميح أوزاكشا. فقد عانتا من الجانب العنيف لقرارات الطوارئ. [ix] كان الأساس المنطقي وراء الإضراب هو أن الاحتجاجات اللفظية غالبًا لا تحظى باهتمام كافٍ من السلطات، لكن الإضراب عن الطعام هو إجراء قوي يضع الجهات الفاعلة المشاركة فيه مع وجود مخاطر صحية خطيرة على المحك. على غرار ما تفسره غولمن بأنه “ضروري لنقل المقاومة إلى المستوى التالي” و “الضغط عليهم فعلاً لاتخاذ الإجراءات”. رداً على الإضراب عن الطعام ، تم تقديم لائحة اتهام في الثاني من مايو ٢٠١٧ إلى محكمة الجنايات المشددة التاسعة عشرة في أنقرة تتهم كلاً من غولمن وأوزاكشا بالانتماء إلى حزب التحرير الشعبي الثوري – الجبهة والانخراط في أنشطة غير مشروعة. (DHKP-C) ، الذي أدى بدوره إلى احتجازهم في سجن سينكان في أنقرة بحلول ٢٣ مايو ٢٠١٧. [xi] وجدت المحكمة أنهن مذنبتان لأنه “إذا لم يتم حبسهما، فسوف يضران بمسار العدالة”. وهو خط يبدو متناقضًا نظرًا لعدم وجود أدلة في التهم الموجهة وعندما يظل كلاهما يقظين في إنكار أي تورط مع DHKP- C لدرجة أن محاميهم حتى نشر سجلاتهم الجنائية كدليل على عدم وجود مثل هذا التورط وواجه جهود وزير الداخلية سليمان صويلو ومركز البحوث والدراسات بوزارته لمحاولة تقوية التهم. [xii]

كان هناك مخاوف من أن كلا المدرستين سيواجهان المزيد من انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان، حيث يُسمح قانونًا لحراس السجن والأطباء بالتدخل وإنهاء الإضراب عن الطعام دون موافقة المحتجون. يمكنهم أيضًا التدخل عندما يكونون فاقدين للوعي، كما هو مذكور في المادة ٨٢ من قانون تنفيذ الحكم رقم ٥٢٧٥، والتي من شأنها أن تنتهك حرية التعبير ومن المحتمل أن تؤدي إلى المعاملة أو العقوبة القاسية أو اللاإنسانية أو المهينة. [xiii] خلال زيارة قام بها رئيس نقابة المحامين في أنقرة، هاكان كاندوران ، وبعض زملائه ، عبّرت غولمن عن الوضع المأساوي الذي وجدت فيه هي وأوزاكشا نفسيهما ، وأخبرت كاندوران أنها ترى أن العدالة تتلاشى مثلها تمامًا. في حالة عدم قدرتها على رفع رقبتها دون مساعدة أو تحريك ذراعيها أو إمساك القلم. في المقابل نرى كاندوران يدعو الحكومة لإنهاء الإضراب عن الطعام من خلال المصالحة المجتمعية والتفاوض مع المتضررين ظلماً من قرارات الطوارئ. قررت محكمة حقوق الإنسان إنهاء احتجازهم على أساس أن إضرابهم عن الطعام شكل في ذلك الوقت مخاطر صحية واضحة، ومع ذلك رفضت المحكمتان طلبهما لأن هذه المخاطر لم تكن تهدد الحياة، وكانت الإجراءات الطبية المناسبة موجودة لمساعدتهم إذا أصبح ذلك. القضية.


أصبحت صحة غولمن خطيرة في نهاية المطاف، وبحلول ٢٦ سبتمبر ٢٠١٧، استدعى نقلها إلى زنزانة نزلاء في مستشفى نوموني. ثم أُطلق سراحها بحلول الأول من ديسمبر، عندما حكمت عليها محكمة الجنايات المشددة التاسعة عشرة بالسجن ٦ سنوات و ٣ أشهر، لكنها سمحت بالإفراج عنها تحت المراقبة القضائية. [xvi] على الرغم من الإفراج عنهم، واصل غولمن وأوزاكشا احتجاجهم أمام نصب حقوق الإنسان، لكن في النهاية اضطروا إلى إنهاء إضرابهم عن الطعام في ٢٦ يناير ٢٠١٨. سعن إلى تركيز جهودهن داخل النظام القضائي المحلي للمضي قدمًا، مؤكدين أن مقاومتهن لم تنته وستستمر. [xvii]

المرة التالية التي كانت فيها غولمن في دائرة الضوء عندما تم القبض عليها مرة أخرى في ١١ أغسطس ٢٠٢٠، خلال مداهمة للشرطة على مركز إيديل الثقافي في اسطنبول في الخامس من أغسطس، وهو مركز تديره الفرقة الشعبية اليسارية Grup Yurum لأسباب غير معنية. [xix] في وقت لاحق من ذلك العام ، تم طرد غولمن وزملائها الآخرين من اتحاد عمال التعليم والعلوم (Eğitim-Sen) بسبب صورتهم على أنهم “مقاومي يوكسل” أو مقاتلين مقاومة في نظر الشعب. [xx] كان آخر تطور في ٤ نوفمبر ٢٠٢١، عندما قدمت غولمن أوزاكشا إلى المحكمة الدستورية التي رفضت لاحقًا بأن لائحة الاتهام في ٢ مايو ٢٠١٧ استخدمت نفس الأدلة مثل تحقيق سابق في ١٤ مارس ٢٠١٧ التي أدى إلى اعتقالهن. ولكن تم رفض هذا الاتهام لاحقًا وتم الإفراج عنهن تحت المراقبة القضائية، مما يشير إلى أن لائحة الاتهام والاحتجاز في ٢ مايو و ٢٣ مايو ٢٠١٧، انتهكت الحكومة حقوقهن في الحرية والأمن. مما يبين إلى أن السلطات القضائية التي قررت القضية لم تكن محايدة ولا مستقلة. رفضت المحكمة قضيتهم لأن ادعاءات غولمن وأوزاكشا تفتقر إلى أدلة ملموسة وأن حقوقهم المنتهكة غير مقبولة وأنهم لم يستنفدوا جميع الوسائل المحلية قبل تقديم دعاواهم. [xxii]
ما يتضح بشكل مؤلم من النشاط الجريء لنوريا غولمن هو أنه منذ عام 2016 ، استهدفت الحكومة التركية ظلماً مئات الآلاف من الأفراد بناءً على حجج لا تصمد، وأولئك الأكثر تضرراً وقرروا معارضة الحكومة. ستواجه الأعمال قمعا كبيرا من خلال الاحتجاز والترهيب القانوني. تدعوا منضمتنا الحكومة التركية والسلطات المختصة إلى إعادة النظر بجدية في أفعالها التي تركت الآلاف دون أمان وظيفي أو خيار مغادرة البلاد والعثورعلى عمل في الخارج. تدعو Broken Chalk بشكل خاص إلى إعادة نوريه غولمن و سميح اوزكاشا من بين كثيرين آخرين، إلى مناصبهم الوظيفية في مجال التعليم.
بقلم كارل بالداتشينو
تحرير إريكا غرايمز
ترجمة رويفة الريامية من

المصادر

[i] Grabenwarter, C. et al. (2017) ‘Draft Opinion on the Measures Provided in the Recent Emergency Decree Laws with Respect to Freedom of the Media’. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Available online from: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2017)006-e [Accessed on 08/03/2022], pp. 3-4.

[ii] Decree-Law No. 679 (6th January 2017) ‘Measures Regarding Public Personnel’. Available online from: https://insanhaklarimerkezi.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2017/02/09/KHK_679_ENG.pdf [Accessed 08/03/2022], p. 1.

[iii] Jones, T. (2018) ‘Two Turkish Teachers End Almost 11-Month Hunger Strike’.  DW. Available online from: https://www.dw.com/en/two-turkish-teachers-end-almost-11-month-hunger-strike/a-42318478 [Accessed 08/03/2022]; Işık, A. (2017) ‘In Turkey, Hope for ‘Justice is Fading Away Just like my Muscles’’. DW. Available online from: https://www.dw.com/en/in-turkey-hope-for-justice-is-fading-away-just-like-my-muscles/a-39482207 [Accessed 08/03/2022].

[iv] Halavut, H. (2017) ‘Interview with Nuriye Gülmen: ‘I Have More Hope Today Than I Did on the First Day’’.  5 Harliler. Available online from: https://www.5harfliler.com/interview-with-nuriye-gulmen/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.; see also Gülmen, N. (2016) ‘DİRENİŞİN TALEPLERi’. Available online from: https://nuriyegulmendireniyor.wordpress.com/2016/11/08/basin-aciklamasina-cagri/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also Wikipedia (2022) ‘Nuriye Gülmen’. Available online from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuriye_G%C3%BClmen#cite_note-18 [Accessed 08/03/2022].

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.; see also Amnesty International (2017) ‘Urgent Action: Fear for Hunger Strikers’ Wellbeing’. Available online from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/EUR4463402017ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[x] Ibid.

[xi] ‘Urgent Action: Fear for Strikers’ Wellbeing’.

[xii] Cumhuriyet (2017) ‘Criminal Record of Gülmen and Özakça, Declared ‘Terrorists’ by Minister Soylu’. Available online from: https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/bakan-soylunun-terorist-ilan-ettigi-gulmen-ve-ozakcanin-adli-sicil-kaydi-748105 [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also NTV (2017) ‘Statements by Minister Soylu about Semih Özakça and Nuriye Gülmen’. Available online from: https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bakan-soyludan-aclik-grevi-yapan-nuriye-gulmenle-ilgili-aciklamalar,Jg2i0I634EyPWqK_cXdIbg [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also Milliyet (2017) ‘The Unending Scenario of a Terrorist Organisation: “The Truth of Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça”’. Available online from: https://web.archive.org/web/20170813220846/http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bir-teror-orgutunun-bitmeyen-senaryosu-ankara-yerelhaber-2179760/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xiii] ‘Urgent Action: Fear for Strikers’ Wellbeing’; see also ‘In Turkey, Hope for ‘Justice is Fading Away Just like My Muscles’.

[xiv] ‘In Turkey, Hope for ‘Justice is Fading Away Just like My Muscles’.

[xv] Armutcu, O. (2017) ‘The Constitutional Court Rejected the Appeal Against the Detention of Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça’ Hurriyet. Available online from: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/anayasa-mahkemesi-nuriye-gulmen-ve-semih-ozakcanin-tutukluluguna-yapilan-itirazi-reddetti-40503721 [Accessed on 08/03/2022]; see also Cakir, A. (2017) ‘ECHR Rejects Semih Özakça and Nuriye Gülmen’s Application’. Voice of America. Available online from: https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/aihm-semih-ozakca-ve-nuriye-gulmen-in-basvurusunu-reddetti/3969669.html [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xvi] Bianet (2017) ‘Nuriye Gülmen Released’. Available online from: https://bianet.org/english/human-rights/192100-nuriye-gulmen-released [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xvii] ‘Two Turkish Teachers End Almost 11-Month Hunger Strike’.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Duvar English (2020) ‘Dismissed Turkish Academic, Known for Hunger Strike, Arrested Again’. Available online from: https://www.duvarenglish.com/human-rights/2020/08/11/dismissed-turkish-academic-known-for-hunger-strike-arrested-again [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xx] Yeni Bir Mecra (2020) ‘Critical Decisions in Eğitim-Sen: Nuriye Gülmen was Expelled’. Available online from: https://yeni1mecra.com/egitim-sende-kritik-kararlar-nuriye-gulmen-ihrac-edildi/ [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xi] Duvar English (2021) ‘Turkey’s Top Court Rules Dismissed Educators’ Rights Not Violated’. Available online from: https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkeys-top-court-rules-rights-of-dismissed-educators-nuriye-gulmen-and-semih-ozakca-not-violated-news-59436 [Accessed on 08/03/2022].

[xii] Ibid.

 

Turkey’s Hard Power Turn: Handing Hizmet Schools to the Turkey Maarif Foundation

This paper summarizes and analyses how Turkey has extended its mission to close down Hizmet schools in African and European countries via the public-private entity known as the Maarif Foundation

 

Edited_Turkey_s_Hard_Power_Turn.edited

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Disclaimer

Some articles referenced in this report show a certain political bias and propaganda by referring to the Gulen movement as the ‘Fetullah Terrorist Organization’ (FETO).

It is important to note that the Turkish government adopted this label as a scapegoating mechanism to pin the 15th July 2016 failed coup attempt upon the Gulen movement and its members. This label sought to create a narrative the Gulen movement had the sole aim of overthrowing the government; however, the reality is that the movement and the schools are facing persecution by a government threatened by legal charges and scandals, one that relied on scapegoating innocent lives and families.

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INTRODUCTION

During his time in Turkey in the 1960s and ’70s, Fetullah Gulen was a well-renowned Imam who preached that English-taught education builds morality and character as much as, if not more, than modesty, altruism, and hard work. He emphasized that education was essential for Turkey’s emergence into the globalized era.[i] In furtherance of this ideology, the Gulen movement of the 1980s was aided by funding from the so-called conservative ‘Anatolian tigers’ to create schools that would carry out such education founded upon, but not formally linked to, the principles espoused by Gulen. These schools were referred to globally as Hizmet schools. ‘Hizmet’ indicated that the schools taught about light, philosophy, reflection, dialogue, and tolerance.[ii] The schools were first formed voluntarily by business people within Turkey and staffed by educators seeking to engage in humanitarian work and charity. They soon expanded to various locations abroad in the ‘90s, including North America, Central Asia, Europe, Australia, and especially Africa. [iii] More often than not, these schools were the first informal instance of Turkey establishing economic, cultural, and political links with foreign governments.

Although the Turkish government initially tacitly supported these schools, this became more complicated after the Presidential Crisis of 2007. As a result of this crisis, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured control of the country’s political handle, forming an administration wary of leaving too much control over national and foreign affairs in the hands of external, private actors within and outside of Turkey.[iv] In a series of talks with the co-founder and executive director of the Centre for Hizmet Studies, Dr. Ismail M. Sezgin outlined how the government’s perception of the schools changed over time. It initially saw advantages in associating with the schools because the Gulen movement’s credibility was well-received by the Turkish population. But this perception changed as the Gulen movement became increasingly critical of the government amid changing political dynamics reflected in the 2012 elections.[v] This election round targeted then-Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, resulting in corruption charges, a departure from Western ideals of democracy, and halted plans to join the European Union (EU). The Gulen movement condemned the government during this time, leading the government to reevaluate its perception of the movement. Dr. Sezgin explains that when more corruption charges emerged in 2014, Gulen became a real threat, prompting Erdogan to actively oppose Gulen. Ultimately, this political realignment resulted in the government’s attempt to blame the failed coup attempt on 15th July 2016 on the so-called ‘Fetullah Terrorist Organization’ (FETO) as a ploy to forcefully rebrand the Gulen movement as a threat to society.[vi]

The failed coup gave Erdogan what he has referred to as ‘a gift from God’ that allowed the AKP to conduct a witch-hunt-style attack on Hizmet schools. This inquisition began in Turkey, with many members facing human rights abuses and even imprisonment, but quickly spread internationally as the government called upon foreign governments to close the schools, especially those based in Africa.[vii] Such an attack obviously detrimentally impacted students who gained a high-quality and valuable education from the Hizmet schools. In many impoverished locations, the schools raised the standard of education and living. Nonetheless, in an attempt to quash the Gulen movement, the Turkish government created the pseudo-entity known as the ‘Maarif Foundation’ just weeks before the failed coup and equipped it with a mixture of public-private authority to either close or replace Hizmet schools.[viii]

The next section of this report shall briefly analyse the function of the Maarif Foundation, followed by a section commenting on the chronological takeover of Hizmet schools in Belarus, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Guinea by the Foundation. Then, the report will analyse Turkey’s shift from a soft power stance of economic diplomacy towards a harder form of power that risks transferring the consequences of Turkey’s domestic politics to other states. Lastly, the final section will conclude with some brief observations and recommendations.

THE MAARIF FOUNDATION’S MECHANISMS

On 17th June 2016, the then prime Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu, announced the implementation of the law numbered 6721 that founded the Maarif Foundation, ‘Maarif’ meaning ‘education’ or ‘instruction’. President Erdogan and his government appointed its 12 members: 4 chosen by the President, three by the cabinet, and the rest by the ministries of education, foreign affairs, and the economy in conjunction with the Higher Education Council.[ix] The Foundation was granted the powers:

“to provide scholarships, schools, education and facilities such as schools, education institutions, and dormitories, to provide them with scholarships in all the processes of education, from pre-school to university education in order to develop and develop education and distribution services, only to be able to afford the institutions that can take part in institutions, the Turkish Maarif Foundation, which is in central Istanbul to conduct scientific research and research, develop and develop methods and carry out the activities of the country in which it operates, to carry out the activities of the country.”[x]

 

These terms of reference indicate that the Foundation is a government entity, receiving its budget and directives from public officials. It was distinguished from other foundations by its additional capacity to perform its functions abroad “by founding or taking over companies possessing private law legal entity,” which falls clearly within the remit of the status held by Hizmet schools founded abroad.[xi] The true, underlying intention of the Foundation started soon after the failed coup a month later, when Erdogan requested that the Foundation “be in 193 countries (…) [and] prioritise countries where FETO is more effective and known. Do not let the FETO schools be called ‘Turkish schools’”.[xii] To a certain extent, this demonstrates that Turkey continues to rely on private and semi-public actors abroad that had established and maintained relations with other states in the past, as noted above with the Gulen movement.

 

The primary barrier to the Foundation’s attempts to expropriate the physical property of Hizmet schools is the fact that domestic authorities must first agree to dispossess these schools to the Foundation, often leading to grueling and time-consuming trials in court, as recently seen in Ethiopia.[xiii] Despite facing resistance in its attempts to convince other countries to close down Hizmet schools or hand over the facilities, the Turkish government has achieved the most success in Africa by using what can be called the ‘stick approach’. In this approach, Turkey uses “sticks,” or hard power, rather than “carrots,” or soft power, to threaten a country’s socio-economic progress and infrastructural projects via economic and investment pressure. Dipama & Dal (2019) discuss Turkey’s use of the stick approach, describing how Turkey can exploit its links with particular African states through business, import, export, and foreign direct investment to its own benefit.[xiv] The next section will focus on the relationship between the Foundation and these select African countries before comparing the Foundation’s success in Belarus and mainland Europe.

 

THE MAARIF FOUNDATION IN BELARUS, BURUNDI, CAMEROON, CHAD, DJIBOUTI, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ETHIOPIA, GABON, AND GUINEA-CONAKRY

 

One of the first African countries to acquiesce to the Turkish government’s demands was Gabon. Public officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the vice president of the Maarif Foundation, Hasan Yavuz, to cede three Hizmet schools to the Foundation, consisting of a total of 200 students.[xv] Chad also acquiesced to transfer Hizmet schools, but the extent of the takeover was only documented later in 2017 when a kindergarten, primary schools, dormitory, and secondary schools were expropriated and transferred to the Maarif Foundation for management ahead of a visit by President Erdogan.[xvi] The Education Minister of Chad at the time, Ahmad Khazali Acyl, considered it a step forward in Chadian-Turkish relations. From an outside, objective perspective, however, this can also be considered further erasure of Gulen’s influence in Africa to advance Erdogan’s agenda, which has painted the Hizmet schools as a ‘sham’ quality of education. It is important to note that “[m]any African countries, immediately after the coup attempt, deported [Hizmet] members and transferred the schools run by the group to our Maarif Foundation.”[xvii]

During 2017, the Maarif Foundation made significant headway in Africa, particularly in Guinea-Conakry, Djibouti, and Burundi. A total of 10 schools in the capital of Guinea were transferred to the Foundation following a three-month-long process of public authorities canceling Hizmet licenses to teach and own the private facilities. Once the Foundation took over former Hizmet schools, they were frequently remodeled with new names linked to political martyrs allegedly killed by supposed Gulenists during the coup attempt. [xviii]  Turkish officials officially inaugurated the schools at events that mimicked the humanitarian and charitable functions of the former Hizmet owners. Likewise, Joel Nkurabagaya, the then Burundian ambassador to Turkey, stated in 2017 that Burundi was working towards allowing the Foundation to open its own schools following the transfer of numerous Hizmet schools. These developments were precipitated by Hasan Yuvuz’s visit to Burundi in May 2017, ostensibly to discuss education but during which Burundian and Turkish officials introduced other political and economic interests. For example, during Yuvuz’s visit, the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, requested that Turkish Airlines open direct flights to Burundi.[xix] Similarly, Djibouti transferred a facility to the Foundation to use as a kindergarten and elementary school. It was additionally one of the first countries in Africa to grant the Foundation a 5-hectare plot of land to build its own Maarif educational institution. This trend would later take shape across Africa.[xx]

By January 2018, the Foundation had signed agreements with a total of 26 African states, with 16 having transferred schools over to the Foundation, consisting of nearly 9,000 students under the influence of President Erdogan’s Islamist ideology and political agenda.[xxi] These states were joined by Equatorial Guinea in September 2018, when Sebnem Cenk, Turkey’s ambassador in Malabo, and Fabiola Angono Miko, the deputy minister of Youth and Sports and Foreign Ministry, agreed to transfer a Hizmet school based in the capital, Malabo, to the Foundation under the new name of ‘Maarif Malabo College’.[xxii] In early 2019, the Foundation also managed to gain the cooperation of the Cameroonian government to close down and transfer Hizmet schools. The re-opening ceremony was attended by numerous distinguished officials from Cameroon and Turkey, with the Turkish ambassador to the country, Ayşe Saraç, commenting that:

“Cameroon supported our country and became our friend and ally in our struggle with [Hizmet]. Maarif Schools are more and more active in the international arena and have achieved significant successes. The Turkish Maarif Foundation will open new schools in Cameroon in the coming period. We keep following and supporting all works carried out in this regard.”[xxiii]

One of the most critical battlegrounds in taking over Hizmet schools can clearly be seen with respect to Ethiopia. This dynamic started in mid-2019 when the first Hizmet school, located in Harar, was expropriated and transferred to the Foundation, which met three years of legal challenges before attaining a second school located in Sebata Town.[xxiv] These legal challenges were prolonged by an investigation conducted by Ethiopian federal and state attorneys into terrorism and money laundering at the school that the Maarif Foundation was attempting to acquire. According to the Stockholm Center for Freedom in 2021, the STEM Education Private Limited Company, composed of several German investors based in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, owned the school.[xxv] The manager of the school, Dr. Norbert Helmut Dinse, explained that the school was foreign-owned within the educational sector of Ethiopia and that:

“Initially, the company was established by Turkish Investors. Through time, the three German investors acquired the investment following all procedures required under the law. German investors stepped in and took over the parent company again in full compliance with the requirements of the laws of the land.”[xxvi]

At first, it seemed that the Ministry of Education in Ethiopia would support the Hizmet school and its STEM owners due to the legitimate proof of its status as a privately owned school, even approving its school license for the 2020-2021 academic year. However, this changed after the Oromia and Sebata Education Bureau and several armed police officers trespassed onto school grounds, illegally installing the Turkish staff of the Maarif Foundation to begin teaching at the school instead.[xxvii] A representative of the Foundation, Levent Sahin, stated that “[a]fter the investigation, state attorney generals decided to suspend education licenses of the Stem company belonging to the terror organization. We want to see that this will be an example for the other schools.” By mid-August 2021, the Foundation took control of eleven more schools formerly run by Hizmet in Ethiopia, consisting of 2,000 students. Although staff and students mounted additional legal obstacles to stop these acquisitions, the Foundation utilized sympathetic parent-teacher associations to quash these legal attempts and sway educational bureaucracy in its favor.[xxviii]

At the moment of writing, there is a lack of credible information about the single institution that was either transferred or opened in Belarus. Nonetheless, this development occurred shortly after the opening of two schools in Bucharest, Romania, and Elbasan, Albania, in late 2019. Both replaced the Hizmet schools that existed in the respective countries.[xxix]

 

ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES

By March 2021, the Maarif foundation had taken control of 216 Hizmet schools in 44 countries, stating that it had signed a further 77 protocols to oversee the management of schools in 45 other countries.[xxx] Over half of the remaining schools managed by Hizmet staff are located in the U.S. and Europe, the former hosting a total of 312 schools, four universities, and 155 charter schools, with the largest facilities in the federal states of Texas, Ohio, California, and Florida.[xxxi] The rapid activity with which the Foundation has attained control over Hizmet schools poses many risks on various levels: for the children and their parents, for the domestic societies within which the Maarif schools operate, and at a bilateral level between Turkey and the host countries.

Toguslu (2017) explained these risks firstly at a bilateral level, correctly foreseeing that once the diplomatic tensions of 2016 and 2017 died down, African countries had paved the way for Turkey’s hard power capabilities to expand further into Africa by using the schools as an extension, as seen in Senegal.[xxxii] On the surface, the Foundation wants countries to believe that the quality of education and facilities offered at Maarif schools are of a higher standard and that the Foundation will discontinue the so-called maligned or flawed education previously offered in Hizmet schools. This superficial presentation is evident from the Secondary Education Minister of Cameroon, Nalova Lyonga, statement that:

“students will learn French and English as well as Turkish, and will develop a different culture and the habit of living together. We give importance to the different languages as part of culture and welcome the Turkish education with joy. I believe that Turkish culture will add a lot to us.”[xxxiii]

At a deeper level, the reality is that Turkey is using the Maarif Foundation to expand its political influence. This trend is evident from past behaviour, namely the export of Turkish teachers and imams to Europe to gather intelligence on diaspora communities and ensure that the diaspora follows the directives and ideology of the AKP party.[xxxiv] Akgun & Ozkan (2020) have also reported on the Foundation’s aspirations to move beyond the educational field and make a larger contribution towards Turkey’s foreign policy and diplomatic relations via the educational sector.[xxxv]

Furthermore, there are significant risks associated with the eradication of Hizmet schools. Hizmet teachers offered a higher than average educational quality to students in their host countries. This is evident from the academic excellence attributed to students and the high rate of satisfaction shown by parents; Hizmet schools were recognized to the point that state officials preferred to send their children to Hizmet education.[xxxvi] International organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have also found that Turkey’s education system underperforms compared to other states. In particular, there is a known risk of sexual harassment in educational institutions and in Turkey more generally, demonstrated by the scandals surrounding the Ensar Foundation, which was closely linked to President Erdogan.[xxxvii] Turkey itself does not provide quality education to its students, and yet it is exporting its own educational systems and values to other countries. This poses a fundamental risk to the countries that import Turkish education by lowering the bar for education in host countries, preventing children from receiving the quality education they deserve. By extension, this could negatively impact the economic development of host countries by preventing the cumulation of human capital via quality education.

A major risk is the possibility that the Maarif Foundation could advance Erdogan’s goal to become the leader of the Islamic world by using investment as a means to ingratiate himself and his agenda to non-Turkish Muslims living abroad.[xxxviii] This ambition is dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, the ‘coexistence’ and expressive approach of Hizmet schools to dialogue with different ethnicities, especially religions, is in stark contrast to the closed and exclusive ideology of Erdogan, who in the past has openly stated that Muslims and Christians should not engage with one another. Secondly, Africa has unique issues with terrorism, such as the proliferation of ISIS in Mozambique, Uganda, and the DRC, as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Should the Maarif Foundation take over a significant sector of the education system in many African countries, these issues may worsen as schools disseminate Erdogan’s ideology, which founds politics on religious principles.[xxxix] Dr. Dinse expressed his concern about the risk of destabilising African societies, saying:

“What has happened to our investment is odd for any listener (…) [i]n a country with a strong system of the rule of law and hosting the Head Office of African Union, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and many diplomatic communities, it is unbelievable that foreign investment can be taken forcefully without recourse Rule of Law.”

The Hizmet Schools were insulated from this risk because they lacked a formal link to Gulen and thus never attempted to create a global movement based solely on Gulen’s ideology. Neither the schools nor the students attempted to defend Gulen after the failed coup, nor did they directly oppose the actions of Erdogan.[xl] The schools thus remained education institutions rather than political tools. The only political activity causally linked to the Hizmet schools was protesting in defense of the schools’ autonomy and legality in the face of the Maarif Foundation’s attempted acquisitions. G. Angey (2018) documented this pushback in a case study of Senegal, wherein civil society, parents, and public officials—rather than Turks or Hizmet staff—publicly challenged the attempted transfers in court, citing the risks of losing cherished educational opportunities.[xli]

There is no possible way for the Maarif schools to be insulated from politics because the Foundation is an institution of the state and because Turkey maintains economic leverage over African governments. Hence, even if African civil society, public officials, and state bodies mobilize against the schools in more substantive ways than previously described, African governments will still be forced to comply and cooperate with Erdogan’s demands due to the economic threat of souring relations with Turkey. For instance, the Ethiopian Investment Commission notes that Turkey is the second largest investor in Ethiopia, with $2.5 billion in direct investment. Turkish companies are also the single largest employers, providing roughly 30,000 jobs.[xlii] These facts give Erdogan the power to influence—for better or for worse—the socioeconomic progress of Ethiopia, and thus the power to demand political actions from the Ethiopian government.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the Turkish government has shifted its foreign policy goals toward exporting education, especially to Africa. Initially, this shift was a product of the Gulen movement, which supported the teaching of moderation, humanitarianism, and multiculturalism. The Gulen movement inspired Hizmet schools, which lacked any explicit link to Gulen and certainly were not willed by Gulen, although they sought to continue his innovative ethos. These schools paved the way for private investment, cultural links, and educational diplomacy prior to the entrance of public representatives of the Turkish government; however, it is also true that the Hizmet schools relied on the Turkish government’s goodwill, using official networks of communication to open more schools across Africa. The rise and fall of Hizmet is, therefore, a tragedy resulting from the fluid identity of the schools. They were both a product of Turkey, since they were inspired by Gulen, financed by Turkish businessmen, and enabled by connections with public officials, and a product of local society, which, over time, came to respect and own the institutions where their children received such a high quality of education. This localisation of formal and informal ownership made the schools adopt an identity that was more African or European than Turkish. This dynamic is evident from the local, rather than international, struggle against the expropriation of the Hizmet schools.

The narratives relating to the schools are divergent, however. Many of the sources referenced in this report support the narrative that the Hizmet schools were a direct extension of the Gulen movement that intended to isolate Turkey and the AKP with a view to overthrow the government. Others support the counter-narrative that the movement and the schools are facing persecution by the Turkish government as part of its campaign for political dominance and disregard for human rights. This report advances this counter-narrative, noting the Turkish government’s escalation of propaganda against Gulen and the Hizmet schools abroad, which recalled the pre-existing fears of terrorism and instability pervasive throughout Africa and Europe. The establishment of the Maarif Foundation furthered these fears by instilling within societies where Hizmet had been successful the idea that Hizmet schools disseminated anti-government sentiment and provided a poor quality of education. The Foundation offered its own Maarif schools as an alternative, claiming they were both educationally superior and more aligned with host countries’ political goals. But the reality is that the Foundation is an extended arm of the Erdogan regime that aims to eradicate the Hizmet system, regain control over foreign relations, and acquire influence over other countries and dignitaries under the auspices of foreign civil society.

 

[i] Toguslu, E. (2017) ‘The Turbulence between AKP and Hizmet: The African Case’. Centre for Hizmet Studies, p. 9; see also BBC (2016) ‘Tukey coup: What is Gulen movement and what does it want?’. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846 [Accessed 09/07/2022]; see also Norton, J. & Kasapoglu, C. (2016) ‘Turkey’s post-coup crackdown hits ‘Gulen schools’ worldwide’. BBC. Available online from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37422822 [Accessed 09/07/2022].

[ii] Toguslu, pp. 8-9.

[iii] Ibid., pp. 10-11 & 13; see also Dipama, S. & Dal, E. P. (2019) ‘Assessing the Turkish “Trading State” in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Dal, E. P. (eds.) (2019) Turkey’s Political Economy in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham., pp. 250-253; see also Angey, G. (2018) ‘The Gulen Movement and the Transfer of a Political Conflict from Turkey to Senegal’. Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 19(1), p. 53 (“By 2013, the Gülen Movement had over 100 schools in 50-odd countries across Africa and was collaborating closely with the Turkish state on the ground.”)

[iv] Toguslu, pp. 16-17; see also Akgun, B. & Ozkan, M. (2020) ‘Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Foundation’. Insight Turkey, Vol. 22(1), p. 60.

[v] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021a) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation took over 216 Gulen-linked schools in 44 countries, chairman says’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-maarif-foundation-took-over-216-gulen-linked-schools-in-44-countries-chairman-says/ [Accessed 16/07/2022] (In order to dissuade his followers regarding these charges, Erdogan began designated the Gulen movement as a terrorist organisation, and that these charges are merely a conspiracy to take down and usurp the government).

[vi] Dr. Sezgin likens Erdogan to Mephisto from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust, explaining that Erdogan’s corrupt nature could have stopped much earlier but instead progressed towards the pinnacle moment when he felt the zeal of the public supporting him and recognized that without support, he would face persecution. The series of charges led to Erdogan committing still more corruption and criminal activity, feeding his growing paranoia and need to collect constant intelligence, growing into a vicious cycle of corruption, crimes, and lies.

[vii] Ibid., p. 7-8; see also Angey, pp. 57-58; see also Akgun & Ozkan, pp. 64-65; see also Stockholm Center for Freedom (2018) ‘Erdogan’s Islamist Maarif Foundation pushes further to replace Gulen science schools in Africa’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/erdogans-islamist-maarif-foundation-pushes-further-to-replace-gulen-science-schools-in-africa/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[viii] Toguslu, p. 19.

[ix] Ibid.; see also Angey, p. 58.

[x] Abstract taken from the official law: https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/turkey/3393423/turkey-maarif-foundation-law.html [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xi] Toguslu, p.; Angey, p. 59.

[xii] Toguslu, pp. 19 & 20 19 (the author notes that “What the Education Ministry should be doing is being handed over to a foundation” which further indicates that the government wishes to continue acting via actors that hold a semi-public status of not exactly representing the government but still carrying out the tacitly approved conduct of its public officials); see also Angey, pp. 59-60; see also Akgun & Ozkan, p. 65 (Despite the nature of propaganda in this article, it is interesting to see how the domestic perspective of the Gulen movement’s and Hizmet schools’ respective images. It state that “In the past, the brand of ‘Turkish schools’ abroad was mostly used, popularized and even hijacked by FETO” and that the Foundation’s activities aim at “reclaiming [the] educational soft power for Turkey.”)

[xiii] Toguslu, p. 21; see also Angey, pp. 60-61; see also Donelli, p. 10; see also Tigli, I. et al. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation takes over2nd FETO-linked school in Ethiopia’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkeys-maarif-takes-over-2nd-feto-linked-school-in-ethiopia/2305135 [Accessed 10/07/2022]; see also Daily Sabah (2021) ‘Tukey’s Maarif Foundation takes over all FETO schools in Ethiopia’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkeys-maarif-foundation-takes-over-all-feto-schools-in-ethiopia [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xiv] Angey, p. 60; see also Dipama & Dal, pp. 245-246, 249, and 257-263.

[xv] Daily Sabah (2016) ‘Maarif Foundation takes over FETO schools in Gabon’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/12/22/maarif-foundation-take-over-feto-schools-in-gabon [Accessed 10/07/2022]

[xvi] Halil, I. & Kazanci, H. (2017) ‘Turkey takes over FETO terror group schools in Chad’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-takes-over-feto-terror-group-schools-in-chad/1014315 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] Paksoy, Y. (2017) ‘FETO-free era of national education begins in Guinea’. Daily Sabah. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/02/02/feto-free-era-of-national-education-begins-in-guinea [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xix] Yuzbasioglu, N. (2017) ‘Burundi transferring FETO schools to Turkish Foundation’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burundi-transferring-feto-schools-to-turkish-foundation/908418 [Accessed 10/07/2022]; see also Tih, F. K. (2017) ‘Burundi to transfer FETO schools to Turkey’s Maarif’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burundi-to-transfer-feto-schools-to-turkey-s-maarif/825981 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xx] Daily Sabah (2017) ‘Djibouti gives Turkey’s Maarif Foundation green light to build schools’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/education/2017/03/07/djibouti-gives-turkeys-maarif-foundation-green-light-to-build-schools [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xxi] Stockholm Centre for Freedom (2018).

[xxii] Durul, T. (2018) ‘FETO-linked school in E.Guinea handed over to Maarif Foundation’. Anadolu Agency. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/feto-linked-school-in-eguinea-handed-over-to-maarif-foundation/1255942 [Accessed 10/07/2022].

[xxiii] Turkiye Maarif Vakfi (2019) ‘Official Opening of Maarif Schools in Cameroun’. Available online from: https://turkiyemaarif.org/post/7-official-opening-of-maarif-schools-in-cameroun-615?lang=en [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxiv] Tigli, I. et al. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif takes over 2nd FETO-linked school in Ethiopia’. Available online from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkeys-maarif-takes-over-2nd-feto-linked-school-in-ethiopia/2305135 [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxv] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021b) ‘Turkey’s Maarif Foundation illegally seized German-run schools in Ethiopia, says manager’. Available online from: https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-maarif-foundation-illegally-seized-german-run-school-in-ethiopia-says-manager/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Ibid.

[xxviii] Daily Sabah (2021).

[xxix] Daily Sabah (2019) ‘Maarif Foundation opens its first school in EU’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2019/09/18/maarif-foundation-opens-its-first-school-in-eu [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxx] Stockholm Center for Freedom (2021a).

[xxxi] Usta, B. (2021) ‘Turkey’s Maarif resumes activities at full speed, taking over 214 schools across world’. Available online from: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkeys-maarif-resumes-activities-at-full-speed-taking-over-214-schools-across-world [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxii] Toguslu, p. 21.

[xxxiii] Turkiye Maarif Vakfi.

[xxxiv] Toguslu, p. 21; see also Pitel, L. (2021) ‘Erdogan’s great game: Soldiers, spies and Turkey’s quest for power’. Financial Times. Available online from: https://www.ft.com/content/8052b8aa-62b9-40c9-a40c-d7187d5cd98a [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also San, S. (2021) ‘Turkish spies are abducting Erdogan’s political opponents abroad’. Open Democracy. Available online from: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/turkish-spies-are-abducting-erdogans-political-opponents-abroad/ [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also Vidino, L. (2019) ‘Erdogan’s Long Arm in Europe’. Foreign Policy. Available online from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/07/erdogans-long-arm-in-europe-germany-netherlands-milli-gorus-muslim-brotherhood-turkey-akp/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxv] Akgun & Ozkan, p. 68.

[xxxvi] Toguslu, pp. 21-22; see also Angey, pp. 62 & 65; see also Donelli, p. 7.

[xxxvii] Toguslu, p. 22; see also Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (2018) ‘Result from PISA 2018 – Turkey’. Available online from: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_CN_TUR.pdf [Accessed 16/07/2022]; see also Nordic Monitor (2019) ‘Turkey’s Ensar Foundation, caught up in child sexual abuse, became OIC partner’. Available online from: https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/09/turkeys-ensar-foundation-caught-up-in-child-sexual-abuse-became-oic-partner/ [Accessed 16/07/2022].

[xxxviii] Toguslu, pp. 23-24; see also Stockholm Center for Freedom (2018)

[xxxix] Toguslu, pp. 22-23 & 24.

[xl] Angey, p. 65.

[xli] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[xlii] Daily Sabah (2021); see also Dipama & Dal, p. 260.

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Summary of North Macedonia 2022 Report

Accompanying document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

Writer: Paul Schamp

Editor: Olga Ruiz Pilato

 

  • Despite improvements in the legal framework, action to provide equal access to education for children with disabilities is at an early stage.
  • More work and legislation are required for the protection of educational rights of boys and girls in educational-correctional facilities
    • Boys in juvenile educational-correctional facility near Tetovo did have access to education between September 2021 and June 2022, but conditions have improved.
    • Girls in the educational-correctional facility in the female ward of Idrizovo prison have not had appropriate education for a year. Legislation should be amended to find long-term solutions for educational-correctional measures for girls.
  • Progress in Roma inclusion through Roma inclusion strategy 2020-2030
    • Strategy does not address participation, empowerment and capacity-building
    • No systematic response to address street children
    • No measures taken to prevent irregular attendance of Roma children in primary education, and no measures to reintegrate students who are not enrolled or who have left without completing it.
    • Segregation in schools remains high
  • The education of asylum-seeking children in primary schools needs improvement
    • Additionally, no systematic Macedonian language and extracurricular classes are offered to foster an easy transition between education levels, older children continue to miss education opportunities due to these gaps.
  • Improvements in reforming education curricula and reducing skills mismatches is hampered by lack of funding and capacity
    • Progressed well in terms of number of people with higher educational attainment, however curricula are not well suited to equip graduates with necessary skills to match labor demand
    • State financial support is insufficient
    • Coordination between education sector and businesses is weak
    • Public spending on education and training amounted to 3.3% of GDP in 2020 compared to an average of 3.75 of GDP in the past five years. However, it has increased to 3.76% of GDP in 2021.
      • This is below the EU level of 5% and below peer-country averages
    • Education spending is inefficiently distributed between municipalities on account of outdated formulas for redistribution of public education funds
  • In 2022, care and education are delivered in 77 public and 30 private kindergartens
  • North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of education, but limited progress was made in the reporting period
    • Still impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic
    • Implementation of the 2018-2025 education strategy is slow
    • Slow development of a proper monitoring system
  • Recommendations from last year’s report were only partially addressed. In particular, North Macedonia should
    • Adopt the vocational education and training (VET) law and establish and operate the regional VET centers.
    • Finalize and adopt the law for adult education
    • Improve access to quality education for all, in particular children with disabilities and Roma children
  • Enrollment remains low
    • Only 45% of children from 3-6 years of age in North Macedonia were enrolled in licensed childhood education institutions (2020-2021)
      • Slight improvement to the previous year.
    • Enrollment in higher education remains low. The number of students enrolled in the first year of studies has been declining in the last 3 years
    • However, the number of ROMA students enrolled in higher education rose from 46% to 52% in the last three years.

Cover image : https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/North-Macedonia/North-Macedonia-new-premier-new-European-perspectives-215366